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Abstract 
 
This dissertation studies the way that shame can be a pharmakon—a toxic affect 
or an intoxicating form—with as much potential to heal as it has to harm. I argue that shame 
informs, inspires, and limits contemporary forms of autobiography. I begin and end the 
dissertation with works of literary criticism that are loosely autobiographical 
autobiographical. Ann Cvetkovich's Depression: A Public Feeling and Kate Zambreno's 
Heroines both aim to rebut traditional forms of literary criticism by writing in the form of 
memoir, thus generating a protective enclave for identities they call ‘minor’ (queer in the case 
of Cvetkovich, female in the case of Zambreno). Sheila Heti's How Should a Person Be? and 
Ben Lerner's Leaving the Atocha Station fictionalize their autobiographies thus questioning 
on both a fictional and a metafictional level whether or not anything—art, in particular—can 
have meaning. Maggie Nelson’s Bluets traces the shame of heartbreak, depression and 
longing across two hundred and forty propositions, all of which are in hot pursuit of 
something blue. Anne Carson's Nox articulates the various shames of personality, subjectivity 
and identification, but also how writing itself can gesture to a less domesticated kind of 
shame: to the physiology of a book that blushes, averts its gaze, hunches its shoulders. In the 
end, we return to literary criticism, and find shame at the very farthest reaches of subjectivity, 
where the subject, literary critic Timothy Bewes, writes about shame as an event in the 
context of the postcolonial. Taken together, these works start to paint a portrait of a self (and 
of a critic) that is better described in terms such as ‘becoming’ where subjectivity has about it 
something contingent or temporary, a kind of self, in other words, that has relinquished much 
of its authority and therefore its capacity to dominate. The effect of these works is a 
collective overturning of the subject as a starting point for ethics primarily because such a 
move seems necessary if we ever want to escape the subject-object structure that has 
supported centuries of systemic inequality. 
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Introduction 
 
This most personal and solitary of emotions cements us into a social 
world, even as its experience is intensely isolating.  
Timothy Bewes, The Event of Postcolonial Shame 
 
…a text cannot belong to no genre, it cannot be without or less a 
genre. Every text participates in one or several genres, there is no 
genreless text; there is always a genre and genres, yet such 
participation never amounts to belonging.  
Jacques Derrida, "The Law of Genre" 
 
 No matter where it comes from, nor how long it lasts, nor even if one thinks of it as a 
feeling—like sadness— or a form—like the novel—shame is a figure of inadequacy and 
isolation in the midst of what matters most. American literary theorist Eve K. Sedgwick 
describes shame’s paradoxical movement as one that pulls us in opposing directions: “toward 
painful individuation, toward uncontrollable relationality" (Touching Feeling 36). Shame’s 
oppositional forces pull us apart, rendering us open, exposed, and vulnerable. It is typical to 
think of shame in association with social failures such as weakness or deviance, but this 
dissertation looks at the way shame expands far beyond such categories. There are individual 
shames which reflect society’s imprint and those which are utterly idiosyncratic, reflecting 
the special hopes and dreams we have for ourselves and the way we, perhaps too often, 
betray them. Sedgwick beautifully describes shame’s flexibility: 
Shame…is not a discrete intrapsychic structure, but a kind of free radical that (in 
different people and also in different cultures) attaches to and permanently 
intensifies or alters the meaning of—of almost anything: a zone of the body, a 
sensory system, a prohibited or indeed a permitted behavior, another affect such 
as anger or arousal, a named identity, a script for interpreting other people’s 
behavior toward oneself. (Touching Feeling 62) 
Sedgwick captures shame’s radical flexibility here, but slips up, it seems, on the question of 
permanence. While it is absolutely true that there are shames that endure for our whole lives, 
at other times the blush has barely reddened before the matter has come to a close. Indeed, 
sometimes a shame that has threatened to mark us forever can imperceptibly transform, 
dissipating, perhaps, or becoming later, a point of pride.  
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 There are shames we adopt as we age, and shames that we grow out of. We can as 
easily feel shame for standing out as for blending in, for speaking up as for staying quiet. We 
can feel ashamed of not being our authentic selves or ashamed of believing that there is such 
a thing. We can feel ashamed of being an oppressed class or of knowing we are among the 
oppressors; sometimes we are both at once. Sometimes shame hides in the shadows. 
Sometimes shame gives shape to writing by insisting on what cannot be said; in such cases, 
we can call shame a form. At other times it is absolutely a feeling and that feeling says 
‘withdraw,’ or ‘look away,’ or ‘run.’ Whenever it emerges—and it can emerge anywhere at 
anytime—shame reveals our deepest attachments and how we forsake them.  
 Fundamental to this dissertation are four interrelated propositions. First, that 
contemporary understandings of selfhood are moving away from the idea that who we are 
relates to a fundamental, unchanging core self. Second, that shame emerges in our most 
intimate relations. Third, that shame feels the injustice of structural inequalities, such as 
between races, classes, genders, nations, or even between the so-called ‘First’ and ‘Third’ 
Worlds. Fourth, that shame is as much a figure of writing as it is a feeling that one writes 
about. What these propositions share is an essential binary structure. At its simplest, we could 
describe the binary as a division between the self and the other. Self and Other are 
notoriously flexible, but within the binary structure, one thing is constant: Self and Other are 
adversaries, not allies. As this relates to the four propositions undergirding this dissertation, 
we can say that shame emerges as a discord between myself and my ideal self or myself and 
my lover; or between men and women, or the colonizer and the colonized; or between the 
writer and what is written. This last example is most apparent in the case of autobiography 
where writing instigates a separation between the self-that-writes and the self-that-emerges-
in-the-writing, but we see the same in literary criticism, where the self-other divide is 
manifest between the critic and the author. Shame is the figure that cleaves these binaries: 
just as it insists on a chasm between them, it also holds out for a bridge. 
 This dissertation explores the way shame emerges in a variety of loosely 
autobiographical works, all of which are concerned with the state of the world and the crisis 
of inequity captured by terms like racism, capitalism, and the postcolonial. The self-other 
binary undergirds all such inequities. The works here are concerned with overcoming that 
binary and one of the formal ways they seek to do this is by deftly mixing autobiography with 
other genres. We will see autobiography blended with literary criticism, fiction, poetry and 
the lyric essay. In some of these works the mixed genre approach speaks to a hope that is 
invested in autobiographical work—the hope that it might be more authentic, ethical, or 
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political by virtue of the personal voice. In others, the mixed genre approach speaks to 
suspicions about such beliefs. Because autobiography as a form is unavoidably self-
reflective, it is the ideal form for tracking the way shame works in writing. This is especially 
true when looking at how writers seek to overcome the shame of living in an unjust world. I 
will describe these works in detail at the end of the introduction.  
 That shame is implied in all writing, but particularly writing about the self, may not 
be entirely self-evident. Perhaps the most powerful example is that of Primo Levi, one of the 
most eloquent narrators of the Holocaust. Levi was an Italian Jew, a chemist, and a writer. 
His 1947 If This is a Man describes the year he spent as a prisoner in Auschwitz. Giorgio 
Agamben describes Levi as the “perfect example of a witness,”(16) but Levi’s own thoughts 
on the matter prove more complicated. In a memoir, Levi described himself as having 
“acquired the vice of writing,” and in Timothy Bewes’ account of Levi’s relationship to 
writing, writing about the Holocaust did not free him of his shame of survival but rather 
manifest it. Witnessing was not an ethical act but rather the inevitable fallout for a figure (a 
writer) who had survived because of an ethical lack. Every eloquent passage was a 
manifestation of the unfair fact of his survival. This may be the most poignant example of the 
way shame can manifest in writing, but there are other ways as well. 
 To the extent that a writer upholds truthfulness as a value, any attempt to write about 
the self will manifest shame. A true account of a whole life would require many lifetimes of 
writing, as exemplified by American poet-laureate Kenneth Goldsmith’s Fidget—which 
records his every physical action for a 24 hour period—an example that illustrates not only 
the futility of attempts at a true representation of life, but also how boring such unstructured 
representations can be. French ethnographer, Michel Leiris, also made valiant attempts at an 
autobiography which would expose everything, yet as with Goldsmith, the attempt is so 
thorough, so unrelenting (four volumes worth) that the work reads more as an interrogation of 
the form of autobiography than an example of it (Bewes). One of the oft-quoted theorists of 
autobiography—Philip LeJeune—formulated a definition of the genre, saying it should be: “a 
retrospective prose narrative produced by a real person concerning his own existence, 
focusing on his individual life, in particular on the development of his personality" (Lejeune 
qtd. in Anderson 2), yet he provided the caveat that: “a certain ‘latitude’ in classifying 
particular cases might be admitted but one condition for autobiography was absolute: there 
must be ‘identity between the author, the narrator, and the protagonist" (Lejeune qtd. in 
Anderson 2). All of the works this dissertation considers demand more than a “certain 
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latitude,” as all take issue with the limitations of genre, and not only those of autobiography, 
but of fiction, poetry, and criticism as well. 
 
Genre as a source of Shame 
 
  One interesting indicator of how genre itself can be a source of shame is the legalistic 
language in which descriptions of it have been cast. Lejeune’s book is called Le Pacte 
autobiographique, suggesting that a writer of autobiography has a sort of contractual 
obligation towards the reader. Similarly, in his “The Law of Genre,” Derrida writes, “I have 
let myself be commanded by the law of our encounter, by the convention of our subject, 
notably the genre, the law of genre. This law…assigned us places and limits. Even though I 
have launched an appeal against this law, it was she who turned my appeal into a 
confirmation of her own glory" (80). Earlier in that article, Derrida describes genre in terms 
that would be familiar to any theorist of shame: “Thus as soon as genre announces itself, one 
must respect a norm, one must not cross a line of demarcation, one must not risk impurity, 
anomaly, or monstrosity" (57). A failure to conform to the law of genre leads to a monstrous 
thing, an anomaly that might be a source of shame. Yet, for another writer, such monstrosities 
could as easily be a point of pride.  
 In autobiography, shame can emerge in at least three ways. It can emerge through the 
shame of the events narrated, through the inherent discrepancy between the self that writes 
and the self that emerges on the page; or even in the way ones autobiography might fail to 
uphold the demands of the genre. Shame also emerges as an important theme in literary 
criticism and academic writing. Literary critics can shame each other, literary critics can 
shame the writers they discuss, and writers can shame literary critics. Yet, words alone 
cannot shame.  
 The words only sting when they come from an individual that one respects. Let us 
consider several manifestations of this dynamic. Sedgwick wrote about the way that literary 
critics often wrote in a tone of “Shame on You!” when evaluating earlier criticism:  
The moralistic hygiene by which any reader of today is unchallengeably entitled 
to condescend to the thought of any moment in the past (maybe especially the 
recent past) is globally available to anyone who masters the application of two or 
three discrediting questions. (Touching Feeling 117)  
This implicit “Shame on You!” could castigate an earlier generation of critics who had, 
perhaps, written from an implicitly colonial or sexist perspective. They might also shame 
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writers if they thought their depictions of race or class were derogatory or malignant. But 
shame appears in much more subtle ways, too. Mari Ruti writes from the perspective of an 
academic who is sometimes shamed by the overly difficult writing typical to her profession, 
where “convoluted rhetoric hides the fact that the concepts being presented are not, in the 
final analysis, very difficult at all" (xi). Perhaps to soften the potentially shaming tone of her 
words, she writes, 
Thinkers in my field—contemporary theory—tend to be proud of the 
impenetrability of its rhetoric, and with good reason, for they see this 
impenetrability as a theoretical intervention in its own right; exasperated by the 
notion that meaning should be transparent and easy to process, they often 
intentionally create an opaque textual surface in order to force the reader to 
grapple with the ways in which meaning is never obvious but open to a variety of 
interpretations. (The Call of Character x-xi)  
The writer Geoff Dyer, with characteristic hubris, hyperbole, and humor, has complained that 
academic writing “Kills everything it touches!”(Janes). We laugh because somewhere in 
there, something about Dyer’s claims ring true, though the opposite can also be true: 
academic writing can often enliven, inspire, and enlighten. 
 In Canada, a debate about positive versus negative reviewing emerged in 2013, with 
poet and philosopher Jan Zwicky writing a robust defense of her policy of writing only 
positive reviews: 
The discipline of the appreciative review is, I believe, among the great unsung arts 
of our culture. I suspect it remains unsung because, appearances to the contrary, it 
is not actually a species of speaking, but a species of listening; and our culture 
tends to regard listening as a passive activity….[But] we are a culture, perhaps a 
species, drunk on a narrow notion of assertiveness and virility. We are also a 
culture, perhaps a species, many of whose individuals are obsessed with 
rank…These twin addictions, as visible in the contemporary university as in the 
military, lead us to suspect those with a gift for listening as ‘soft,’ and to celebrate 
those with a taste for volubly dispensing judgement as ‘tough.’(“The Ethics” 
n.pag) 
In all of these cases, the potential for shame is highly contingent upon a feeling of respect, 
interest, or admiration between the one who shames and the one being ‘shamed.’ Not all 
criticism is shaming, of course. Some critical attention—even of the negative sort—is, itself, 
an indication of respect. To the degree that someone we respect has noted our failings in a 
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domain that matters to us, we will feel shame, but we might also feel pride at having garnered 
their attention at all. An academic who doesn’t care about beautiful writing will pay little 
heed to Dyer and Ruti, and a critic of the colonial era, such as Matthew Arnold, wouldn’t turn 
over in his grave at the thought of later generation’s accusations of colonial pieties. There is 
nothing in this world that is inherently shameful. Yet shame does have a fairly predictable 
structure. 
 
A Philosophical Shame: Shame as Structure in Being and Nothingness 
 
 In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre described shame within a tripartite 
structure that we will return to throughout the dissertation. There, Sartre summarizes the 
structure in a manner that could be paraphrased as: I am ashamed of myself before the Other 
(351). In a section entitled “The Look,” shame is dependent on self, other, and perception. 
Perception is an important addition to the binary structure I described above. While within 
the specialized world of high theory, it is practically a truism that systems of inequality are 
based upon a binary structure of self-other, such a structure only exists with the added 
element of perception. One must perceive the other. Perception doesn’t automatically lead to 
shame, of course; it can also lead to love, appreciation, and recognition. Without perception, 
however, shame doesn’t exist. Perception makes the self-other binary possible. Shame is not, 
in Sartre’s account, a register of wrong-doing nor of weakness. It is simply a register of being 
a subject in the world, of existing in what Sartre calls a state of fallenness. Sartre’s account of 
shame is one that theorists repeatedly return to, perhaps because of the way it does not 
impose a value system: “Shame, according to Sartre, does not hang on the nature of the self, 
but simply on its production as a self; the relation of shame to guilt is purely incidental, an 
association produced by the newly individuated subject out of the structures of social, 
psychological, and ethical interpretation" (Bewes, The Event 164). This structural way of 
understanding shame frees it from much of its social, psychological, moral, and theological 
attachments. It illustrates the way these attachments are contingent rather than universal.  
 Throughout Being and Nothingness, Sartre elaborates his philosophy through 
evocative scenes involving named characters and familiar locations such as cafes and parks. 
In “The Look,” Sartre defines the other as “the one who looks at me" (345) and the look as 
that which is manifest in the other’s eyes, “the convergence of two ocular globes in my 
direction" (346). Yet we can notice ourselves being the subject of a look in other moments 
too, such as  
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when there is a rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstep followed by 
silence, or the slight opening of a shutter, or a light movement of a curtain. During 
an attack men who are crawling through the brush apprehend as a look to be 
avoided, not two eyes, but a white farmhouse which is outlined against the sky at 
the top of a little hill. (Sartre 346) 
The slight tremor in a bush behind us indicates the probability that we are being watched. I 
mention these because they exemplify the potential for shame, if not shame itself. These 
moments capture vulnerability: 
What I apprehend immediately when I hear the branches crackling behind me is 
not that there is someone there; it is that I am vulnerable, that I have a body which 
can be hurt, that I occupy a place and that I can not in any case escape from the 
space in which I am without defense—in short, that I am seen. (Sartre 347) 
The look, in Sartre’s description, is what first makes me aware of myself. Sartre asks: “What 
does being seen mean for me?" (347) What we want to know is at what point does the 
awareness of being seen constitute shame?  
 In order to explore the answers to this question, Sartre gives an account of himself 
watching a scene through a keyhole. He is alone in a hallway, in a state of pure observation: 
“a pure mode of losing myself in the world, of causing myself to be drunk in by things as ink 
is by a blotter" (348). This is a moment of pure freedom because he is not conscious of 
himself: “I am my own nothingness" (348). The spectacle on the other side of the door 
absorbs him completely, though he tells us nothing about it. When the sound of someone’s 
footsteps are suddenly heard behind him, he loses this freedom: “Someone is looking at me!" 
(349). What does it mean?  
It means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications 
appear in my structure—modifications which I can apprehend and fix 
conceptually by means of the reflective cogito…It is this irruption of the self 
which has been most often described: I see myself because somebody sees me. 
(Sartre 349)  
The foundation of the self becomes external—“I am for myself only as a pure reference to the 
Other" (349). And there, “It is shame or pride which reveals to me the Other’s look and 
myself at the end of that look" (350). It is important to note just how neutral Sartre is in this 
moment: he has been caught, but both shame and pride are possible.  
 When he does define shame, it is when we agree with the judgements of the Other: 
“shame of self; it is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the Other is 
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looking at and judging. I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become 
a given object" (350). Sartre describes this as a moment where our selfhood escapes us 
entirely—it is a flight without limit towards the Other—but also as a moment where the look 
of the Other situates us in the world, and I agree to be so situated. “Shame reveals to me that I 
am this being" (351), I “apprehend myself as seen in the world and from the standpoint of the 
world" (353) such that “behold now I am somebody!" (353). Prior to having been observed 
by the person whose footsteps he heard, he was nothingness; being perceived made him 
somebody. Being perceived is what drops us into the world, into community, and into a 
situation where we become somebody. We might even say that being observed is a kind of 
gift—being observed gives us a position in the world. In writing, we become two figures at 
once: the self crouched at the keyhole and the self responsible for the footsteps in the hall. In 
writing, therefore, we give that gift to ourselves, as does anyone who reads us. Pride, 
recognition, fear, and shame: all of these are possible, and more.  
 When does being observed by another become shame as it is colloquially used? 
When, that is, does shame start to resemble the negative feelings of embarrassment, 
ostracization, and isolation? Shame has been called the most paradoxical of emotions because 
even though it feels intensely isolating, we only feel isolated in the midst of community. We 
only feel shame as a negative emotion when we are alienated from a community with which 
we would like to belong. To return to the earlier examples I gave, writers may experience 
shame as a failure to express oneself: we feel that language is failing us when we have a 
sense of what language could do, if only it would. As a subject in a world characterized by 
racism or capitalism, we can feel shame if we see these systems as unfair, if we believe that 
the world’s advantaged and disadvantaged are arbitrarily so: that we could as easily have 
been them, that they could have been us. Shame is the feeling that tells us how isolated we 
are, and how deeply we want not to be. Shame believes that isolation can be overcome. For 
shame to be shame, it must also be hope. 
 While Sartre’s account provides a fascinating and seemingly incontrovertible 
description of the structure of shame, this thesis will gradually pursue an undoing of the self-
other structure. One way of thinking of this is as a gradual move away from binary structures 
in general. Another way of thinking about this is as a move away from the digital on-off 
understanding of feelings towards something more analogue.1 We can trace the beginnings of 
                                                
1 For a fascinating discussion of the way Silvan Tomkins affect systems works analogously to both 
the digital on/off and the analogue gradations of the pre-digital era, please see Eve Sedgwick and 
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this movement in the work of psychologist Silvan Tomkins and in his two most important 
proponents, the literary theorists Eve K. Sedgwick and Adam Frank. Their study of Tomkins’ 
work led to the 1995 publication of Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader, and it is 
in that year that we might say that the turn to affect in literary studies, as well as elsewhere, 
began. Tomkins’ three-volume work, Affect Imagery Consciousness, laid the theoretical 
groundwork for the study of affect (a term which I will distinguish from emotion shortly). In 
Tomkins’ schema, there are eight affects, all of which can be felt in a range of intensities. 
Those affects, listed from low-to-high intensity are: enjoyment-joy, interest-excitement, 
surprise-startle, anger-rage, distress-anguish, fear-terror, shame-humiliation, and contempt-
disgust. Tomkins described shame as an affect that partially diminishes the positive affects of 
enjoyment-joy or interest-excitement. Nevertheless, as we move forward in the present work, 
shame will be less and less something we would describe in terms of emotion or feeling, and 
more something we would describe in terms of literary form. 
 
Affect, Emotion, Intensity 
  
 In conjunction with the move away from emotion towards form, we will also see a 
move away from narration and into forms that provide less connective tissue between their 
constituent parts. A fundamental distinction within the language of feelings is that which 
theorists make between affect and emotion. The body of work whose genealogy traces back 
to Silvan Tomkins’ Affect Imagery Consciousness, tends to maintain a stronger link between 
subjectivity and affect. The body of work whose genealogy includes Spinoza, Henri Bergson, 
Deleuze and Guattari, is exemplified by Brian Massumi’s work in Parables of the Virtual, 
where it is possible to think of Affect as something entirely separate from the human body 
that feels, or the human consciousness that is able to describe it. In Parables for the Virtual, 
Massumi gives us a useful distinction between what is generally referred to as emotion and 
affect. In his language, both are affect, but the latter is “intensity,” and the former is 
“emotion,” 
Intensity is…a nonconscious, never-to-be-conscious autonomic remainder. It is 
outside expectation and adaptation, as disconnected from meaningful sequencing, 
from narration, as it is from vital function. It is narratively delocalized, spreading over 
                                                                                                                                                  
Adam Frank’s “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins” in Touching Feeling 93-
121. 
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the generalized body surface like a lateral backwash from the function-meaning 
interloops that travel the vertical path between head and heart. (Massumi 25)  
Affect, in Massumi, is nonconscious, rather than say, pre-conscious, something which signals 
not only his break from the Freudian psyche, but also his kinship with Deleuze and Guatarri, 
and furthermore, to Henri Bergson. Affect is, in this description, the supersaturated 
experience of being in the world that registers without naming, perceives without declaring. It 
is the hum, crackle, sparkle, glow, heat, fizz, scent, ache, buzz, tension, fullness, brilliance, 
connection, in short, the intensity, of swallowing the world whole. This affect is not 
explained, elicited, or experienced within the cause and effect sequencing of narration.  
 In contrast, Massumi defines Affect-as-Emotion as a kind of domestication. With 
Affect-as-Emotion, the intensity of the supersaturated experience is tamed through 
classifications such as happy, sad, ashamed, frightened and is tied to the time-bound 
experiences of a self who feels. Such emotional states are often understood as feelings that 
develop in the context of narrative. They anticipate, respond to, predict, expect, and cause 
across a temporal plane. Cognitive psychologist Keith Oatley, author of Emotions: A Brief 
History, agrees:  
emotions are most typically caused by evaluations—psychologists also call them 
appraisals—of events in relation to what is important to us: our goals, our concerns, 
our aspirations. (Oatley 3) 
One possible way of understanding emotion is that it enlists narration to make meaning of the 
mess of sensations encompassed in Affect. Meaning is created by narration, and narration, as 
every storyteller knows, is selective. A story begins or ends according to the emotional arc 
the story-teller wants to create. (It is for this reason that emotion and story-telling are often 
held to exist in a world distinct from “truth.”) One reason emotion wants to make meaning is 
because it wants to communicate and it wants to limit the range of meanings that story can 
have. Emotion is social, then, in a way that Affect is not. Emotion relies on conventions of 
narrative and language because of that desire to effectively communicate. Massumi describes 
emotion as: 
subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is 
from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the 
conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and 
semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into 
function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. (Massumi 28) 
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We must recognize two aspects of this description. First, emotion is a kind of fixative. 
Consider the way early photography worked: a silver plate was exposed to a scene. The scene 
was abuzz with things that made noise, smelled, were wet or dry, salty or sweet, and radiated 
with light and color. Yet the silver plate registered only the gray-scales of light and dark. The 
electricity and texture, the roar of the traffic or the humidity of the summer morning made no 
impact upon the plate, and once the chemicals had washed over it and the silver ions had 
settled into silver metal, all that remained of the multi-sensory experience was an image from 
which one would take meaning. Narration is that chemical wash; emotion is the resulting 
fixed image. Emotion interprets intensity.  
 Emotion not only speaks the language of narration, but is its result: first we have 
affect, of which we cannot speak, and then there is emotion of which we can. Emotion is 
personal, subjective content. Its intensity is qualified, narrated, and means something. Affect 
is non-conscious, atemporal, belonging not to the meaning-making functions of 
consciousness but to the observant, absorbing capacity of a sensing body in a sensual world. 
This manner of distinguishing affect from emotion is the one most commonly used by 
theorists of feeling (Altieri, Ngai, Oatley, Terada, Tomkins, among others). Thinking of this 
in terms of Sartre at the keyhole, we might say that when he is alone, in a moment of pure 
observation, what he is experiencing is affect; with the footsteps, he is inaugurated into the 
social and into the possibility of emotion. I linger over the nuances of these theoretical 
approaches because I think they suggest ways that shame—as form and as affect—might 
bridge the traditional gaps between self and other.  
 Where theorists differ is in the relative importance they give to subjectivity, to the self 
that feels. One of the perils of considering Affect as centrifugal to human subjectivity, is that 
it can lead to problematic modes of reading (or interpretation) that consider every affective 
element of a text only within the narrative, temporal, subjectivity-grounded modes of Affect-
as-Emotion. We run the risk, as Charles Altieri argues, of “overread[ing] for ‘meaning’ while 
underreading the specific modes of affective engagement presented by works of art" (2). We 
practice what has elsewhere been called “symptomatic reading” and, in the process, mistake 
the clap of thunder and lightening for light only, and the smell of tar for nothing more than 
darkness. Alternatively, a peril associated with the Massumi version of Affect is that it erases 
the particularity of human experience in favor of something supposedly universal, a 
“something” which too often, and too quickly, can look a lot like the objective, universal 
truthfulness of what is ultimately a white, heterosexual, male perspective. What we are after 
here, then, is something that sits, uncomfortably, between the two. The subtlety of the 
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position I am pursuing here is one Sedgwick struggled with, here summarized by Art 
historian Jason Edwards: 
Following Fat Art, Thin Art, Sedgwick grew only more interested in challenging 
both the damagingly static and conservative essentialism of conceptions of the 
core self and the fatuous postmodern suggestion that there are millions of random 
or endlessly proliferative, different ways a person could wear his or her body and 
selfhood (128). 
While it may seem counterintuitive to explore the concept of shame while flouting both the 
notion of the core self and of endlessly proliferative selfhoods, we will find that several of the 
works this dissertation studies do just that. 
 
Kinds of Shame: Shame as Emotion, Shame as Intensity 
 
 Considering shame according to these two models, we will find that, as above, there are 
(loosely) two modes of thinking about shame, one more attached to subjectivity than the 
other. In the first—the path pursued by philosophers Giorgio Agamben, Emanuel Levinas, 
and, with more nuance, by Silvan Tomkins—shame is the affect that is most closely aligned 
with the ideals, aspirations, and values of the self as it exists within society. Tomkins says, 
“In contrast to all other affects, shame is an experience of the self by the self. Shame is the 
most reflexive of affects in that the phenomenological distinction between the subject and 
object of shame is lost” (qtd. in Sedgwick 136). Shame, in this view, signals a discord 
between the experienced self and the values upheld by that self. In more conservative 
societies (or individuals), the values of the self may be more normative and in such cases, the 
expectations of society and the times when one falls short of such expectations are also 
moments where the shamed personality emerges. In this sense, shame always appears in the 
margins, in darkness. The corollary of this subjective understanding of shame is the notion—
best articulated by Psychologist Leon Wurmser—that shame has a protective function. 
Shame’s tendency to withdraw is shame’s way of protecting deviation or, put in more 
positive terms, the idiosyncrasies, status-quo-overturning, creative aspects of an individual 
personality. Withdrawal permits a creative distance in which such idiosyncrasies can flourish 
undisturbed before emerging—again, as Wurmser would say—heroically, in defiance of 
society’s restrictive norms. Shame’s anti-social nature makes it an incubator for individuals 
who can then become society’s most challenging provocateurs—be they within scientific, 
spiritual, social or artistic realms.  
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Shame considered along the lines of Affect-as-Intensity is a more challenging 
proposition. Timothy Bewes, in The Event of Postcolonial Shame argues that shame is 
peculiarly resistant to the logic of symptomatology: of cause and effect. If we 
translate this resistance to the register of literary interpretation, [we find that]…. A 
work that affects us with shame is a work that cannot be contained in a mere reading; 
something else, some event, is taking place that is not reducible to the personality 
writing, nor to the personality reading, nor to the historical circumstances in which the 
text was composed, nor to the events it depicts, nor to any combination of these. 
(Bewes 22) 
Even as the thesis that shame is identical to the self that feels is a compelling one, Bewes 
argumentation here demands that we think of shame not only within the constraints of Affect-
as-Emotion but also as Massumi described it, as Affect-as-Intensity. 
Shame is a figure not of the intimacy of the self to itself—or at least, if that is so, 
it is the very discontinuity of the self, its otherness to itself, that is emblematized 
in that relation. Shame, far from being a figure of self-identity, is a figure of 
incommensurability. It is experienced when we are treated as something or 
someone—a foreigner, a personality type, an ethical person, a generous spirit, a 
human being, an animal, an alien—that is incommensurable with our own 
experience. (Bewes 23) 
Shame as emotion is tied to selfhood, but Shame as Affect is not. As this relates to literary 
interpretation, then, an attention to shame requires not only an attention to the personality that 
writes, the personality that reads, and the personalities depicted in the work, but also to that 
which cannot be summarized by the bounds of subjectivity and emotion, that which can only 
be noted in the sounds, sentences, and structural choices we call form. 
Key ideas in Silvan Tomkins and Leon Wurmser 
 While a variety of theorists have nourished my understanding of shame, Tomkins and 
Wurmser have been extraordinarily important. As is likely already evident, Eve K. 
Sedgwick’s insightful observations and use of Tomkins’ work, not to mention her own 
original contributions to the study of shame, have also been of utmost importance. Several 
key aspects of their thought will recur in this thesis, including the relationship of shame to 
positive affects, the role of shame theories, and the way shame safeguards our dignity. In her 
characteristically sharp summary of Tomkins, Sedgwick writes, “Without positive affect, 
there can be no shame: only a scene that offers you enjoyment or engages your interest can 
make you blush. Similarly, only something you thought might delight or satisfy can disgust" 
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(Touching Feeling 116). Shame only emerges as a feeling in the places we want to belong—
places that have interested us, places that have provided or promised enjoyment. What makes 
shame feel so horrid is partly the mistake we made in hoping for interest or joy and partly the 
ongoingness of that hope. In Tomkins words, shame is 
an affect of relatively high toxicity, that…strikes deepest into the heart of man, 
that… is felt as a sickness of the soul which leaves man naked, defeated, 
alienated, and lacking in dignity….Man is not only an anxious and a suffering 
animal, but is above all a shy animal, easily caught and impaled between longing 
and despair. (387) 
Shame describes how it feels to be caught in the purgatory between isolation and 
communion. When we are in the hallway with Sartre hunched in an inelegant posture at the 
keyhole, we are absolutely alone; with the footsteps behind us, we have the possibility of 
communion. We are dependent on the other for the possibility of belonging, but that 
wonderful possibility comes with the risk of shame. When we think of this in terms of 
writing, a self-other binary is created between the writer and what is written, but also between 
writing and the reader or critic. Using Tomkins’ language, we can think about reading and 
writing in terms he described as a shame theory. 
 
 Because this dissertation is interested in shame, it enacts what Tomkins would have 
called a high shame theory: I have been on the lookout for shame, have read for it and 
presumed its presence even when it didn’t want to be found. Tomkins idea of affect theories 
can apply to any affect—joy-interest, distress-despair, shame-humiliation. These theories 
work as interpretive filters. An affect theory filters sensory and affective circumstances in 
such a way that one or another affect is heightened. A strong or weak shame theory can 
develop throughout an individual’s life and its purpose is to reduce the toxic affect (shame) 
and increase the positive affects (interest or joy). Sedgwick summarizes: 
…an affect theory has two components: ‘First, it includes an examination of all 
incoming information for its relevance to a particular affect, in this case, shame 
and contempt. This is the cognitive antenna of shame. Second, it includes a set of 
strategies for coping with a variety of shame and contempt contingencies, to avoid 
shame if possible or to attenuate its impact if it cannot be avoided’ (2: 319-20). 
The stronger the shame theory, the more expensive it is for the person who holds 
it…and the more its antennae make ‘the shame-relevant aspects of any 
situation…become figural in competition with other affect-relevant aspects of the 
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same situation’ (2:231); that is, the more often the theorist misrecognizes, 
imagines, sees, or seizes upon—shame. (Touching Feeling 115) 
A high shame theory will put an individual on a constant state of alert. When Sedgwick says 
that the stronger the shame theory, the more expensive it is for the person who holds it, she 
means that a stronger shame theory demands much more attention than a weak shame theory. 
The faux pas, for someone with a strong shame theory, will be revisited a thousand times 
afterwards as the individual tries to understand its cause and how such a mistake might be 
avoided in the future. One indication of a strong shame theory, then, is constant self-
monitoring: an awareness that the self and its desires, dirtinesses, digressions, deviancies and 
so on, are potential sources of debilitating shame and worth any amount of effort to prevent 
them from taking place. Someone with a weak shame theory will commit a faux pas in the 
morning and forget about it by lunch.  
 In terms of identity, Tomkins’ articulation of shame theory illustrates convincingly 
why the concept of the core self impoverishes the complexity of what it means to be human. 
Very often, shame emerges when the values of one aspect of the self conflict with those of 
another:  
… every individual is ordinarily vulnerable to shame experience whenever he 
violates the social norms which he inherits by virtue of his membership in society 
or whenever he violates the norms of a particular ideology to which he may be 
committed. The Catholic, the Communist Party member, the Christian Scientist 
are each vulnerable to shame not only should they violate general social norms, 
but also if they transgress the dictates of their religious or political ideologies. 
(Tomkins 412) 
What matters most depends on the individual and the particular socio-cultural norms to which 
one is committed (by choice or by socio-cultural inheritance). Regardless of their particular 
formulation—something which will always be largely individual—it is universally true that 
shame emerges as the partial diminishment of the joy, excitement, or interest that the 
connection—to the Communist Party or even to one’s partner—originally engendered. As we 
will see throughout this dissertation, reading for shame means reading with a high shame 
theory, something inherent to some practices of literary criticism. On this point I want to be 
absolutely clear: being on the lookout for shame does not need to mean that we increase the 
toxicity of its affects. On the contrary, being on the lookout for shame can simply be a form 
of listening. 
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 When shame is experienced in the subjective sense, it is an affect or feeling that is felt 
by a human subject in the context of a story, or of multiple stories. The stories are not just the 
narratives of events outside of the self, however: they are stories we tell about ourselves, 
about our own personal ideals and the quests we undertake in an effort to fulfill them. Now 
I’d like to draw on psychologist Leon Wurmser’s book The Mask of Shame because he 
describes shame within thoroughly subjective terms. Here his description echoes the way 
shame theory works to manage the potential of shame and its after effects as well as the way 
shame can pervade our everyday lives. There are, he says,  
three major phenomenological types of shame. There is anxiety about something 
impending—shame anxiety; a reaction about something that has already 
occurred—shame affect in the narrower sense; and a character attitude that should 
prevent the other two—a shame attitude, shame as reaction formation, 
Schamhaftigkeit in German, pudeur in French. (Wurmser 49) 
Wurmser goes on to describe the main sources of shame. I mention them here because they 
will provide a familiar touchpoint from which we may depart: 
The content of the affect of shame—what one is ashamed for or about—clusters 
around several issues: (1) I am weak, I am failing in competition; (2) I am dirty, 
messy, the content of my self is looked at with disdain and disgust; (3) I am 
defective, I have shortcomings in physical and mental makeup; (4) I have lost 
control over my body functions and my feelings; (5) I am sexually excited about 
suffering, degradation, and distress; (6) watching and exposing are dangerous 
activities and may be punished. (Wurmser 27-28) 
Much of this will read as very familiar; we all feel inadequacies such as these from time to 
time. Implicit in Wurmser’s list is an underlying societal belief that individuals ought to 
demonstrate self-determination and self-control. Yet, this dissertation will illustrate that 
shame’s range extends far beyond those values, perhaps indicating also, that the social 
cohesion of Wurmser’s time is no longer characteristic of today. This is what might even be 
come to be seen as shame’s gift: experiencing shame is one way we can learn about ourselves 
and about what is most important to us and to our society. Not everyone feels shame at being 
physically weak nor at being dirty, for example. 
 Though Wurmser’s The Mask of Shame, published in 1980, was written later than the 
first volumes of Tomkins’ Affect Imagery Consciousness, his approach to selfhood reads as 
less contemporary than Tomkins’. Wurmser retains the ideal of a core self, saying “[in] the 
core of oneself, the deepest feelings for someone else or for a supreme value need to be 
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protected and veiled against all eyes. Shame, then, is a guardian protecting the core of 
integrity" (47-48). If one of shame’s gifts is the way it provides us with a mirror, another is 
that its constant desire to reconnect with society means that it can conjure up our most heroic 
capacities—capacities that allow us to transcend the way society can shame our deepest self. 
On the other hand, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick summarizes, Tomkins’ work remains  
[supremely alien] to any project of narrating the emergence of a core self. A 
reader who undergoes the four volumes of Tomkin’s Affect Imagery 
Consciousness feels the alchemy of the contingent involve itself so intimately 
with identity that Tomkins comes to seem the psychologist one would most like to 
read face-à-face with Proust. (Touching Feeling 98)  
Tomkins’ description of the self as something categorizable according to various emotional 
(affective) attachments and as something in an ongoing state of transformation means that if 
there is a redemptive aspect to shame, it is that it monitors an aspect of the self that another 
aspect of the self deems in need of monitoring. Whether this monitoring is good or bad is not 
a question Tomkins sees fit to ask, and the power that shame asserts internally—of one part 
of the self over the other—is ever-changing. Whether or not a momentary soft-spot will 
become a lifetime soft-spot is a complicated question and not something about which 
Tomkins is prescriptive. The flexibility of contemporary understandings of shame dovetail 
with the flexibility of today’s concepts of selfhood. 
 
Kinds of Autobiography and Theories of Selfhood 
 
 It goes without saying that implicit in every autobiography is a theory of selfhood. 
Traditionally, that theory posited a model of selfhood that was thoroughly Romantic: “each 
individual possesses a unified, unique selfhood which is also the expression of a universal 
human nature" (Anderson 5). Autobiography gathered together the disparate parts of the self 
and made of them a whole: a coherent self emerged in the process of writing. Not surprising 
that another tenet of that model was that the self was male: 
the genre of autobiography has been implicitly bound up with gender. Insofar as 
autobiography has been seen as promoting a view of the subject as universal, it 
has also underpinned the centrality of masculine – and, we may add, Western and 
middle-class – modes of subjectivity. (Anderson 3) 
Autobiography, up until recently, tended to participate in upholding “ideals of autonomy, 
self-realization, authenticity and transcendence" (Anderson 4) and exemplified “‘the vital 
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impulse to order’ which has always underlain creativity” (Olney qtd. in Anderson 5). Read 
from our postmodern perspective, these constraints on selfhood make autobiography a form 
that is inherently shameful—not as shameful as another form of performance—like blackface 
whose performance of racial identity is inextricable from the shame of racism—but perhaps 
in that order.   
 Starting in the 1970s, feminist scholars began work undermining the patriarchal 
implications of this genre. One barrier they had to overcome, according to Carolyn G. 
Heilbrun, author of Writing a Woman's Life, was the idea that writing about ones life 
presumed that one had taken control over their life; the obstacle for woman was that taking 
power was "unwomanly…woman have been deprived of the narratives, or the texts, plots, or 
examples, by which they might assume power over—take control of—their own lives." (17). 
That woman ought not only write their autobiographies but rescue those of writers in the past 
became an important project for many feminist scholars in the 1980s and 90s. Yet, a 
concurrent theoretical development was the increasingly widespread adoption of the 
Derridian/Foucauldian perspective that declared "there is only text," or "the author is dead." 
To this, literary scholar Nancy Miller declared:  
The postmodernist decision that the Author is Dead and the subject along with him 
does not, I will argue, necessarily hold for women, and prematurely forecloses the 
question of agency for them. Because women have not had the same historical 
relation of identity to origin, institution, production that men have had, they have 
not, I think, (collectively) felt burdened by too much Self, Ego, Cogito, etc. (Miller 
qtd. in Anderson 88) 
According to this logic, women's autobiographies (and by extension those of other 
marginalized groups) needed to be written as a counterweight to the centuries during which 
the autobiographies of white middle-class men defined the genre. An obvious drawback of 
this project, and any other project that begins with identity, is that it proposes the stability of 
the identity that is "woman," and, as we see in this dissertation, with the dominance of the 
subject and the core self as the starting point for autobiographical writing. Admirable as such 
projects may have been, they present, to my mind, a significant problem whose political 
consequences are undeniably evident in the ways they undermine a much-needed solidarity, 
especially on the left. Identity politics can tend to create alliances which fracture society, 
something which only benefits those who can consolidate—such as the Republicans, such as 
the Conservative Party in Canada or the Front national in France. 
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 A later generation of theorists have similarly defended the importance of the personal, 
not, however, along the lines of protecting the importance of women’s agency per se, but 
because of the way the personal can emphasize partiality and a limited perspective as 
opposed to the universal impersonal voice. The personal story is now emblematic of 
contemporary culture in North America, where radio shows such as The Moth, This American 
Life, and diaristic blogs all uphold the sentiment that connects the autobiographical with the 
authentic, the true. Even if today’s use of the autobiographical speaks of the opacity of self—
we may never fully know ourselves—it nevertheless maintains an authenticity in its 
unknowingness. In this line of thinking the purpose of the personal story is to enable 
identification, empathy and love in a fractured society. When it can’t create feelings of 
identification across society, it can, at least, create protective enclaves as we will see with 
some of the works discussed here. Autobiography is no longer confined to its traditional 
mode of recounting the exceptional life of a usually white, usually male, individual.  
 In contrast to the authentic core self that underpinned the traditional autobiography, 
the works I consider here embrace a much more flexible notion of selfhood. Concepts such as 
“integrity” no longer refer to one’s incontrovertible values, but rather to the way many 
aspects of the self work together dialectically, making a whole. We may never fully 
understand all the parts of the self, and this might be especially true in relation to what we 
love, desire, or find beautiful. In her book Cruel Optimism Lauren Berlant writes that “being 
coherent in relation to desire does not impede the subject’s capacity to live on, but might 
actually….protect [that capacity]" (16). The desire to protect a place of incoherence or 
undecidability or opaqueness is central to how contemporary thinkers conceive of both 
selfhood and of the self in writing. Again, Mari Ruti describes something similar: 
I do not believe that our character is a fixed core of being that once and for all 
dictates who we are. ‘Authenticity,’ in my opinion, is not a function of specific 
personality traits or attributes, but rather a mode of living and relating to the 
world; it is not some sort of a permanent truth of our being, but rather a matter of 
how we enter into the continuous process of transformation that characterizes 
human life. (9) 
While the position of author remains a coveted one, I think there are ways of writing and 
reading that disrupt any sense that the author replicates the power of the colonizer, say, or of 
the universal male subject. Even in books that are predominantly discursive or argumentative, 
the power of the speaking voice can be undermined by a reading that reads for affect:  
  
25 
The sense that power is a form of relationality that deals in, for example, 
negotiations (including win-win negotiations), the exchange of affect, and other 
small differentials, the middle ranges of agency—the notion that you can be 
relatively empowered or disempowered without annihilating someone else or 
being annihilated, or even castrating or being castrated—is a great mitigation of 
that endogenous anxiety, although it is also a fragile achievement that requires 
discovering over and over. (Sedgwick, "Melanie Klein" 631-32) 
Autobiographies that permit such relative empowerment are, indeed, fragile achievements. 
The works I treat here all achieve this to some extent. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study the way that shame informs, inspires, and 
limits academic and literary autobiography. I begin and end the dissertation with literary 
criticism inflected with autobiographical writing, beginning, therefore, with a study of Ann 
Cvetkovich's Depression: A Public Feeling and Kate Zambreno's Heroines, both of which 
aim to establish a collective identity (queer in the first, female in the second) as a rebuttal to 
the traditional male authoring of autobiography. The sense of outrage that pervades especially 
the latter book (and the outrage it inspires) bleeds into the second chapter which treats two 
semi-fictional autobiographies, Sheila Heti's How Should a Person Be? and Ben Lerner's 
Leaving the Atocha Station. For both Heti and Lerner, a key question in an age where 
authenticity and sincerity are constantly interrogated is whether or not anything—art, in 
particular—can have meaning. In the third chapter, an unnamed narrator traces the shame of 
heartbreak, depression and longing in Maggie Nelson's Bluets. In the fourth, Anne Carson's 
Nox articulates the various shames of personality, subjectivity and identification, but also 
how writing itself can gesture to a less domesticated kind of shame: to the physiology of a 
book that blushes, averts its gaze, hunches its shoulders. In the final chapter, I explore shame 
at the very farthest reaches of subjectivity, where the subject, literary critic Timothy Bewes, 
writes about shame as an event in the context of the postcolonial. Taken together, these works 
start to paint a portrait of a self that is better described in terms such as ‘becoming’ where 
subjectivity has about it something contingent or temporary, a kind of self, in other words, 
that has relinquished much of its authority and therefore its capacity to dominate. The effect 
of these works is a collective overturning of the subject as a starting point for ethics primarily 
because such a move seems necessary if we ever want to escape the subject-object structure 
that has been at the heart of centuries of systemic inequality. 
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Shame as Pharmakon  
  
It is with this kind of flexibility in mind that I propose that shame be thought of as a 
pharmakon, a term whose range of significance includes a remedy, a poison, and something 
that intoxicates. Hemlock was a pharmakon. It killed Socrates, but the clay pots that 
delivered the stuff were also found in the ruins of Athen’s hospital: it was also a cure. We 
might even imagine shame as that clay pot: a container that can deliver, by dint of dosage, a 
substance that will either heal us or kill us. There is no doubt that a life defined by shame, 
especially a shame that is unexamined, will be a cruel kind of existence. Yet shame is one of 
the mechanisms that teaches us how to belong where we most want to: ignoring it all together 
might mean ignoring its lessons which include not only how to behave “appropriately” but 
what (and who) matters to us most. While there is a kind of bliss to being alone the way 
Sartre was as he crouched before the keyhole, we cannot control when the footsteps behind 
us will appear. Shame may allow us to withdraw temporarily but also might teach us to better 
negotiate, “the vagaries of social life, where others are both necessary and unreliable supports 
for the self. As such, shame is not to be avoided, but rather explored as part of the process of 
becoming a subject in relation to others, a process which involves both the pleasures and the 
risks of social life" (Geunther n.pag).  
 This dissertation examines the risks and gifts of shame, but it will also examine the 
risks and gifts of writing. The term pharmakon comes from Plato’s works, and in the 
Phaedrus, Plato describes writing as a pharmakon. Derrida’s essay, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 
rehearses the debate about writing’s value as it occurred between Socrates and Phaedrus on a 
path that led them far beyond Athen’s walls. It is the first time that Socrates has left Athens. 
Phaedrus has convinced him to leave the urban world of men and enter the country world of 
daemons and nymphs by promising to read to him. Socrates can neither read nor write; 
during their discussion he calls writing a pharmakon, by which he means a drug—something 
enticing enough to have convinced him to leave the city. Derrida recounts how the discussion 
about writing takes shape in a myth, where the Egyptian demigod Theuth is presenting 
writing as a finished work of art or a gift to King Thamus. But Theuth is seeking Thamus’ 
approval. Will King Thamus agree that writing is a gift? “The value of writing will not be 
itself, writing will have no value, unless and to the extent that god-the-king approves of it" 
(Derrida, “Pharmacy” 432). The King rejects it. Writing, the pharmakon, is dangerous 
because it will be used by men who want to appear learned and wise without them actually 
  
27 
being so; they will no longer need to remember what they learn. Furthermore, writing will be 
like death:  
another thing held against the invention of the pharmakon is that it substitutes the 
breathless sign for the living voice, claims to do without the father (who is both 
living and life-giving) of logos, and can no more answer for itself than a sculpture 
or inanimate painting….The master of writing, numbers, and calculation does not 
merely write down the weight of dead souls; he first counts out the days of life, 
enumerates history. (Derrida, “Pharmacy” 435).  
This is the pharmakon as autobiography where the form is, in Paul de Man’s thinking, a kind 
of literary death mask. Through the pharmakon another set of opposites are introduced—
life/death, speech/ writing, philosophy/sophistry, day/night—opposites that the concept will 
immediately work to overcome: “And if one got to thinking that something like the 
pharmakon—or writing—far from being governed by these oppositions, opens up their very 
possibility without letting itself be comprehended by them; if one got to thinking that it can 
only be out of something like writing—or the pharmakon—that the strange difference 
between inside and outside can spring,” then one would recognize something in it that no 
longer even resembles mere logic or discourse, (Derrida, “Pharmacy” 437). All of this could 
be said of shame as well. Shame is the most flexible of emotions:  
We may feel shame for many things for which no one has shamed us. We may not 
feel shame though another tries to make one feel ashamed. We may be shamed by 
another, though the other does not intend that we should feel ashamed. We may be 
shamed because the other expresses negative affect toward us, though he does not 
wish to shame us as such. Finally, we may be shamed only because another tries 
to shame us. (Tomkins 370).  
The pharmakon is a figure of reversibility and one that has been important to several of the 
thinkers in this dissertation.  
 I posit that we can also find the pharmakon not only in writing, but as a figure of 
writing. This is most obvious in the proliferation of the figure of the paradox which has 
become one of the most compelling manifestations of a widespread awareness of the 
inadequacy of language. The paradox is a hallmark of poetic intelligence: it gestures to 
seemingly contradictory extremes and then argues for a truth that transcends the 
differences—both sides are true. The pharmakon is a conceptual paradox:  
Spivak's use of pharmakon alludes to Derrida’s essay 'Plato's Pharmacy'; the word 
- taken from Plato’s Phaedrus, and usually translated as 'remedy' - denotes, she 
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says, 'poison that is medicinal when knowingly administered.' In other words, the 
pharmakon … signifies an entity that has no truth in and itself. (Bewes, 
Reification 13) 
The paradox is also the figure of speech that most closely resembles shame’s dialectic, 
shame’s distances, and shame’s unrelenting awareness of inadequacy.  
 In Tomkins’ writing about shame in particular and the negative affects in general, he 
makes use of a term that corresponds nicely with the concept of the pharmakon. The term is 
“toxic,” or “toxicity.” Like the pharmakon, something that is toxic can potentially heal as 
well as harm. Tomkins links the toxic effects of the negative affects to drugs, saying that 
every year many drugs are discovered which can tackle disease but which are useless 
“because their toxicity for the host is as great as it is for the bacteria or virus against which it 
is effective" (Tomkins 292). Similarly, “if negative affect is too punishing, biologically or 
psychologically, it may be worse than the alarming situation itself, and it may hinder rather 
than expedite dealing with it" (Tomkins 292). In the world of animals, we find that, 
“occasionally the overly anxious animal is so frozen in fear that he is eaten before he can flee 
the predator" (Tomkins 293). Fear is toxic: a too-high dosage can be paralyzing rather than 
catalyzing.  
 I want to emphasize that the pharmakon—be it shame, or writing, or a poison or a 
drug—is not a meaningless figure. It is simply a term that always requires qualification. Its 
usage is context dependent, contingent. Inconsiderate use of it, therefore, poses great risk. 
The toxicity of shame has been well documented and is undeniable. Shame registers our 
weakness, deficiencies, and vulnerabilities like nothing else; it also registers our hopes, 
ambitions, and most profound connections. What if there were a way to register such 
weaknesses and attachments without falling into an egoistic obsession about them? What if 
they could be as potentially educational as advice from a wise parent or a good book? What if 
it were possible to learn to read shame without the ego? What if this ‘most subjective of 
emotions’ could become just a little bit less subjective? Less about us and more about 
attention to the world around us? Earlier I suggested that listening might be an appropriate 
reaction to shame as it appears in literary criticism, autobiography, and even in ourselves. 
Listening to shame need not mean loving it, but it might be a way to think about shame 
without the judgments that normally attend awareness of the affect. 
 
 I hope it is as true for every writer in the humanities—if not elsewhere—as it has been 
for me, that a personal commitment or passion lies as the starting point of their research. In 
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my own personal constellation of shame I can say that the family grief of Anne Carson’s Nox, 
the heartbreak of Maggie Nelson’s Bluets, and the often thwarted desire to create something 
meaningful in this life—be it a work of art or an academic study—have all been, for me, 
situations imbued with shame in its best and worst iterations. That I occupy a privileged place 
in the world is only more obvious as I reflect on the numerous privileges that have allowed 
me to pursue this topic so earnestly. I can only hope that Sedgwick is right that such 
psychological and affective motivations have contributed to, and not diminished, the 
academic quality of this work (“Melanie Klein" 629). My commitment to sharing the lessons 
of these years of close reading has propelled my decision to write in the form I have. I believe 
very much in the project of academic work being accessible to anyone with an interest and 
the time to read; at the same time there is no reason—especially in a subject that touches 
every single person, as this one does—for the full complexity of the topic to be simplified to 
the point of reduction. I personally despair at the demands contemporary culture places on us 
to be happy, fulfilled, and ecstatic at all times and hope that in some small way these 
reflections on shame as an affect and shame as a form of writing permits a degree of relaxing 
into the discomforting lessons the affect has for all of us.  
 If at the end of this work, I have shown that shame is inextricable from the parts of 
our lives that matter most and that in such places, shame can be a pharmakon that heals, I 
will be content. If at the end, I have illustrated how in the places where shame is toxic that it 
can, sometimes, through persistence and a bit of grace, be overcome, I will have succeeded. 
On these two fronts, discernment might allow us to see which shames we might want to keep 
and which ones we might want to abandon. In the first case, where shame amounts to a 
recognition of systemic injustice, perhaps our shame will inspire us to political commitments, 
to efforts that could, over time, dismantle the framework upon which such injustice is based: 
most notably the binary distinction of self and other.  
Yet, for all my optimism, it is true that there are some shames that have woven 
themselves into the very heart of our beings, lives, and societies. In such cases, the notion of 
anything so detached or rational as “discernment” will be laughable: the idea that we could 
discern an effective approach would be an idea that fails to appreciate the ways that some 
shame—usually our deepest ones—practically constitute us. They have been with us from 
our very beginning and without them we might even cease to exist. Or so it seems. In such 
cases, perhaps the best approach is to abandon the story of rationality, of emotion, and return 
to the noisy, demanding, electrified scene were Affect reigns. There, stories surrender their 
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power and give way to something bigger: to the wash of Affect that always resists, resists, 
resists our efforts to comprehend and conquer. 
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The Disappointments of Empathy: On Subjectivized Criticism 
 
Wounds promise authenticity and profundity; beauty and 
singularity; desirability. They summon sympathy. They bleed 
enough light to write by. They yield scars full of stories and slights 
that become rallying cries….And yet—beyond and beneath their 
fruits—they still hurt. 
 
 Leslie Jameson, The Empathy Exams 
 
…to say that the traumatized self is the true self is to say that a 
particular facet of subjective experience is where the truth of history 
lies: it is to suggest that the clarity of pain marks a political map for 
achieving the good life, if only we would read it. It is also imply 
that in the good life there will be no pain. 
 
Lauren Berlant, “The Subject of True Feeling,” in  
Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law 
 
 
 One of the implicit indicators that negative feelings—and shame in particular—are 
considered pathological is the popularity of books that advertise its antidote. Not that we ever 
thought it was grand to feel bad, but these days, feeling bad isn’t merely rotten, it’s worthy of 
diagnosis. Shame’s longstanding association with deviance, defectiveness and weakness is 
also its link to pathology and the attendant assumption that a cure must be found. This is why 
more recent claims that shame is “all too human,” sound such a redemptive chord. When 
shame becomes universally human as opposed to a sign of the pathological, it makes empathy 
possible. Empathy tops the list of antidotes to shame, and one of its most popular 
spokespersons is American sociologist Brené Brown, whose books have been New York 
Times bestsellers; her books, such as Daring Greatly and The Gifts of Imperfection, are self-
help books with a database. Brown cites shame as the root cause of depression, drug use, and 
suicide and argues that 
empathy is the antidote to shame. If you put shame in a petri dish, it needs three 
things in order to grow exponentially: secrecy, silence, and judgment. If you put 
the same amount in a petri dish and douse it with empathy, it can't survive. The 
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two most powerful words when we're in struggle: ‘me too.’ (“The Power of 
Vulnerability”) 
Beyond the sphere of our most intimate relations, if empathy is shame’s antidote, one of its 
most reliable modes of delivery is the memoir. In this, our “confessional age,” writers and 
readers of memoir seek empathy and authenticity: for every kind of failing, there’s a memoir 
written about it to make you feel ‘less alone.’ Today’s memoirists often trot out their deepest 
traumas sparking one reviewer to describe the genre as a competition in atrocity (Mendelsohn 
n.pag). Articles proclaiming the rise of the memoir are now so ubiquitous that their titles 
make fun not only of the genre but of the articles that ritually track its rise, such as The 
Guardian’s “The rise and rise of the memoir,” or The New Yorker’s “Cry me a River,” or 
“But Enough about Me" (Armitstead, Harvey, Mendelsohn). As such titles suggest, the most 
common critique of memoir is its implicit self-indulgence. Memoirists that take such critique 
seriously often to try to head off charges of solipsism by blending their self-reflections with 
another genre—academic study, essays, or fiction—or another medium—such as 
photography. Memoirists that dismiss the critique of self-indulgence often pursue an 
aesthetics of excess: excess feelings, excess identification, excess shame. And the academy 
has not quelled the tide.  
 To the contrary, academics have added their own slew of sub-genres including the 
academic memoir, the critical memoir, and others (Watson). The books I study in this chapter 
both take a mixed-genre approach to memoir with the goal of offering solace to those who 
would identify with them and critique to those who would reject them. The first, Kate 
Zambreno’s 2012 Heroines is a study of the mad wives of the modernists and of the ongoing 
gendering of literature. The second, Ann Cvetkovich’s Depression: A Public Feeling uses 
memoir and “speculative essay” to argue that depression ought to be considered less a 
pathology than a symptom of capitalism or as a register of the ongoing impact of racism and 
colonialism. Both Zambreno and Cvetkovich aim to depathologize mental illness, claiming 
that it is either a near-phantom ailment, dreamt up by men in an effort to justify oppressing 
women, or that it is a symptom of a sick society more generally. Both of these projects could 
be considered examples of the affect turn in scholarship, even if only one of them, Ann 
Cvetkovich, is an academic. By ‘turn to affect,’ I mean that their work suggests the influence 
of Eve K. Sedgwick, where affect is subjective and is narrated by a subject who feels. This, in 
contrast to affect as defined by Massumi, where affect is not necessarily tied to human 
subjectivity. Zambreno calls Heroines an example of subjective criticism, or criticism with 
the self left in (281).  
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 My purpose in this chapter is to take seriously the political goals behind Zambreno 
and Cvetkovich’s work. I conclude, however, that despite their promising aims, where these 
books fail, it is memoir that fails them. Both writers place enormous stock in the value of 
their feelings, presuming that their raw presentation will create an intimate space with 
readers, and that this intimate space will be politically generative. Empathy, they hope, will 
lead to a politics. In the first half of the chapter, I want to show how Zambreno and 
Cvetkovich tie their personal accounts of mental illness to a larger politics—in Zambreno to a 
long-standing sexism in literary culture and the accusations of mental illness that has served 
it, and in Cvetkovich to similar systemic causes of depression. In the second half, building on 
two of Lauren Berlant’s concepts—the intimate public and cruel optimism—I want to show 
how empathy cannot be politically generative. Empathy’s efforts to dismantle the structures 
of shame are effective only at a very local level. Beyond such localities, I argue that these 
efforts run the risk of expanding shame’s domain rather than limiting it. 
 For some, memoirs are a way of providing solace to the similarly afflicted. In such 
cases, the memoir allows the individual who has suffered the opportunity to share their 
personal journey with an audience who seeks to understand it or already does, having been 
through something similar themselves. It can alleviate the shame of the writer and of the 
reader, but only if they identify and empathize with each other. Such works can shore people 
up, providing them with the much needed community and potential tools for overcoming 
shame. In such cases, such books work as a nurturing parent might, where 
 the child is offered sympathy and help to overcome his discouragement 
and shame…. As this is done again and again the child grows in self-confidence, 
learns how to tolerate his own shame responses whenever he meets failure and 
learns how to cope both with the sources of defeat and with shame and 
discouragement….Since the experience of shame is all but inevitable in the 
development of human beings, a critical part of the rewarding socialization of 
shame and self-contempt must consist in teaching the child the double skills of 
tolerating his own shame and in overcoming the source of it. (Tomkins 454) 
This describes much of the impetus behind the depression memoir. Destigmatizing or 
depathologizing depression is almost always its goal. Such works may create a temporary 
asylum for those struggling to deal with traumatic situations and can strengthen the empathic 
muscles for those for whom the struggle isn’t personal, allowing them insight into what 
would normally be a very private affair. In the hands of Cvetkovich and Zambreno, however, 
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the depression memoir aims to transcend the personal, becoming instead, works that seek to 
address depression as a historical or social ail as opposed to a personal struggle. 
 
Kate Zambreno’s Heroines 
 
  Heroines began as a blog called Frances Farmer is My Sister. It was, and is, an 
invitation-only blog. When she began to write it, she was living in Akron, Ohio, reading 
about the mad wives of the modernists, and experiencing herself as a reduced identity—no 
longer a writer (no one was interested), but a wife. The blog was a way for her to re-establish 
herself as a writer. She describes the community she created there as, 
A small community of mostly women, all writers, each [in] their own cages, in 
different corners of the world…speak[ing] of writing…confess[ing] and hear[ing] 
confessions of the pauses and gaps and scratches that were not writing. (93) 
The blog created a space where the shame of being a writer-who-does-not-write could be 
expressed. Shame emerges where we fail our own aspirations. The empathetic community 
assuaged that shame because it said ‘me too.’ When Zambreno’s first book, Green Girl, was 
published by a small independent press, she writes that she  
had to exit the private bubble of my dinner party with the mad wives, and begin to 
negotiate becoming a public writer-self in the world. Because of this, the blog 
began to be overtaken by doubt, or rather become a performance of this doubt. 
The posts began to be about what it was like to be a minor writer in the world, 
these moments of humiliation, of abjection, of shame. (285) 
The online community shored her up, especially regarding her feeling that the small press 
was inherently minor, that her readership would be necessarily limited. One of her blog’s 
readers was the radical feminist Chris Kraus who would become the editor of Heroines. 
Kraus is the author of I Love Dick, and one of the first feminist writers to explore humiliation 
as feminist freedom.2 Kraus saw the blog as the beginning of a book. In her 
acknowledgements, Zambreno writes “I feel lucky to have as an editor such a radical writer 
who has revolutionized my own conceptions of the urgency of not erasing the self in our 
criticism" (309). For Zambreno, writing the self into criticism defies a gendered literary 
culture whose injunctions against women’s writing date at least as far back as the modernists. 
                                                
2 I Love Dick is also fictional autobiography. “Dick,” is Dick Hebdige, British media theorist and 
author of the 1979 Subculture: The Meaning of Style. 
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There are several parts in her project, and I’d like to disentangle them first before evaluating 
how they work together. The tangled parts are: the claim that what she is doing here 
constitutes literary criticism; that writing the self ‘into’ criticism constitutes a politics; that 
the political nature of the project is feminist one; that feminist writing and women’s writing 
can be defined, and that she is equipped to do the defining. 
  Heroines is part memoir, part literary criticism and all manifesto. The overall aim of 
the project is to oust the sexism of contemporary literary culture, in particular the way it 
ignores what she calls “women’s writing,” writing she defines as fragmented, menstrual, 
highly personal, and ecstatically irrational. She argues that, “Inherent in any dismissal of 
women writers who draw from memoir is a bias against autobiography that comes out of 
modernism. The self-portrait, as written by a woman, is read as somehow dangerous and 
indulgent” (235). This sounds like an outcry, but I think it’s a point of pride.  
 As a work of literary criticism, the supposed subject of study is the mad wives of the 
modernists and the invalidating rhetorics that made them so. These rhetorics were crafted by 
their husbands, mainly, but also by modernist literary culture and fin-de-siècle society at 
large. Her main focus is Vivien Eliot and Zelda Fitzgerald, but she also writes about Jane 
Bowles, Jean Rhys, and Virginia Woolf. Her inclusion of Woolf among the silenced ladies 
already illustrates something of Zambreno’s methodology. Woolf is sometimes the husband, 
but mostly the mad wife: she is invalidating husband when she declares that art must 
transcend the self; she is mad wife when she submits to writing only an hour a day in 
abeyance with doctor’s orders and her husband’s observation that writing seemed to make her 
“nervous.” 
 Heroines begins with an invocation to the prophetess Sibyl, a figure associated with 
writing and prophecy, but also to the withering of the body, a body reduced to a mere voice, 
“And then not really her voice at all" (Zambreno 8). Zambreno casts the modern wives as 
Sibyl-figures, and then models herself after them: “Sitting at the mouth of my cave, I string 
together fragments on paper. My scraps scattering to the wind if unread./ Out of this narrative 
will emerge a chalk outline. It is the body of a woman” (9). Heroines is constructed out of a 
series of fragments, most of them about a paragraph long, some of which connect to the 
others in longer narratives or longer arguments and others which stand alone, a structure due 
in part to its origin as a blog.  
 Zambreno interweaves highly personal accounts of her life with her husband John 
with the lives of the modernists, describing the various houses she and her husband have 
lived in—in London, in Chicago, and then in Akron, Ohio. She compares their homes to 
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those of the modernists and their lives to theirs: “We echoed the Eliots. Marrying fast out of a 
sense of noble adventure (they had known each other three months, we had known each other 
nine)" (27). Thus ensues her undoing: she becomes a wife, begins to “tell the mutual lie of 
marriage" (16), joins in the “union of forgotten or erased wives. I pay my dues daily" (18). 
That she loves her husband doesn’t preclude her from hating him: he drags her from bed in 
the mornings, tells her to be more disciplined, uses an “invalidating rhetoric" (69) and 
eventually, withdraws. Later, she will get her period and he will bring her tea (72). 
Meanwhile, she is Virginia Woolf, she is Zelda Fitzgerald, or worse: “I am Madame Bovary 
as I read Madame Bovary. Ennui, excess of emotions. C’est moi. I am Zelda, I am 
Vivien(ne)" (19).  
 Zambreno seems to think of identification as a research method. Identification defines 
who does and does not get to read Frances Farmer is my Sister, and identification is her 
method of studying the mad wives. Identification is also an important element in the affect of 
shame, where identification is the bond—chosen or otherwise—that makes us most interested 
in (and empathetic with) the lives of others who are like us. Zambreno tells us that she and 
the mad wives share physical and mental ills, that they all struggle to write, that they are all 
married to men who invalidate them. This identification is timeless: the past century is one 
long present tense. Vivien Eliot behaves badly; Kate Zambreno throws a book at her 
husband, tells him “FUCK OFF” (60). She declares it true for them and true for her that “the 
patriarch decides on the form of communication. Decides on the language”(60). Vivien’s 
husband, T.S. Eliot, abandoned her (102). Zambreno describes her own abandonment. It 
happens daily when her husband goes to work. If he calls at lunch, she says, “[he] plays 
Savior" (50). She describes these women who, by dint of marriage, have been prevented from 
writing (79). Zambreno and the mad wives have stomach problems and arguments with 
medics and psychologists. When she and the mad wives do not mirror each other so perfectly, 
Zambreno tries to “channel” them, mostly by copying their outfits: “I already wear the weird 
costumes and cloche hats and spit curls”(114). “In channeling [Vivien],” says Zambreno, “I 
can sense her early inner spirit and see it squelched and doomed into sickness and 
submission. Under different circumstances…she could have been an author”(107). Zambreno 
buys their hats and their make-up—“a NARS blush called Madly,” “a NARS lipgloss called 
Orgasm”(179); she buys their nailpolish —the sparkly silver glitter that Zelda wore in her last 
days at the asylum.  
  While Zambreno paints a compelling portrait of the various ways early twentieth 
century culture oppressed women and the mad wives in particular, her argument that today’s 
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culture is unchanged is unconvincing. She argues that the sexism of the early twentieth 
century continues today is visible in a bias against autobiography and memoir, yet it would 
be hard to find a more popular form. These complaints show that she seeks a literary 
audience while writing in a popular form: contemporary literary cultural criminalizes the 
confessional mode (266). She says 
The idea that one must control oneself and stop being so FULL of self remains a 
dominating theory around mental illness, and, perhaps tellingly, around other 
patriarchal laws and narratives, including the ones governing and disciplining 
literature. (55) 
According to Zambreno, the confessional mode is considered feminine. Heroines wants to 
salvage women’s writing: “We live in a culture that punishes and tries to discipline the messy 
woman and her body and a literary culture that punishes and disciplines the overtly 
autobiographical (for being too feminine, too girl, too emotional)” (252). 
Heroines wants to define women’s writing as excessive, consumeristic, menstrual, 
fragmentary, anxious, unpolished, diaristic, autobiographical, unplotted; at the very least we 
can say that Heroines is all of those things. She says,  
I am beginning to realize that taking the self out of our essays is a form of 
repression. Taking the self out feels like obeying a gag order—pretending an 
objectivity where there is nothing objective about the experience of confronting 
and engaging with and swooning over literature. (281) 
Taking the self out would not only take away the “swooning over literature,” but also the 
stories of marginalization—of the way she and other women are subjected to an invalidating 
rhetoric.  
  Yet, if Heroines were literary criticism or literary history (as it has been described by 
many critics), it ought to have cited Zelda Fitzgerald and Vivien Eliot's writing rather than 
their nail polish. One of the negative reviews of Heroines asked:  
What does it mean to reject the psychopathology offered by Zambreno — as a 
reader, as a writer, as a woman? To disinvest myself of disorder in my response to 
this text? To reject hysteria and mania, to refuse the glamor of the broken woman 
writer? (Keeler, LA Review of Books n.pag) 
What it means is to refuse to revel in the glamor of the wounded woman. In her essay “Grand 
Unified Theory of Female Pain,” Leslie Jameson writes:  
We may have turned the wounded woman into a kind of goddess, romanticized 
her illness and idealized her suffering, but that doesn’t mean she doesn’t happen. 
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Women still have wounds: broken hearts and broken bones and broken lungs. 
How do we talk about these wounds without glamorizing them? (187) 
It’s a difficult question, but not one that Zambreno is interested in answering. She wants to do 
the opposite: “I am trying to conjure up an atmosphere of oppression" (53). This is perhaps 
the most problematic aspect of Zambreno’s memoir, whose politics are firmly situated in a 
discourse of female oppression and in heralding a kind of writing that “leaves the self in,” but 
whose real experience speaks not to a history of sexism but of quite the opposite.  
 What happens if the self that Zambreno has supposedly “left in” is as fictionalized as 
her kinships with the mad wives? In her acknowledgements she thanks her husband, John, for 
being her “collaborator and co-conspirator, always my first reader and indefatigable editor on 
all my books, especially this one. Thank you for…encouraging me never to censor myself, if 
it served the project, even if it involved making you a character” (309). If her husband of the 
‘invalidating rhetoric’ was a character and if her status as a marginalized writer was not the 
result of systemic oppression but rather emblematic of the slow accumulating recognition 
most writers would be lucky to experience, what are we to make of Zambreno’s political 
claims?  
 Yet, in writing so explicitly of what she is doing, perhaps this is Zambreno’s saving 
grace: she is doing this consciously, she says several times. One would imagine that there is a 
logic behind this effort. What is that logic? What does she hope it will do?If the atmosphere 
of oppression needs to be conjured so explicitly, is she not, then, taking some responsibility 
for it—it having been her creation as much as his? Or, even, more her creation than his? 
Certainly this is what makes Kraus’ I Love Dick so humiliating: Dick may not come off as the 
most sympathetic character but he is no monster. If there is a monster in that book, it is Chris. 
Looked at from this perspective, these books enact nothing less than Gramsci’s notion of 
Hegemony—the notion both the subjugated and the oppressor actively or passively agree that 
the power distribution should be thus. Neither military force nor domestic violence are 
needed to perpetuate this imbalance. Whatever we make of it, we cannot make of it a politics. 
It may be hard to define reality, but we can at least say that anything that is so self-
consciously conjured is not it. Politics wants to deal with reality as much as it can.  
 Zambreno’s “literary criticism” is really a rescue campaign, and, as should be clear 
from her incessant identification with the mad wives, the rescue campaign is not one 
conducted for their benefit, but for hers. The unflattering portraits that she paints of Tom 
Eliot and Scott Fitzgerald are convincing, but if the aim of this work was to rescue the 
literary output of Vivien and Zelda from the silencing mechanisms of a literary establishment 
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that would reduce them to their hysterias, she fails. Worse: she sees them that way too. 
Vivien, Zelda, Virginia, Jane, Jean, Sylvia: those women are all foils for Kate Zambreno, 
character roles that she plays. Zambreno didn’t really pay attention to her subjects: 
Zambreno has a tendency, throughout Heroines, to erase the specificity of each of 
her mad wives, even as she is fiercely possessive of them. She calls up their 
situations as if from a catalogue of gendered slights, generic female 
oppressions…. That Zambreno aligns herself with the feminine, with all of these 
women writers who've been suppressed, is one thing. That she makes them all into 
one entity (her) is quite another. Why should we clump Vivien(ne) Eliot together 
with Virginia Woolf, why Jane Bowles with Sylvia Plath? Placing these histories, 
these women, beside each other under the guise of their shared womanhood 
threatens to hollow out their work and, perhaps more crucially, their lives. 
(Keeler, LA Review of Books n.pag) 
In other words, Zambreno, rather than illustrating the saving power of confessional literature, 
illustrates the danger of generality. Note the outraged tone of Keeler’s review. Keeler 
knows—Emily Keeler knows—that Zambreno is making claims on behalf of womanhood 
that Keeler doesn’t buy. Plenty of books write about experiences that are not our own; this is 
often their virtue. Keeler’s outrage stems from the fact that Zambreno is saying that her 
claims are true for all women writers. But what kind of recognition can a fictionalized self 
rightly demand? What happens when self-righteousness becomes an aesthetic rather than an 
ethics? 
 Following the publication of Heroines, Zambreno wrote about the critical response on 
her blog. Conflating her self with her book, she writes: 
I have been criticized lately of writing a bad book, a flawed book, a book that 
needs to be more disciplined, a book that needs to behave better, a book that needs 
to be a better scholar, a book that needs to be less obsessive and emotional and 
mad, a book that needs to be less vain, less circling around vanity. Did I say 
book? I meant self. (Zambreno qtd. by Heti, LRB 22) 
This is a fascinating conflation, and perhaps the most revelatory confession of them all. 
Zambreno wants to write a flawed self, an undisciplined self, an emotional and mad self 
because she considers it a kind of daring. The self she writes is not a political being. It is an 
aesthetic, an aesthetic of excess. If there is something political about it it is that this aesthetic 
would find its community among her fellow bloggers, writers who, like her, identify as 
outsiders. They are 
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outside the institutions of writing, whether the major publishing houses or the 
universities and their creative writing programs. Outside the poetics coteries of 
academia. We are writers because we say we are. We reassure each other of our 
potential genius. (Zambreno 293)  
What kind of outsider-ship is this really? If this is a politics, it is a politics based upon 
identification and recognition. But it is a politics that puts aesthetics first, so not really a 
politics at all. I see an interesting parallel in an extended review written about Tao Lin, a 
Brooklyn-based writer who, like Zambreno, began his writing career online and whose dry, 
flat aesthetic has made him a polarizing figure in contemporary letters in North America. In a 
review written about Tai Lin’s Taipei, but which could equally have been about Heroines, 
Frank Guan writes, 
 So art, since it reduced the net amount of universal pain, was fundamentally 
ethical—as with “politics,” “aesthetics” were entirely replaced, or nullified, or 
superseded, by ethics. Just as questions of political validity depended entirely on 
the individual actor, questions of aesthetic quality depended entirely on the 
individual reader: if some communication sympathetically consoled a person, that 
communication was art—to that person. It was entirely possible that that thing 
would not be art to another person. There was no abstract standard of “good” or 
“bad” art that could reconcile disparate opinions. (Guan n.pag) 
Zambreno's version of politics seems to be similarly unambitious. What she seems to want is 
recognition from those who she know will recognize her. She wants to write about the glamor 
of female pain for those who find it glamorous. For those who do not, she will call them 
patriarchs. She will call them invalidating. 
  In this context, perhaps the most revealing outcome of Zambreno’s work is the way it 
essentializes women’s writing, and how little criticism she has gotten for doing so. This may 
be because of recent outcry about the practice of negative reviewing, something many critics 
have foresworn in light of revelations of the ongoing gender disparity in books that get 
reviewed (written by mostly male authors) by reviewers, who are also mostly male.3 
Nevertheless, as a result of Heroines, respected literary publications such as The Paris 
Review and the LA Review of Books consider Zambreno an important figure in “contemporary 
                                                
3 For more information on this point see the research findings at CWILA (Canadian Women in the 
Literary Arts) and VIDA (Women in Literary Arts), both of which track the gender gap in book 
reviewing culture. 
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literary culture and feminist discourse" (Milks) both in English-speaking North America and 
across the pond, where The London Review of Books ran a nearly 4,000 word review of the 
work (Heti, “I dive under the covers,” LRB 21-22). Columbia University has engaged her as a 
professor (albeit adjunct); Harper Perennial re-released her first novel, Green Girl, this past 
Spring.  
 In terms of the fellow-feeling that might theoretically be evoked by confessional 
writing such as Kate Zambreno’s, it seems clear that whatever benefit may arise through its 
creation—in Heroines as well as on her blog Fannie Farmer is my Sister—the intimacy it 
creates also has the potential to exclude, offend, or disgust a larger public. In terms of shame, 
then, Zambreno puts a lot of faith in the idea that her shame is shared (by other women, 
across centuries) and that expressing that shame will be political because it creates fellow-
feelings such as solidarity. Identification is, indeed, one of the ways that shame spreads. We 
can feel ashamed of, for, and by our loved ones only because our connection to them is so 
close that they seem a part of us. Yet when someone demands that we identify with them 
(along familial, racial, or gender lines, to give a few examples), and we don’t, the affect that 
is generated is not shame, but contempt, an affect I will discuss at length in the following 
chapter. 
 
Depression: A Public Feeling 
 
 Like Kate Zambreno’s Heroines, Ann Cvetkovich's Depression: A Public Feeling uses 
memoir and scholarly research to argue that depression ought to be considered symptomatic 
of the systems we live under: capitalism, racism, and colonialism to name a few. Unlike 
Zambreno, Cvetkovich is an established academic; before delving into the book itself, I want 
to situate Cvetokovich’s work within its intellectual milieu of the Public Feelings projects in 
the United States. I will then analyze Cvetkovich’s contribution to these projects according to 
the terms they, and she, set. In analyzing Depression, I begin with the latter half of her book 
called “A Public Feelings Project: (A Speculative Essay)” because it is there that her 
argument is most original and lucid. Then I’ll turn to the depression memoir. About both 
sections, I will argue that Cvetkovich’s work highlights the flexibility of shame and the way 
that the memoir form can sometimes mistake empathy for politics, much the way that 
aesthetics are (mis)taken for politics in Kate Zambreno’s work. 
In her introduction, Cvetkovich describes Depression: A Public Feeling as a project 
whose spirit is indebted to the group of U.S. based activists, artists, and academics who work 
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under the rubric of Public Feelings. Cvetkovich has been a principle actor in the group since 
they gathered first in 2001. She describes their work as an  
investigation [that] has coincided with and operated in the shadow of September 
11 and its ongoing consequences—a sentimental takeover of 9/11 to underwrite 
militarism, war in Iraq and Afghanistan, Bush’s reelection, and the list goes on. 
Rather than analyzing the geopolitical underpinnings of these developments, 
we’ve been more interested in their emotional dynamics. (1)  
Public Feelings projects are identifiably left, queer, feminist, and activist. They meet 
nationally and locally; the most prominent of the local “cells” is the Feel Tank Chicago, and 
its most prominent scholar is Lauren Berlant, whose work we will turn to at the conclusion of 
this chapter. Cvetkovich describes Depression as a Public Feelings project not only because it 
aims to chart the emotional impact of the systems we live under but also because of its form, 
a combination of memoir and speculative essays. As we saw in the introduction, “going 
public as a private subject [had its roots] in earlier feminist critique of universal values [such 
that] personal criticism and other autobiographical acts….flourished in the 1990s” (Miller 
qtd. in Anderson 1-2). Under the rubric of Public Feelings, academics continue to challenge 
the dominance of the discursive form and of the authoritative subject who writes in such 
forms. What distinguishes Public Feelings projects from the earlier feminist critique is that 
rather than adopting a mode of writing that instantiates women as subjects equal to men, 
these forms often aim to dismantle the authoritative subject altogether. Kathleen Stewart, for 
example, begins her book, Ordinary Affects, by saying: 
I write not as a trusted guide carefully laying out the links between theoretical 
categories and the real world, but as a point of impact, curiosity, and encounter. I 
call myself ‘she’ to mark the difference between this writerly identity and the kind 
of subject that arises as a daydream of simple presence. ‘She’ is not so much a 
subject position or an agent in hot pursuit of something definitive as a point of 
contact; instead, she gazes, imagines, senses, takes on, performs, and asserts not a 
flat and finished truth but some possibilities (and threats) that have come into 
view in the effort to become attuned to what a particular scene might offer. (5) 
Many Public Feelings scholars continue to produce more traditional discursive texts, but it is 
in this unconventional spirit that Cvetkovich describes the second half of her book as a 
collection of “speculative essays.” Nevertheless, reading Depression alongside work by 
Kathleen Stewart or Eve Sedgwick (whose work has inspired many Public Feelings projects), 
Cvetkovich’s insistence on the truth of her subjective experience dates her work, making it 
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read much more in the spirit of 1990s feminists and queer theorists than in those that came 
after. 
 
 The second half of Depression: A Public Feeling is composed of three essays. The 
first, “Writing Depression: Acedia, History, and Medical Models,” aims to challenge the 
dominance of medical and psychological explanations of depression as an illness that can be 
“detected, diagnosed, and treated” (90). She wants to expand the range of depression’s public 
intellectuals to include not just doctors and psychologists, but also cultural theorists, 
historians, artists, monks, and ordinary people. Because she views depression as a product of 
a “sick culture,” medical diagnosis can only ever treat an individual’s symptoms, not provide 
a cure. In the second chapter, “From Dispossession to Radical Self-Possession: Racism and 
Depression,” Cvetkovich asks, “What if depression, in the Americas at least, could be traced 
to histories of colonialism, genocide, slavery, legal exclusion, and everyday segregation and 
isolation that haunt all of our lives, rather than to biochemical imbalances?”(114) In the final 
chapter, “The Utopia of Everyday Habit: Crafting, Creativity and Spiritual Practice,” 
Cvetkovich returns to a more personal register, describing her own “collection of cultural 
texts,” that have accompanied her as she has battled with depression. They “reflect the 
sensibility and cultural taste of the specific demographic that I inhabit,” she writes: “a small 
and frequently ephemeral niche of queer and feminist bohemian intellectuals [from] New 
York and other cosmopolitan cities such as Toronto and Chicago" (Cvetkovich 159). She 
says that she “wanted to see how the arty queer culture that sustains me brings a queer 
perspective to depression, one with a taste for the nonnormative and perverse" (Cvetkovich 
160). As other reviewers have also commented, the strongest part of the book is this second 
half, and of the second half, it is the second chapter that makes the most original and 
substantive contribution to the notion of depression as a public feeling (Lockwood). 
  It is with real sensitivity that Cvetkovich articulates the problems with medical and 
psychological models that “presume a white and middle-class subject for whom feeling bad is 
frequently a mystery because it doesn’t fit a life in which privilege and comfort make things 
seem fine on the surface" (115). The presumption that depression looks the same for 
everyone regardless of race or class neglects the way the medical system fails poor, non-
white Americans, who don’t have access to the medical system and, even if they did, 
wouldn’t go due to historic suspicions of the medical industry and/or cultural impediments to 
admitting mental illness; it is also damaging to the privileged white middle-class subject (for 
whom life “should” feel good). Cvetkovich provides what is essentially a literature review of 
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scholarship dealing with race and depression before going onto a close reading of four books, 
two written by scholars of the African diaspora and two written by white writers for whom 
class mobility and immigration are pivotal backdrops to their more straightforward 
depression memoirs. The first two books are Saidiya Hartman’s Lose Your Mother and 
Jacquie Alexander’s Pedagogies of Crossing, both of which chart the emotional impact of 
“an absent archive of slavery.” The second two are Sharon O’Brien’s The Family Silver and 
Jeffery Smith’s Where the Roots Reach for Water.  
 In reading Hartman and Alexander, Cvetkovich aims to illustrate the ordinariness of 
depression within the everydayness of racism. One particularly powerful incident in Saidiya 
Hartman’s Lose Your Mother is both utterly personal and illustrative of the effects of 
everyday racism. When Hartman was twelve-years old, an icy patch of road led her mother to 
slide through a red light. When the police pulled them over, Hartman, out of an inbred terror, 
yelled ferociously at the policeman, reflecting what Cvetkovich summarizes as a something 
inherited: “alongside hopes for political change, [there was] a dread of white policemen,” part 
of a “legacy of fear and suspicion even in a respectable black family—an inability to trust 
white people or a tendency to assume the worst in any encounter with authority" (131). 
Cvetkovich remarks upon key moments like these in order to illustrate how the broader story 
of depression and race is not the one that reports the depression statistics in black 
communities but is rather one that recounts the way it goes unnoticed. She describes her 
approach here as speculative or unconventional because it, “captures affective experiences 
that aren’t always publicly visible, especially to white observers" (122).  
 Her treatment of Sharon O’Brien’s The Family Silver and Jeffery Smith’s Where the 
Roots Reach for Water is similarly sensitive to the way academia-fueled class ambition can 
be a cause of depression yet an interesting dynamic emerges out of the way that Cvetkovich 
identifies with both of these writers: identification leads Cvetkovich to empathy with both, 
but sometimes, with Smith, that identification turns to shame. O’Brien had had a successful 
academic career at Harvard but nevertheless, at the age of 40, became depressed: 
Seeking to turn from scholarship to more creative kinds of writing (including The 
Family Silver itself ), she finds a way out of depression by detaching herself from 
this capitalist emphasis on the pressure to make one’s identity around 
dissertations, books, and other markers of productivity (and in this respect, among 
others, her story resonates with my own). (143) 
Cvetkovich, O’Brien and Smith all share the pressures to be productive and the depression 
that prevents it. However, when Cvetkovich turns to Smith’s work, she has a tendency to 
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discipline him. The subtext seems to be that because Smith is also an academic he ought to 
know better that to write about his depression in the ways he does. Reading one passage, for 
example, she points out how Smith fails to recognize the way his nostalgic sense of ties to the 
land (carried in the blood) are “naturalizing, especially to a reader attuned to notions of queer 
kinship,” (149) and later, she notes his insensitivity to indigenous land rights: 
But when he writes of the ‘parched and unpeopled prairie’ (272) of Wyoming, 
where coal mines have replaced the grazing lands of the bison, he doesn’t mention 
that it would have been occupied (and still is) by indigenous peoples who have 
made the High Plains landscape their own. (Cvetkovich 150)  
These are failures in his memoir because they are political failures, failures along 
progressive, liberal lines, failures she tries to avoid in her own memoir. 
  Cvetkovich’s “The Depression Journals: A Memoir” is divided into three parts: 
“Going Down,” “Swimming,” and “The Return.” It charts her first decent into depression, a 
Springtime mania, a second decent, and her slow recovery. It spans the years when 
Cvetkovich was struggling to finish her dissertation, deal with the academic job market, and 
begin the tenure-track position she holds today. Geographically, these were years of constant 
displacement between the unstated West coast university where she did her doctorate, the 
professorship at University of Texas, and a postdoc in Connecticut. In addition to these 
career-related displacements, Cvetkovich returned to the small community of Campbell River 
in British Columbia, Canada, where she grew up. These were years of negotiating with 
several identities—that of being queer just as Gay and Lesbian studies were taking off, that of 
being a young academic, and that of being the daughter to a man with manic-depression.  
 The journals are notable for their quotidian tone. We see Cvetkovich struggle with the 
everyday demands of an alarm clock, the grocery store, the Thank you Note, never mind 
finishing the dissertation and writing up the job proposals. We see her overcome apathy and 
disconnectedness in manic bursts of creative energy and spiritual connectedness. We see her 
mourn a friend who dies of AIDS. We see her dance at New York's Girl Bar. We see her 
return to Campbell River and think seriously about her family home and the fact that it was 
(and probably is) indigenous land. We see her publish and flourish and fall back into 
depression. Shame is there at every instance, revealing itself as it always does for all of us, as 
a function of ones idiosyncratic attachments and aspirations. Cvetkovich's attachments—to 
productivity, to boldness, to being a friend, to being political, to being a writer—are what she 
aspires to when she is up, but are also what shame her when she is down. 
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  One of the weaknesses of Depression: A Public Feeling is Cvetkovich’s equivocal 
relationship to privilege. In recent years, recognition of one’s privilege has virtually become a 
mandatory first step for anyone wanting to participate in Left political activism.4 Privilege 
comes in many forms, of course, some of which we are born into—class, race, gender—and 
some of which emerge over the course of a lifetime—professional status is but one example. 
Yet when Cvetkovich claims that she is writing about political depression and how capitalism 
feels, her writing has the whiff of hypocrisy when we read of her privileged experience of 
them. When she speaks about everyday racism, for example, she says that “racism is present, 
but differently so, for both white people and people of color—we are affected by a system of 
differential access" (120). While it is certainly true that systemic inequality affects everyone 
in the system, an important qualification must be made: the impact differs greatly depending 
on which side of inequality one finds oneself. This isn’t to say that she has not suffered from 
depression, nor is it to say that she doesn’t recognize the kind of ills that racism and 
capitalism causes, but simply that the shame of privilege is not a parallel to the shame of 
racism. Here is Cvetkovich acknowledging the way privilege appears in her everyday life: 
“Health maintenance has become for me a sign of self-love, although it also gives rise to 
some nagging questions about class. Regular dental care seems to be part of the secret life of 
middle-class domesticity that passes for normal" (48) or how, on moving to Connecticut, she 
missed the supermarket chain Whole Foods, "which, for those who can afford it, aims to 
transform grocery shopping from the invisible drudgery that can induce depression into an 
aesthetic experience” (45). What she seems to be doing is illustrating the way privilege can 
be an ongoing ‘nagging’ concern in the same way that racism has an ordinariness about it that 
structures the lives of every African-American living in the US. She doesn’t make this 
parallel explicit, but her use of words like everydayness and ordinary in both cases makes the 
parallel implicit. These confessions of privilege are part of a larger trope whereby 
contemporary consciousness-raising often involves rituals of the confession of privilege that 
are meant to be working towards a more equal society. Yet, they do the opposite. 
 Much of Cvetkovich’s discussion about her depression memoir indicates that, for her, 
the form itself is imbued with shame, and not simply because of its potential solipsism, but 
because of its use within the sphere of therapeutic culture and the skepticism it evokes within 
the academy where its scholarly value is doubted, (Depression 16). She writes about, “how 
                                                
4 Please see Andrea Smith’s, “Unsettling the Privilege of Self-Reflexivity.” Geographies of Privilege. 
New York: Routledge, 2013. 263–280. Print. 
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academia seemed to be killing me, a statement that seems very melodramatic given the 
privileged nature of my professional status" (18). Academia, she says, “breeds particular 
forms of panic and anxiety leading to what gets called depression—the fear that you have 
nothing to say, or that you can’t say what you want to say, or that you have something to say 
but it’s not important enough or smart enough" (18), and she asks: “Why is a position of 
relative privilege, the pursuit of creative thinking and teaching, lived as though it were 
impossible? What would make it easier to live with these sometimes impossible conditions?” 
(18) But what good does this do? Cvetkovich knows that she is able to see the dentist, think 
about indigenous land rights, and have her thoughts on such things published by one of the 
most prestigious academic publishing houses because of her privilege. Her confessions of 
privilege do not undo it; they manifest it.  
 I want to look more closely at the way Cvetkovich describes the writing that became 
this book. It illustrates an equivocation that Cvetkovich seems not to have noticed. By using 
the word ‘equivocation’ I mean to draw our attention to the way that meaning seems to slip 
out from under Cvetkovich. That she is not in control of these meanings is perhaps the most 
revealing part of the memoir: we learn most about Cvetkovich not by reading her 
discursively, but by reading her for what she says without quite meaning to. In a 2007 article 
about Public Feelings, she described the project that would become Depression: A Public 
Feeling as follows: 
I have been combining memoir and critical essay to critique medicalized notions 
of depression and to document the pressures of surviving academia. This is the 
riskiest project I’ve yet undertaken, even as I am inspired by other academic and 
specifically queer experiments in writing and take heart from the claim that the 
queer memoir operates as a form of collective witness. (463) 
I will read this passage twice, first for the way it uses the word queer and secondly for the 
way it adopts a rhetoric of risk, an important convention among memoirists.  
 In the passage, Cvetkovich is using the term queer in two ways. In the first, where she 
speaks of “queer experiments in writing,” she is using the term queer to mean nonnormative. 
Normative writing in academia is the discursive mode of academic articles and monographs. 
Queer experiments in writing defy such norms. Queer in this sense resists the kind of 
essentialism suggested by Cvetkovich’s second iteration of the word, where she says “the 
queer memoir operates as a form of collective witness.” This second iteration suggests that 
what makes Depression a queer project is the fact that its author is a lesbian. We see this 
again in her justifications for including the memoir part of the book where she writes:  
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Although up until the last drafts of the book, I was not sure if “The Depression 
Journals” would remain, the vitality of memoir within minoritarian cultures 
(which constitute a very different point of reference than the memoirs debated in 
the mainstream public sphere) remained a significant counterweight to my fear of 
exposure. (74) 
Again we see Cvetkovich claiming the position of writer-as-witness for “minoritarian 
cultures.” One way of understanding Cvetkovich’s ambivalent use of the word queer is 
through shame.  
  Cvetkovich’s ambivalent use of the word queer suggests that she is writing for two 
audiences. As Silvan Tomkins reminds us repeatedly in his work Affect Imagery 
Consciousness, shame, like all the affects, is incredibly idiosyncratic. For writers or artists, or 
anyone who performs their special talents for an audience, shame is particularly prevalent. 
Tomkins writes, “If I wish my work to be in the mainstream of contemporary efforts, I may 
be ashamed if my work is judged to be somewhat deviant. If, however, I wish to be creative, I 
may be ashamed if my work is judged to be in the mainstream of contemporary opinion,” 
(390). Shame relates to our aspirations; if we aspire to mainstream acceptance, accusations of 
deviancy shame us. Consider this modification of the Tomkins’ from what might be 
Cvetkovich’s perspective: ‘If I wish my work to be lauded by the mainstream, I will be 
ashamed if it is judged queer in the non normative sense; If, however, I wish to be recognized 
by my Public Feelings colleagues, I will be ashamed if my work is judged queer, in the 
reductive, essentialist sense.’ Since Cvetkovich hopes her work will make an impact on the 
wider culture where medical and psychological explanations for depression dominate, she 
adopts the reductive use of the word queer at the risk of alienating her allies in Public 
Feelings. This point may seem minor, but I think the kind of equivocating we see with her 
use of the word queer is repeated in other ways as well.  
 In particular, I was struck by the way Cvetkovich describes her project in terms of 
risk. Depression was her “riskiest project,” to date, she writes. Yet, the rhetoric of risk is 
actually one of the most mainstream elements of its writing. I find it difficult to read her 
“fears of exposure,” and claims of participation in “minoritarian culture,” as more than 
rhetoric. Undoubtedly, Texas at large is hard place to be a lesbian, but if there is one well-
protected, privileged enclave for a queer intellectual, Ann Cvetkovich has found it in her 
professional position in Austin. Consider the riskiness of this project from the point of view 
of Cvetkovich's two audiences: her Public Feelings colleagues and the mainstream. On the 
first front, for all the ways she imagines her memoir to exemplify a creative escape from the 
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confines of academic writing, the critical memoir was already a thoroughly sanctioned form 
within the community that matters to her most—queer and feminist academics and the Public 
Feelings community. Examples of such work would include Kathleen Stewart’s Ordinary 
Affects, which I quoted above, or Sedgwick’s A Dialogue on Love or The Weather in Proust. 
From a mainstream perspective, Cvetkovich’s justifications for writing in the personal draw 
also from the confessional, risk-taking rhetoric of American culture, where personal exposure 
is a necessary element in memoirs, day-time talk shows, and reality TV. The implied heroism 
of risk-taking and witnessing are merely examples of the everyday individuating rhetoric that 
pervades American society. Rhetorics of exposure are as seductive and as marketable as the 
word "sale." What might have been more risky, for Cvetkovich, would have been to proclaim 
no risk at all. Indeed, thinking about the very everyday nature of her memoir, we might 
applaud her on that front because Cvetkovich has sought and succeeded in capturing the very 
dull way that depression can deaden the day.  
 I began this chapter with a discussion of empathy and its relation to shame. Both 
emotions rely upon identification. In Kate Zambreno’s Heroines, we saw identification in 
three ways. First, we saw how Zambreno “channelled” the mad wives, creating alliances with 
them along various lines: they all struggled with depression, with writerly ambition, with 
invalidating husbands. They all wore cloche hats and sparkly nail polish. Secondly, in her 
blog Frances Farmer is my Sister, this invitation-only community was and is a place of 
encouragement, solidarity and consolation for mostly women writers, who read and write 
“like girls" (Zambreno 279). Thirdly, with her publication of Heroines, Zambreno sought a 
wider audience and at some point began to describe this work as a politics. Shared identities 
and shared feeling, were, on their own, political. In Ann Cvetkovich’s Depression: A Public 
Feeling, though her language is more subtle and her claims to the political more restrained, 
we find a similar method of writing through identification. Cvetkovich sees her struggle as 
typical to life in academia, and hopes that depressed “graduate students and untenured and 
adjunct faculty, especially those in the humanities,” will find solace in her memoir (32). She 
also hopes that her work will provide comfort to minoritarian cultures, by which she means 
those labeled by the term queer, in any sense of the term. For both, these books were political 
because they were personal; their willingness to expose themselves was due to their 
commitment to their communities, and to change. 
 
Intimate Publics and the Memoir as an Instance of Cruel Optimism 
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With these two books in mind, I’d now like to turn to two concepts that will elucidate 
why the kinds of alliances these books try to create foreclose rather than generate a politics. 
Both concepts come from Lauren Berlant: the first is the intimate public; the second is her 
notion of cruel optimism. In her book The Female Complaint, Berlant describes an intimate 
public as one that is defined by the shared painful experience of being a member of a 
subordinated class. She argues that an intimate public shares the perception of a commonly 
lived history and, consequently, of “narratives and things…deemed expressive of that 
history" (viii).  
Whether linked to women or other nondominant people, it flourishes as a porous, 
affective scene of identification among strangers that promises a certain 
experience of belonging and provides a complex of consolation, confirmation, 
discipline, and discussion about how to live as an x. One may have chosen freely 
to identify as an x; one may be marked by traditional taxonomies—those details 
matter, but not to the general operation of the public sense that some qualities or 
experience are held in common. The intimate public provides anchors for realistic, 
critical assessment of the way things are and provides material that foments 
enduring, resisting, overcoming, and enjoying being an x. (Berlant viii) 
Note Berlant’s choice of words to describe this affective scene of belonging. What is 
promised to these strangers is “consolation, confirmation, discipline and discussion about 
how to live as an x" (viii, emphasis mine). While the scene of identification may be porous, it 
is not too porous: the word discipline says as much. The x tells us that an intimate public can 
coalesce around almost anything, but it must believe in itself as nondominant. In 
Cvetkovich’s work, the nondominant were people who identified as queer, though they could 
conceivably also include academics caught in precarious financial situations or the depressed 
more generally. In Zambreno’s work, the nondominant were women writers. Their books 
were written for such intimate publics; they were “laboratories for imagining and cobbling 
together alternative construals about how life has appeared and how legitimately it could be 
better shaped" (Berlant and Prosser 182).  
 An intimate public creates a community but often it is one that is carefully sealed off 
from mainstream culture. Life writing and blogging both exemplify intimate publics at work: 
“all the focused Internet worlds in which people are hammering out how to live as anomalous 
to a projected-out norm" (Berlant and Prosser 181). One scholar working with this paradigm 
describes personal mommy blogging as an example because it creates an intimate public 
distinct from the mainstream through the use of pseudonyms and “the general emphasis on 
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securing an audience of sympathetic, like-minded strangers to these writings, while 
minimizing their visibility to a broader, outsider audience, as well as by keeping these 
writings secret from their ‘real-life’ employment, social, and familial networks”(Morrison 
38). An obvious parallel in this chapter is the community created by Kate Zambreno’s blog, 
Frances Farmer is My Sister. Berlant says that these kinds of communities are those that 
Foucault might have called heterotopias, “where one can encounter the positivity of being 
otherwise" (Berlant and Prosser 181). All of this sounds quite promising: it is, and it isn’t.  
 While an intimate public certainly serves the affective interests of those in its midst, 
one of the disturbing aspects of such cultures is that they are effectively juxtapolitical, 
flourishing, says Berlant, “to one side of politics, referring to historical subordinations 
without mobilizing a fundamental activism with respect to them” (184). The political is, 
“deemed an elsewhere managed by elites who are interested in reproducing the conditions of 
their objective superiority" (Berlant, Female Complaint 3) and intimate publics implicitly 
accept that the political does not involve them. At the end of her introductory chapter, Berlant 
says, 
This was a depressing book to write because it is a case study in what happens 
when a capitalist culture effectively markets conventionality as the source and 
solution to the problem of living in worlds that are economically, legally, and 
normatively not on the side of almost anyone’s survival, let alone flourishing. 
Nonetheless, flourishing happens. (Berlant 31)  
Flourishing is what happens when the mommy bloggers and women-writers find company in 
protective online enclaves. Berlant describes intimate publics as having a “love affair with 
conventionality" (Female Complaint 3). She doesn’t mean that they have a love affair with 
normativity:  
Conventionalizing and normativizing are not the same thing. Sometimes they 
are….only sometimes is the taking up of generic form the taking up of a 
normative norm (a norm to which valorization is attached). Sometimes 
conventionality is a defense against norms too, a way to induce proximity without 
assimilation… and sometimes it’s a way of creating another, counterconventional, 
space. (181) 
This is precisely how Zambreno conceives of the space she has created:  
So the decision to write the private in public, it is a political one. It is a 
counterattack against this [historically sexist] censorship. To tell our narratives, 
the truth of our experiences […] Why write one's diary in public? To counter this 
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shaming and guilt project. To refuse to swallow. To refuse to scratch ourselves 
out. To refuse to be censored, to be silent. (Zambreno 291) 
The problem with the works we’ve read here is that they are so subjective they can never be 
anything more than juxtapolitical—sitting on the sidelines, minor, with a minor range, 
creating an intimate public that is more “gendering machine” (Female Complaint 36) than 
anything else. The paradox of Zambreno’s writing is that it maintains the gender inequality 
she supposedly wants to overthrow. By belying any historical discontinuity between the mad 
wives of the modernists and her as the mad wife of Akron, Ohio, she casts female hysteria as 
universal, or at least universally female. By casting her husband in the role of the invalidating 
partner, she chooses an oppressive atmosphere rather than working to overcome it. In 
Cvetkovich’s case, the solutions to the problems she cites are similarly narrow: queer knitting 
groups provide solidarity for a very few.  
 Intimate publics are, in Berlant’s view, a mode of coping with the pain of being in a 
marginalized position. They are depressing because they console and discipline the 
marginalized without providing them with a way out. We saw the way that Cvetkovich 
disciplined Smith for his “naturalizing” rhetoric and his failure to recognize indigenous 
populations and Zambreno concludes Heroines by encouraging young women writers to “cry 
Woolf,” like she has. What Berlant would prefer would be for the marginalized to find an 
active way out of such enclaves.  
 In her book Cruel Optimism, Berlant argues that we must find a way to detach 
ourselves from such modes of coping. When the memoir is envisioned as political because it 
as been written in the highly subjective forms we have seen in Heroines and Depression: A 
Public Feeling, it starts to look a lot like a site of cruel optimism. Berlant explains that  
a relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an 
obstacle to your flourishing. It might involve food, or a kind of love; it might be a 
fantasy of the good life, or a political project. It might rest on something simpler, 
too, like a new habit that promises to induce in you an improved way of being. 
These kinds of optimistic relation are not inherently cruel. They become cruel 
only when the object that draws your attachment actively impedes the aim that 
brought you to it initially. (Berlant, Cruel Optimism 1) 
As we have seen in both Cvetkovich and Zambreno, the aim of the memoir has been to 
generate a politics. What they mean by the term ‘politics,’ is something like an ethics—a 
mode of participation that would be good for society as well as for them. They hope that 
identification with others like them will produce solidarity and that from such feelings of 
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solidarity, social change would emerge. In the meantime, identification would shore them up, 
allow them to remain hopeful and optimistic.  
 For many years, Berlant has been writing books that trace what she calls a “national 
sentimentality,” or the way in which affect is mobilized in all sorts of political and 
juxtapolitical realms. Her national sentimentality trilogy—The Anatomy of National Fantasy, 
The Female Complaint, and The Queen of America Goes to Washington City, all examine 
“the affective components of citizenship and the public sphere,” “the state’s withdrawal from 
the uneven expansion of economic opportunity, social norms, and legal rights,” and the way 
fantasies are fraying in the realms of “upward mobility, job security, political and social 
equality, and lively, durable intimacy" (Berlant, Cruel Optimism 3). Cruel Optimism’s final 
chapter is titled “On the Desire for the Political.” There, she traces the way desire for the 
political has lead, in recent years, to a proliferation of affectively political performances—by 
artists but also by politicians. She begins by quoting President George W. Bush who wanted 
to “speak directly to the people" (Berlant, Cruel Optimism 223) because he believed, in her 
assessment, that “a public’s binding to the political is best achieved neither by policy nor 
ideology but the affect of feeling political together" (Berlant, Cruel Optimism 224). Feeling 
political together can happen anywhere. It can happen at rallies and vigils, or in a knitting 
group, or any place that one is called upon to offer a “personal story about not being defeated 
by what is overwhelming" (227). It happens at “political meetings in town halls, caucuses, 
demonstrations, and other intimate assemblies [where the preference for immediacy is 
preferred to] the pleasure of disembodied migratory identification that constitutes mass 
politics" (226).  
 Berlant describes affective attachments like these as sites of cruel optimism because 
they maintain an attachment “to the system and thereby confirm [it] and the legitimacy of the 
affects that make one feel bound to it, even if the manifest content of the binding has the 
negative force of cynicism or the dark attenuation of political depression" (Berlant, Cruel 
Optimism 227). Yet, Berlant also suggests that cruel optimism may be the only kind of 
optimism presently available to us. That we no longer live in a society where uniformity and 
normatively are prized the way they once were is a good thing, but the enclaves of 
nonnormativity and the ongoing valorization of writing for minoritarian cultures suggests that 
active participation in the body politic continues to be the domain of elite, or at least more 
mainstream, cultures.  
 We are back where we started where I argued that empathy was an effective antidote 
to shame only on the most intimate levels and that, beyond that, it could tend to expand 
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shame’s domain rather than limiting it. There is no doubt that empathy is what we seek from 
our friends, family and lovers. Intimate publics aim to expand the realm of empathy to 
include people we don’t know, but might like to. They are strangers who are like us. In all of 
these situations, shame’s toxicity can be quelled by the simple utterance Brené Brown 
suggested: me too. Yet in a world as fractured by systemic inequality as ours, some shames 
will not find their antidote in such a phrase; indeed, some shouldn’t. 
 Both Zambreno and Cvetkovich see their minoritarian status as a source of shame. 
Cvetkovich adds to this a recognition of her own privileged status within a society defined by 
systemic inequality. Both hope that their personal stories and the form of the memoir will be 
a starting point for something political. Considering these hopes from the perspective of 
Lauren Berlant, however, these hopes read as illustrations of cruel optimism. Their 
attachments to the personal do create intimate publics, but they also inherently accept and 
maintain their sidelined status, thereby leaving mainstream politics as they are. By relying on 
identification and fellow-feelings such as empathy as a basis of politics, the mistake they 
seem to make is best summarized by Leslie Jamison, author of The Empathy Exams: 
“empathy can fuel an ironic kind of self-absorption: the encounter with another person’s 
experience becomes another way of experiencing oneself,” and worse: “It can also offer a 
dangerous sense of completion: that something has been done because something has 
been felt” (Jameson, “Response” n.pag). Perhaps it is for this reason that the authors I 
treat in the next chapter—Sheila Heti and Ben Lerner—are so ambivalent about 
feeling, selfhood, and meaning. They are ambivalent about autobiography, too. In the 
final chapter of this dissertation we will find a formal counterpoint to the critical 
memoir in Timothy Bewes’ The Event of Postcolonial Shame. There we will revisit 
the shame of privilege, the role of autobiography in literary criticism and a different 
perspective on how subjectivity can and cannot deepen the political significance of 
such work. 
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The Unexpected Gifts of Shame and Contempt 
 
A history of learned contempt as it appears in philosophy and 
science, in manners and morals, and in esthetics would be nothing 
less than the story of civilization.  
 
Silvan Tomkins, Affect Imagery Consciousness 
 
What happens to autobiography and shame when both are fictionalized? This chapter 
discusses Sheila Heti’s How Should a Person Be?, published first in Canada in 2009 and then 
republished (in a slightly different version) in the US and the UK in 2012 and Ben Lerner’s 
Leaving the Atocha Station, published in the US in 2011. The books parallel each other in 
many ways, yet their differences—in tone, particularly, but also in terms of their engagement 
with the world—make them projects of entirely different orders and, I suspect, longevity. 
What they share is a contemporary suspicion about what it means to be a self, a lover, a 
friend, a writer, an artist, a genius. They wonder whether or not art means anything, and 
whether or not the word ‘beautiful’ has any relation to what art might mean, if it does. Both 
books are loosely autobiographical; both involve narrators who set out to write something 
(Sheila, a play about women; Adam, a long, research-driven poem); and both narrators 
abandon the initial art works in favor of a narration of the failure to write (a shame-fueled 
trope we saw also in Cvetkovich and Zambreno in the previous chapter). Both books begin in 
a place strongly inflected with shame, move in and out of periods of contempt, and conclude 
as a traditional bildungsroman might, though in both cases the concluding tone of sincerity 
and optimism comes as a surprise. Similar as they may be in the questions they ask about art, 
selfhood, meaning, and genius, reading the books couldn’t feel more different. Ben Lerner is 
a poet and Leaving the Atocha Station is a poet’s novel: every sentence sounds beautiful. On 
the other hand, about half way through Sheila Heti’s How Should a Person Be?, I wrote in its 
margin, “This book makes me want to start a fight.”  
Though shame is a central theme in both books, in this chapter, I take a new approach 
to shame by expanding the boundaries of my inquiry to include a closely related affect, 
disgust-contempt. I include disgust-contempt because it seems to offer both authors a way out 
of the shame spiral, where shame begets shame ad infinitum. Unlike shame-humiliation, 
which is self-reflective and sometimes endlessly so, disgust-contempt interests itself only in 
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the rejected object with the purpose of severing any connection to it. If shame-humiliation’s 
typical physiological manifestation is the blush, disgust-contempt’s is the action of vomiting. 
At their worst, shame-humiliation can spiral into narcissism; disgust-contempt into the 
dehumanization of the other. Politically, shame-humiliation maintains uncomfortable ties to 
corrupted or corroded institutions in the hopes that they would improve; disgust, on the other 
hand, writes manifestos, divides cities, creates concentration camps. At their best, shame 
accepts one’s place in the world and hopes for the possibility of being able to contribute to it 
or change it; disgust-contempt actively rejects what it hates. A positive manifestation of 
disgust might, then, be a disgust with shame’s inaction or a disgust with disgust’s historic 
tendency to dehumanize the other.5 In How Should a Person Be? shame is no longer an 
interruption of interest or excitement, shame is what is interesting and exciting. Similarly, in 
Leaving the Atocha Station, the protagonist, Adam Gordon, seems to pursue shame, at times 
even recklessly. At key moments in both texts, shame is no longer the negative afterglow of a 
behavior one regrets but is actually the sought after affect. In both texts, shame is what keeps 
the protagonists tied to community; where such ties are severed, disgust is what does the 
severing. 
This chapter has five sections. In the first, I explore the autobiographical nature of these 
books as they relate to notions of the self-as-performance and to postmodernity. In the 
second, I illustrate how both books articulate a deep suspicion about what art means and 
whether or not the word “beautiful” might have anything to do with it. In the third and fourth 
sections I treat the books separately: illustrating, in the third section, how contempt leads to 
freedom in How Should a Person Be? and demonstrating, in the fourth, how shame keeps 
Adam in Leaving the Atocha Station attached to an identity he did not choose (that of being 
an American citizen) and one he did (that of being a poet). In the fifth and final section, I 
bring the two books back into dialogue, showing how both narrators are finally able to 
abandon their performed selves, at least momentarily, and how this permits intimate 
friendships to flourish. 
 
 
                                                
5 Seen this way, disgust could reject right-wing efforts to dehumanize the other, and therefore rouse 
the left to action rather than the spiral of self-abasement in which it is too often caught. There is a 
power to disgust that the left has too often been unwilling to use. For a lengthier discussion of the 
political uses of disgust, please see Daniel R. Kelly’s Yuck!: The Nature and Moral Significance of 
Disgust.
 57 
On the Question of Autobiography and the Performed Self 
 
 Neither How Should a Person Be? nor Leaving the Atocha Station are strictly 
autobiographical yet both narrators—Sheila Heti and Adam Gordon—are clearly echoes of 
the writers who created them. Sheila Heti and Ben Lerner know that part of what will make 
their work intriguing is the suggestion that some of what happened to the fictionalized 
characters actually happened to them. In his extended review for The New Yorker, literary 
critic James Wood misses the point of this tantalizing indeterminacy when he writes that, 
"Since most readers do not know who Heti's friends are or how Heti herself lives, the 
characters will effectively appear invented--as Heti doubtless understands” (68). Heti may 
know that her characters will feel invented, but she knows that what will make them so 
compelling is the suggestion that they aren’t. Heti, writing about this topic in a review of 
Lerner’s book, notes the same kind of thrill in his Leaving: 
It’s hard not to take Adam’s life as a version of Lerner’s: both are young poets 
raised in Topeka, Kansas; both spent time in New York among ‘the dim kids of 
the stars’; both spent a year in Madrid on a poetry fellowship (Adam’s unnamed; 
Lerner’s a Fulbright). If you were to see, at a fancy-dress party, a man dressed up 
in the clothes he wears every day, you would not know whether he was dressing 
up as himself, or not dressing up at all. That’s part of the frisson of this book. 
(Heti, “I hadn’t even seen the Alambra” LRB 32) 
Lerner and his fictional counterpart, Adam, share a fellowship, a constellation of cities 
(Topeka, Providence, Madrid), and, among other things, the fact of being a poet (Lerner, 
Leaving has published three collections of poetry and one of those poems appears in Leaving 
as the ‘work’ of Adam Gordon). Heti and her fictional counterpart, Sheila, share a circle of 
friends—Margaux Williamson, Misha Glouberman, Sholem Krishtalka—a home city—
Toronto, and both are writers in their mid-thirties, recently divorced.  
 At the outset of How Should a Person Be?, the character Sheila Heti is writing a play 
that had been commissioned by a feminist theater company, and, overwhelmed by the 
experience of having just left her marriage, is finding this impossible to do. In a last ditch 
effort, Sheila asks her best friend Margaux if she can record their conversations in the hopes 
that it will jumpstart the play. Margaux doesn’t want to be recorded: “I don’t know! I don’t 
know where things will end up! Then whatever I happen to say, someone will believe I really 
said it and meant it? No. No. You there with that tape recorder just looks like my own death" 
(Heti 60). Margaux’s fears here are an interesting echo of both Barthes conceptions of 
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photography and Paul de Man’s of autobiography who argued that all autobiography was a 
kind of disfigurement or defacement and always, to an extent, speaks to the reader as if the 
writer were already dead (Anderson 13). Margaux eventually concedes. Attentive readers 
knew she would because the form of the book had already shifted from the layout typical of 
prose to that of playwriting, as below. Sheila summarizes her play for Margaux concluding 
with “It’s stupid!” to which Margaux replies: 
 
 MARGAUX 
(laughing) It's just an autobiography.  
 Sheila puts her head in her hands. 
SHEILA 
I know, I know! But my life keeps changing. My life keeps changing! (65-66) 
That Sheila agrees with Margaux’s assessment of the play—that it is just an autobiography—
is important because the play Sheila was writing turns into the book we will read. This point 
is made clear later in the book when Margaux tells Sheila she must do something with the 
recordings she has made:  
Then finally she [Margaux] looked at me and said, ‘I want you to finish your 
play.’ 
‘What! My embarrassing, impossible play!’ 
‘Yes! And I want it to answer your question—about how a person should be—so 
that you never have to think about it anymore….' 
‘Does it have to be a play?’ 
She thought about it for a moment, then grinned. ’No.’( 262) 
This scene is the genesis of the book. The play that Sheila has spent most of the book failing 
to write (I will elaborate upon this later), becomes the novel we are reading, but it isn’t just a 
novel. As Margaux said of the play, and as we can say of the book, to a certain degree, “It’s 
just an autobiography!” 
 Yet, in interviews, Heti was contradictory about the significance of having created a 
character whose name she shared. In some interviews she claims an absolute separation from 
the fictional character and other times she seems unconcerned about them being read as one 
and the same. In an interview for The Awl, Heti declares them utterly distinct: 
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JESSICA: Among so many strands of this book, one that really appealed to me 
was the one about your friendship with Margaux. In the beginning of the book 
you write that you didn’t really have any friends until you were 25. 
SHEILA: My character didn’t! (n.pag) 
Similarly, in an interview for Joyland, she says: “I should say that this book is not 
autobiographical, any more than my last book, Ticknor, was autobiographical. Both are 
emotional autobiographies, but neither are faithful to the facts of my life or its progress 
through time.” But elsewhere, Heti seemed unconcerned about whether or not the character in 
her book was understood to be a faithful representation of her personality. Indeed, much 
criticism of her work has spoken about Sheila Heti, the writer, and Sheila Heti, the character, 
as if they were interchangeable:  
This error of criticism suggests the book is being treated less as literature and 
more as a picture of Sheila’s persona. Heti has indicated a similar lack of interest 
in her own aesthetic choices. When asked by an interviewer if he could refer to 
her and Sheila as the same person, Heti said, “Sure. I don’t care. They’re not the 
same thing, but I don’t care.” (Tennant-Moore n.pag) 
This flippancy over the slippery nature of autobiography suggests that the performativity of 
selfhood that we see acted out on the level of the books extends beyond their pages into the 
discussions of the performed self in the world.  
 When Ben Lerner was asked similar questions, his responses were more thoughtful. 
In discussion with Tao Lin, the author his own semi-autobiographical novel entitled Taipei, 
Lerner remarked that, “Part of what impoverishes discussions about fact and fiction is that 
they tend to forget the degree to which what doesn’t happen is also caught up in our 
experience—is the negative element of experience. I think you can write autobiographically 
from experiences you didn’t have, because the experiences you don’t have are experienced 
negatively in the experiences you do” (Lerner qtd. in interview with Tao Lin in The Believer). 
In his most recent book, 10:04 Lerner writes again about the conflation of the imaginary with 
the real. 10:04 is again fictionalized autobiography, sitting “on the very edge of fiction,” 
(237), and it describes the impact of the unexpected success of the narrator’s first novel. One 
of the narrative strands in Leaving the Atocha Station is a lie that Adam tells his two love 
interests—Isabel and Teresa—about his mother. He says that she has died, then, out of guilt, 
he says that she hasn’t died but was dying. He explains that he said she was dead because he 
was trying it out, testing himself to see how it would feel. In 10:04, he writes about the 
impact of what he’d written in Leaving: 
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In my novel the protagonist tells people his mother is dead, when in fact she’s 
alive and well. Halfway through writing the book, my mom was diagnosed with 
breast cancer and I felt, however insanely, that the novel was in part responsible, 
that having even a fictionalized version of myself producing bad karma around 
parental health was in some unspecifiable way to blame for the diagnosis. I 
stopped work on the novel and was resolved to trash it until my mom—who was 
doing perfectly well after a mastectomy and who, thankfully, hadn’t had to do 
chemo—convinced me over the course of a couple of months to finish the 
book.(Lerner, 10:04 138). 
Listening to the authors speak about the nature of their fictional autobiographical writing 
suggests that, for them, the stability of selfhood or of the self that is performed extends 
beyond the boundaries of their books. This is important because it gives Sheila and Adam’s 
questions about authenticity, selfhood, and art-making a double meaning. On the level of the 
books, these questions propel plot lines. Beyond that level, these questions look more like 
philosophical interrogations about the links between authenticity and art-making. One of the 
ways these questions are explored is through the performed self.  
 One of the blurbs on the back of the UK edition of How Should a Person Be? is taken 
from the review Wood gave of the book in The New Yorker. It wasn’t a glowing review. Yet 
the pull-quote swings to the positive and is read that way all the more as a presumably 
laudatory blurb: “a vital and funny picture of the excitements and longueurs of trying to be a 
creator in a free, late-capitalist, Western city” (Wood 68). As anyone with a background in 
theory knows, late-capitalist is a term that rouses its own connotative entourage: with it, 
Wood is claiming that this book is about simulation, posing, and fakery. In Frederic 
Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late-Capitalism, postmodernism is 
characterized as “an aesthetic situation engendered by the absence of the historical referent” 
(25). Elsewhere, Jameson describes the postmodern as an era characterized by the waning of 
affect: 
As for expression and feelings or emotions, the liberation, in contemporary 
society, from the older anomie of the centered subject may also mean not merely a 
liberation from anxiety but a liberation from every other kind of feeling as well, 
since there is no longer a self present to do the feeling. (Jameson qtd. in Terada 2) 
If there is no longer a self present to do the feeling, what entity is it, exactly, who is present 
enough to do the writing? One answer, these books suggest, is that in the place of selfhood, 
we have only performance. The real has been utterly replaced, says Jean Baudrillard: 
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By crossing into a space whose curvature is no longer that of the real, nor that of 
truth, the era of simulation is inaugurated by a liquidation of all referentials….It is 
no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is a question 
of substituting the signs of the real for the real, that is to say of an operation of 
deterring every real process via its operational double, a programmatic, 
metastable, perfectly descriptive machine that offers all the signs of the real and 
short-circuits all its vicissitudes. (2)  
Both Baudrillard and Jameson have abandoned the idea that the self and the self that thinks 
(or feels) is our last defense against skepticism. Descartes’, “Je pense donc je suis,” no longer 
proves anything except that at one time, a person performed selfhood so convincingly for 
himself that he believed it. In Don DeLillo’s Underworld, “subjectivity has become so 
invaded by the image that modern identity itself is a 'pretence' with no real--a mask which is 
no longer separable from what might once have been underneath. People, reflects the 
protagonist, have started pretending to be exactly who they are" (qtd. in Bewes, Reification 
xii).  
 Certainly this is how How Should a Person Be? and Leaving the Atocha Station 
initially portray selfhood, both in what the protagonists say about selfhood but also on the 
meta-fictional level where the self of the author is just barely distinguishable from the 
protagonist of the book. We have seen this before: an author’s self-referentiality is often a 
kind of metafictional-joke or a tool for extra-fictional commentary. In Borges’ The Aleph, for 
example, a character named Borges rants about the writings of a poet who couldn’t be anyone 
other than Pablo Neruda; in Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything is Illuminated, a character 
named Foer is writing a highly magical novel about a town named Trachimbrod and a 
massacre that took place there. What distinguishes the use of the author-as-character in Heti's 
and Lerner's works from, say, DeLillo’s observations on the performed self or Foer’s use of 
himself as a character in his own novel, is that in these works there is no sense that a 
performed self is a fallen state, nor is it merely a joke. In Lerner’s and Heti’s work, the 
fictionalized self cannot be fully distinguished from the self that writes. As we saw above, 
when asked if she minded when interviewers confused the Sheila of the book with her Heti 
answered, simplistically, “They’re not the same thing, but I don’t really care” (qtd. in 
Tennent-Moore n.pag).  
 The question of selfhood, traditionally a serious, ethical, character-building question, 
is now pure performance, something we see in both books. The opening to Sheila Heti’s How 
Should a Person Be? captures this perfectly: 
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For years and years I asked it [How Should a Person Be?] of everyone I met. I was 
always watching to see what they were going to do in any situation, so I could do 
it too. I was always listening to their answers, so if I liked them, I could make 
them my answers too. I noticed the way people dressed, the way they treated their 
lovers—in everyone, there was something to envy. You can admire anyone for 
being themselves. It’s hard not to, when everyone’s so good at it. But when you 
think of them all together like that, how can you choose? How can you say, I’d 
rather be responsible like Misha than irresponsible like Margaux? Responsibility 
looks so good on Misha, and irresponsibility looks so good on Margaux. How 
could I know which would look best on me? (Heti 1) 
If “oneself” is the traditional answer to How Should a Person Be? Heti, here, dismantles that 
expectation entirely, making fun of it in a contemporary way. Selfhood is like a dress: totally 
disposable. A recent cartoon in The New Yorker features a couple standing before a door: the 
woman is about to ring the doorbell, her partner, a man, is holding a bottle of wine. As a kind 
of united front, or setting out of a battle plan for the evening, he says to her, “Just don’t be 
yourself." “Being” is nothing more than performance. What a person is is nothing more than 
what one can see—how people behave at parties, dress, treat their lovers, answer questions 
and so on. These performances are choices that other people have made, just as they chose 
which beer to drink and which outfit to wear: they are not choices that are outer 
manifestations of a complex inner self, no. They are simply scripts people have adopted. Heti 
goes on: “I know that personality is just an invention of the news media. I know that 
character exists from the outside alone. I know that inside the body there’s just temperature." 
(2)  
Similarly, Ben Lerner’s book describes selfhood in terms of performance though here we 
start to see the way even performances reflect a value system at work. For Adam, admirable 
people are politically engaged and their art reflects that engagement in a serious yet 
unpretentious manner. Artists should be aesthetically and philosophically honest. They 
should be aware of the limitations of art, but should always push to the very edge of those 
limitations. And they must care about the world. All of these values are legible in the masks 
that Adam adopts. Unsurprisingly, in addition to these more serious values, there is the hope 
that he might be attractive, but even there, his aesthetic and political ideals are on display:  
…I was acutely aware of not being attractive enough for my surroundings; luckily 
I had a strategy for such situations… I opened my eyes a little more widely than 
normal, opened them to a very specific point, raising my eyebrows and also 
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allowing my mouth to curl up into the implication of a smile…. The goal of this 
look was to make my insufficiencies appear chosen, to give my unstylish hair and 
clothes the force of protest; I was a figure for the outside to this life, I had known 
it and rejected it and now was back as an ambassador from a reality more 
immediate and just. (Lerner 26-7) 
This performance, and others like it, is repeated throughout Leaving, usually in an effort to 
seduce a woman. Even if Adam doubts the sincerity of the roles he adopts, the consistency 
with which he chooses them illustrates how the masks we choose reflect a self that does the 
choosing. His performances are sometimes of a figure he would admire—one who could be 
authentically political—and sometimes they are of someone he thinks he appears to be 
anyway—the melancholy poet. Adam spends much of his time in a drug-induced haze, the 
result of the cocktail of caffeine, hash and the white pills (tranquilizers or anti-depressants) he 
takes every morning. His performances, then, capture both Adam’s stoned detachment but 
also his wish to belong.   
 One of the most evocative aspects about Leaving the Atocha Station is the way Lerner 
manages to work such longing into the level of language, by which I mean not only his use of 
English but also his reflections on what it means to be learning his second language, Spanish. 
His descriptions are intellectually playful without the cheekiness such linguistic pyrotechnics 
usually perform. He considers his failure to speak Spanish properly to be his only real asset, 
particularly in relation to his romantic pursuits. We see an example here, where Adam 
describes his relationship with Isabel:  
our most intense and ostensibly intimate interactions were the effect of her 
imbuing my silences, the gaps out of which my Spanish was primarily composed, 
with tremendous intellectual and aesthetic force. And I believe she imbued my 
body thus, finding every touch enhanced by ambiguity of intention, as if it too 
required translation, and so each touch branched out, became a variety of touches. 
Her experience of my body, I thought, was more her experience of her experience 
of her body, of its symphonic receptivity, ridiculous phrase, and my experience of 
my body was her experience once removed, which meant my body was dissolved, 
and that’s all I’d ever really wanted from my body, such as it was. (46-7) 
Adam is grateful for the way language can cleave them in both senses of the word. Without 
the barrier that Spanish provides, Adam’s words would be simply Adam’s words and his 
body merely his body. Adam truly does desire Isabel and wants her to desire him. Yet, in 
Lerner’s formulation, it is antiquated or at least irrelevant whether or not Adam is desired for 
 64 
who he truly is. Adam performs the melancholy artist whenever Isabel or Teresa (his other 
love interest) is around to see him, and although he knows that he is performing, he is still 
disappointed and angry when he realizes that neither of them have been taken in by his 
performances: Teresa saw them as evidence of his homesickness and Isabel saw them as a 
manifestation of jealousy.  
 Heti’s Sheila is similarly distressed that her friends see past her performances: “They 
like me for who I am,” she laments, “and I would rather be liked for who I appear to be, and 
for who I appear to be, to be who I am" (3). In an interview, Heti commented on this aspect 
of her character, Sheila, saying: “this is a culture of performance, right? There are personas 
everywhere. For a fiction writer, you can choose: you can play with character, or, like the 
entire culture, you can play with persona. Persona is a social performance, while character is 
really make-believe" (Heti "Interview" in Joyland). From one perspective, persona is more 
closely tied to personality because it is a performance that one has chosen. A character, on 
the other hand, is pure invention and so, in a sense, entirely free from the person doing the 
invention. From another perspective though, character is fully bounded by the imaginative 
contours of the individual personality that writes. Persona makes no such demands upon the 
personality.  
 While it is clear that both Sheila Heti and Ben Lerner are interested in the way that 
selfhood gets performed, their approaches to the question bifurcate. In Heti’s book, the only 
people who can see through Sheila’s performance are her close circle of friends. For 
everyone else, presumably, the persona she adopts is never interrogated. As one of the very 
few critical reviewers of Heti’s book described it, in How Should a Person Be? 
“inscrutability is merely a tone" (Tennant-Moore n.pag). Heti is unconcerned about Sheila’s 
character, suggesting that the answer to the book’s titular question will always apply only 
superficially. In Lerner’s book, on the other hand, Adam’s performances are read by the other 
characters as symptoms of deeper, truer feelings. Their interpretations (of homesickness and 
jealousy) are absolutely correct, something which suggests that recognition and intimacy are 
possible even in a culture so enamored with performance. In Lerner’s book, the possibility of 
intimacy is already foregrounded in the way Adam reflects upon his façade versus his true 
self, exemplified by his plaintive observation, “that’s all I’d ever really wanted from my 
body, such as it was" (47). In this way, Lerner creates an intimacy with the readers that will 
eventually be found between the characters as well. 
 
 
 65 
Authentic Art in a World of Performance? 
  
 Leaving the Atocha Station begins with an astonished and apprehensive account of the 
narrator seeing a man moved to tears while standing before Roger Van der Weyden’s 
fifteenth century painting, Descent from the Cross. Adam asks himself, “Was he, I wondered, 
just facing the wall to the hide his face as he dealt with whatever grief he’d brought into the 
museum? Or was he having a profound experience of art?" (8) Adam, himself a successful 
poet, muses: 
I had long worried that I was incapable of having a profound experience of art and 
I had trouble believing that anyone had, at least anyone I knew. I was intensely 
suspicious of people who claimed a poem or painting or piece of music ‘changed 
their life’ especially since I had often known these people before and after their 
experience and could register no change. Although I claimed to be a poet, 
although my supposed talent as a writer had earned me my fellowship in Spain, I 
tended to find lines of poetry beautiful only when I encountered them quoted in 
prose, in the essays my professors had assigned in college, where the line breaks 
were replaced with slashes, so that what was communicated was less a particular 
poem than the echo of poetic possibility. Insofar as I was interested in the arts, I 
was interested in the disconnect between my experience of actual artworks and the 
claims made on their behalf; the closest I’d come to having a profound experience 
of art was probably the experience of this distance, a profound experience of the 
absence of profundity. (Lerner 8-9) 
The man heads to another room where he “stood before The Garden of Earthly Delights, 
considered it calmly, then totally lost his shit" (9). The phrase, “totally lost his shit,” captures 
Adam’s perception of the scene perfectly. The man who is possibly having a “profound 
experience of art” occupies the role of the mad genius: perhaps he is more attuned to the 
beautiful things of this world (and therefore someone we might envy) or perhaps he is simply 
crazy (and therefore an object of pity). Another possibility is that he is critically unintelligent. 
Adam follows the man from gallery to gallery, joining a crew of security guards who are 
similarly awed by the man’s outbursts. Adam says,  
I could not share the man’s rapture, if that’s what it was, but I found myself 
moved by the dilemma of the guards: should they ask the man to step into the hall 
and attempt to ascertain his mental state, no doubt ruining his profound 
experience, or should they risk letting this potential lunatic loose among the 
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treasures of their culture….I found their mute performance of these tensions more 
moving than any Pietá, Deposition, or Annunciation, and I felt like one of their 
company…(10) 
These are the inaugural pages of Leaving the Atocha Station and they establish Adam’s 
simultaneous desire to be moved by art and a certain disdain for those who are so moved.  
  The immediate, profound appreciation of art—an appreciation that is entirely 
aesthetic—is something that forecloses the man’s capability of coming to a critical (more 
serious, more intelligent) judgment of art. When the man “loses his shit,” he is so laughable 
because his reaction is considered sentimental, uncritical: an indication of poor thinking. 
Critical judgement, in this rendition, reveals itself in a cynical posture, something that the 
man losing his shit seems not to have. Critical judgement is intellectually superior to that 
immediacy though it is also paralyzing—Adam is only ever sure that something is beautiful 
when an authority has cited it as such. Being moved by “beauty” seems alternatively either 
too bourgeois, too sentimental or too simple-minded; being convinced by a work of art’s 
aesthetic success requires time (in study, in close contemplation of art) that many do not 
have. All of these roles are infused with and informed by a strong shame theory, a sense and 
attentiveness to shame that the man in the Prado seems conspicuously free of. Perhaps what 
Adam finds so disturbing and such a source of envy is that the man can engage with art 
without any shame at all. 
  Adam’s cynicism about art’s potential is further revealed by the fact that he has never 
“been changed by a piece of art,” and also, contradictorily, in his claim that “poems aren’t 
about anything” (36; see also 54, 127). "Being about" something would make poems 
something they ought not be: useful. While, the aesthetically pure and intellectually superior 
position is one where one can say that poems do not have meaning, Adam seems to wish they 
could mean something. Although Adam knows war and leaders like Bush had the potential to 
create a world where all artworks would be lost and that “in such a world, [he] would 
swallow a bottle of white pills" (45) he still doesn’t want art to sully itself by making political 
claims.  
 If Leaving the Atocha Station articulates a contemporary doubt about whether or not 
art can have a profound impact on the viewer, How Should a Person Be? takes the project 
one step further by challenging two painters to create the ugliest painting they can. The 
competitors in the Ugly Painting Competition are Margaux and Sholem. The competition is 
born over breakfast in an ugly breakfast joint whose, “owners had repainted the diner walls 
from a grease-splattered beige to a thicky pastel blue and had spray-painted giant pictures of 
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scrambled eggs and strips of bacon and pancakes with syrup" (Heti 11). There are many ways 
to arrive at ugly. Ugliness is potentially the result of a lack of attention, but just as potentially 
the result of a thorough and unflinching determination. “Thicky” is the latter. Any word 
processing system underlines thicky with a wavey-red line indicating that it is a neologism—
thickly or thick, misspelt—and therefore, purposely so. It’s not a beautiful neologism that 
Anne Carson or Paul Celan would use—it is not Carson’s “nightsky" or “unlost” or Celan’s 
“atemmünze” (breathcoin). The diction is ugly, but so, too, is its imprecision. The diner 
owners had either spray-painted pre-existing pictures of scrambled eggs—i.e. painted overtop 
pictures of scrambled eggs and pancakes with syrup or, they had used spray-paint to depict 
the scrambled eggs and pancakes. Spray-paint, especially inside, is hallmark ugliness, and 
here its imprecise use makes it all the more so. Neither option is at all palatable, but by 
leaving us in between the two options of ugly, spray-painted eggs, Heti gives us both.  
 In addition to an aesthetic ugliness, the conversation illustrates a moral ugliness that is 
highlighted by the sudden clarity of the prose:  
I remember none of the details of our conversation until the subject turned to 
ugliness. I said that a few years ago I had looked around at my life and realized 
that all the ugly people had been weeded out. Sholem said he couldn’t enjoy a 
friendship with someone he wasn’t attracted to. Margaux said it was impossible 
for her to picture an ugly person, and Misha remarked that ugly people tend to 
stay at home. These are a few of the sordid fruits that led to the Ugly Painting 
Competition. (11-12) 
This passage is economical and neatly divvies the ugly observations up amongst her friends 
in tidy comments of less than ten words each. These statements are morally ugly—indicating 
her friends’ shared superficiality—yet pithy and straightforward, delivered in honest, clear 
statements. Heti finds her way out of the ugly pit by regaining some narrative distance from 
the conversation, summarizing the whole thing—its words, sentences, and sentiments—as a 
collection of “sordid fruits” that led to the frame of the book. The Ugly Painting Competition 
is about the intellectual labour and political purpose of art-making, as well as the critical 
labour of interpreting or judging a piece of art. 
 Sholem is so disturbed by the idea of the competition that he completes his ‘entry’ 
before the end of the day. His ugly is reactionary: “He would just do everything he hated 
when his students did it" (Heti 13). He begins his  
composition smack-dab in the middle of a piece of paper, since paper is uglier 
than canvas… he painted a weird, cartoonish man in profile with fried-egg eyes, 
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and he outlined things instead of shading them, delineating each individual 
eyelash….Though he thought in the end there would be some salvageable 
qualities to the painting, it just kept getting more and more disgusting until finally 
he began to feel so awful that he finished it off quickly. Dipping a thick brush in 
black paint, he wrote at the bottom, really carelessly, The sun will come out 
tomorrow. (13-14) 
What are the elements of this ugliness? The paper, the mineral sediment, the cliched 
optimism of the song from the 1982 Disney movie, “Annie.” The composition disobeys the 
rule of thirds, the images are cliched, and the techniques are pastiche. Worse, the ugliness 
betrays a lack of imagination: Sholem merely reverses the rules he learned in art school, 
implying that when he pursues the beautiful, he merely follows them.  
 The whole experience creates a moral-aesthetic crisis for Sholem. He emails Margaux 
at the end of the day: 
This project fills me with shame and self-loathing. I just did my ugly painting, and 
I feel like I raped myself. How’s yours, Margaux? 
Margaux, the better artist, wrote back: i spent all day on my bed island reading the 
new york times. (15)  
Freedom, in How Should a Person Be? is the capacity to let oneself produce something ugly. 
Margaux, whose art is characterized by both freedom and a feeling that, “Ugly, beautiful—I 
don’t even understand what those words mean” (172). Sholem can be shamed by ugly; 
Margaux can only be shamed by meaninglessness. Though Heti’s Sheila has spent many 
years of her life in pursuit of beauty, these efforts are symbols of everything that has blocked 
her. Her marriage, her play, her presentation of self in society: all of these attempts at the 
beautiful have concealed her true ugliness, something which is, if ugly, still highly valued 
because, unlike the beautiful, her ugliness is true. The freedom she seeks is a freedom from 
beauty. It’s a freedom from a beauty that has been defined by men, particularly men who 
have wanted to teach her something, a refrain we hear repeatedly in the book (Heti 17, 54, 
224, 228). More than one reviewer has noted that the book seems, itself, to be a reaction to 
beauty: cliché, pastiche, awkwardness and a governing lack of imagination are guiding 
aesthetics for the entire book (Wood, Goad, Peterson, Biggs, Keeler in The New Inquiry, The 
Economist). 
 When, later that day, Sheila goes on a walk with Misha (the fictional version of one of 
Sheila Heti’s closest friends and collaborators, Misha Glouberman), Heti inserts oddly lyrical 
moments of summary as if in order to illustrate that the ugliness is intentional. Their walk, for 
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example, concludes this way: “We had circled ten blocks and the sun had gone down as we 
were talking. The houses and trees were now painted dark, dusky blue" (19) or, describing an 
earlier discussion with him: “We were drinking at a party and left to take a walk through the 
night, our feet brushing gently through the lightly fallen snow" (20). Similarly, the 
description of meeting Margaux incorporates the same lyricism:  
She told me her name was Margaux, and I told her my name was Sheila and lit her 
cigarette, then sat back, trembling inside. Had she come out here for me? An 
excitement rose in my being just to think it. But I didn’t say a word. Instead, we 
smoked together quietly, and as she exhaled, the trees touched each other’s 
branches in the wind. (Heti 28) 
These brief lapses into the lyrical—the dark, dusky blue of night, feet brushing gently, trees 
touching each other’s branches—are a kind of alibi: Heti’s attempt to show that what she is 
doing is purposeful, rather than accidental. None of these moments are astonishing in their 
beauty, but they are lyrical in a way that most of the book is not. “See!” they seem to say: “I 
can be beautiful if I want. I just don’t want to! I’m sick of beauty.”  
 Ugliness is something How Should a Person Be? pursues for three reasons. First, in 
terms of art, it refuses the formalism of an aesthetic ideal—beauty—that has been defined by 
men. Here, aesthetic value is associated with a freedom from the constraints of the old ideals. 
Secondly, in terms of art criticism, it demands an appreciation that would be informed by a 
highly developed critical judgement, not a lowly, sensuous reaction to the 'merely' beautiful. 
Thirdly—and this seems to contradict the previous two points—it creates an aesthetic that is 
based on accessibility and accessibility is that which is easily digestible not because it has 
been perfected and made glossy, but because it has been left alone, in the sound and register 
of everyday speech. Altogether these aims are inflected with a concern about the role of art in 
contemporary society, a concern that is captured in How Should a Person Be? by the word 
meaningful. 
 In How Should A Person Be?, this concern is manifested in the figure of Margaux 
Williamson, Sheila Heti’s best friend (both in the book and in real life). Margaux is plagued 
by the idea that art might mean nothing, a concern that Sheila, the narrator, summarizes:  
Margaux worked harder at art and was more skeptical of its effects than any artist 
I knew….She hoped it could be meaningful, but had her doubts, so worked double 
hard to make her choice of being a painter as meaningful as it could 
be….Sometimes she felt bad and confused that she had not gone into politics—
which seemed more straightforwardly useful….Her first feeling every morning 
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was shame about all the things wrong in the world that she wasn’t trying to fix. 
(Heti 17) 
Shame is the affect of an ongoing relationship with something or someone where the joy or 
interest the relationship inspires is regularly thwarted. And shame is the affect that registers a 
foresaken ideal, in this case that capable people ought to work to better the world for those 
unable to do it themselves.  
  At the outset of both books, Sheila and Adam have been given grants to produce 
artistic projects that will be of evident benefit to society (to feminism, for Sheila, to memory 
of Franco’s war, for Adam), and both are finding their projects impossible, boring, 
uninspiring. Adam, in Spain on a prestigious scholarship, is supposedly interested in “the 
significance of the Spanish Civil War, about which,” he says, “I knew nothing, for a 
generation of writers, few of whom I’d read; I intended to write, I explained, a long, research-
driven poem exploring the war’s literary legacy” (Lerner 23). Sheila had been commissioned 
to write a play for a feminist theatre company, but, she laments: "I didn't know anything 
about women!…I had never taken a commission before, but I needed the money, and figured 
I could just as easily lead the people out of bondage with words that came from a 
commissioned play as I could writing a play that originated with me" (Heti 41). Both Adam 
and Sheila had written grant applications that promised art works that would be socially 
meaningful, even activist in nature. And both books are the result of a diversion from their 
funded projects, something which leads Sheila to much anguish and Adam to continually 
attempt to avoid the foundation’s representative in Madrid, María José.  
 In an article entitled “On Art Activism,” Art Historian and scholar of aesthetics and 
media theory, Boris Groys argues that contemporary artists are creating work that disrupts an 
essentially conservative nature of art. Heti has described her project in just such terms: 
having read a 2006 article by James Wood which described the key aspects of successful 
realist fiction, she set out to do the very opposite (Barber). James Wood was just another man 
who wanted to teach her something. Such work, according to Groys, "is made against the 
natural gift. It does not develop ‘human potential’ but annuls it" (n.pag). Groys goes on to say 
that we must learn to aestheticize both the presence and absence of gifts. On the one hand, 
this is a call to a kind of interpretation, where one must learn to take pleasure or feel pleasure 
in the presence and absence of beauty (the classical meaning of the word aesthetic being 
about feeling rather than thinking). In Leaving, Adam will try (and fail) to appreciate 
something in cliché-riddled poetry. On the other hand, from the perspective of the artist, the 
call to aestheticize the presence and absence of gifts seems to be a call to a different kind of 
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work. The Ugly Painting Competition dramatizes, and makes fun of, this call. Even if How 
Should a Person Be? is intrigued by and, for a time, pursues, the notion of annulling one’s 
natural gifts, it seems to suggest that, eventually, this kind of pursuit is merely reactionary 
rather than radical. Sholem's ugly painting exemplifies this reactionary approach.  
 Art-making becomes a shameful activity when it doesn't seem to better the world. 
Margaux, Sheila's best friend, is plagued by the idea that art might mean nothing:  
Margaux worked harder at art and was more skeptical of its effects than any artist 
I knew….She hoped it could be meaningful, but had her doubts, so worked double 
hard to make her choice of being a painter as meaningful as it could 
be….Sometimes she felt bad and confused that she had not gone into politics—
which seemed more straightforwardly useful….Her first feeling every morning 
was shame about all the things wrong in the world that she wasn’t trying to fix. 
(Heti 17) 
Margaux's shame is echoed by other artists in their community, with varying degrees of 
subtlety. In the chapter titled, “The white men go to Africa,” several friends come over and 
describe their recent trip to an unstated country in Africa: 
For me, it was because my life in theater is so consuming and busy and it’s such a 
kind of insular world in a lot of ways, and I was dissatisfied with the absence of 
doing meaningful—what I felt was meaningful—I didn’t feel I was spending my 
time in the most meaningful way possible, and I wanted to bring a more 
meaningful, uh, component to the work I was doing. (Heti 160) 
The friends quickly identify that going to Africa to do something “meaningful” is both “very 
fashionable” and narcissistic—something Sheila says it shares with art and books (166). But 
the play directors persist in believing that in Africa it was possible to do something 
meaningful because the economic injustice was so extreme, so visible, whereas in Canada, 
the injustice was “disguised. It’s so easy to forget" (162). Margaux responses: “Seems kind of 
hard to forget; I don’t know" (162). The directors—both are men—lecture Sheila and 
Margaux on their immorality and then leave. One of the refrains in the book is “He’s just 
another man who wanted to teach me something,” and this refrain is echoed in these white 
men. Despite their evident foolishness, Margaux is upset by the conversation, exclaiming at 
the end of the night:  
I’m interested in meaning, not paintings. Paintings can be pretty meaningless, you 
know. Like, it’s insane! I want to create complete meaning in art that’s even better 
than political meaning! (Heti 171-172) 
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Margaux's pursuit of the meaningful means that she stays serious about her art, while Sheila 
does not. Having abandoned the idea of a feminist play, she is sarcastic about its aims: “I am 
writing a play that is going to save the world. If it only saves three people, I will not be 
happy. If with this play the oil crisis is merely averted and our standard of living maintains 
itself at its current level, I will weep into my oatmeal" (87). But this changes in the course of 
the book. As with any bildungsroman, the central protagonist does develop morally. In a later 
conversation with Margaux, Sheila considers the matter more carefully: “I wanted to tell 
[Margaux] that being a painter was not meaningless, decadent, narcissistic, and vain, but how 
could I know for sure?” (177)  
 Ben Lerner's Adam also wishes that art could mean something, and similarly suspects 
that it never will. In one of the early conversations about meaning and poetry, Adam reflects: 
I tried hard to imagine my poems’ relation to Franco’s mass graves, how my 
poems could be said meaningfully to bear on the deliberate and systematic 
destruction of a people or a planet, the abolition of classes, or in any sense 
constitute a significant political intervention. I tried hard to imagine my poems or 
any poems as machines that could make things happen, changing the government 
or the economy or even their language, the body or its sensorium, but I could not 
imagine this, could not even imagine imagining it. (44) 
Even if both Adam, Sheila and Margaux would like art to mean something, tying art to 
activism or to beauty will not yield the kind of meaning they seek. Groys argues that it is 
because our society views art as either useless or as celebrating the status quo that, "the art 
component of art activism is often seen as the main reason why this activism fails on the 
pragmatic, practical level—on the level of its immediate social and political impact" (Groys 
n.pag). It is along these lines that Lerner and Heti pursue different solutions to the 
meaningless of art. Both narrators--Adam and Sheila--abandon their socially-committed 
projects and contemplate abandoning the beautiful as well. In Sheila's case, what temporarily 
replaces the beautiful and the meaningful is contempt. 
 
Contempt and Ugliness as Freedom in How Should a Person Be?  
 
 Though I have primarily focused on the story of shame in these books, in How Should 
a Person Be? contempt is equally important because it allows Sheila to extract herself from a 
variety of attachments that have constrained her. One of those attachments is to a lover, 
though it is the very contemptible nature of their relationship that, initially, makes her so free. 
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Another of those attachments is to beauty: an apt description of the Ugly Painting 
Competition might, in fact, be that it was born of contempt for the beautiful. Contempt 
appears first and most obviously in the prologue, where the narrator, describing herself giving 
a blow-job in a tone reminiscent of self-help books says, “I just try to breathe through my 
nose and not throw up on their cock. I did vomit a little the other day, but I kept right on 
sucking" (3). Vomit appears elsewhere too, including later when Sheila realizes her mistake 
in going to New York: “I could have vomited. I saw it all so clearly…somehow I had turned 
myself into the worst thing in the world: I was just another man who wanted to teach me 
something!" (228). In order to really examine the implications of disgust, we must remember 
how we can distinguish it from shame. Shame, as we have seen in the introduction, is the 
affect that is most closely associated with the experience of being a self:  
In contrast to shame, contempt is a response in which there is least self-
consciousness, with the most intense consciousness of the object, which is 
experienced as disgusting. Although the face and nostrils and throat and even the 
stomach are unpleasantly involved in disgust and nausea, yet attention is most 
likely to be referred to the source, the object, rather than to the self or the face. 
(Tomkins 356) 
Disgust is the affect that recognizes the physical danger posed by something close, usually a 
food, either before its consumption or, in the case of accidental consumption, by inducing a 
physical response to remove the object from the system via vomiting. However, disgust is not 
limited to moments involving the ingestion of a noxious substance. (If it were, it would not 
be an affect, but rather a drive). In Tomkins' system, this affect is categorized as contempt-
disgust, where contempt is of a lower intensity, toxicity, or duration than disgust. 
 Tomkins notes that even though disgust is normally evoked by a strong desire to 
insinuate distance between the self and the object, “disgust may be aroused by a very 
attractive sex object, if there is both a strong wish for and fear of sexual contact. In such 
cases, paradoxically, the less disgusting the object, the more disgust may be felt if fear 
exceeds desire" (Tomkins 357). In other words, fear of intimacy may produce a sensation of 
disgust, all the more so if the potential for intimacy is heightened by the fact that the (sex) 
object is actually quite attractive. This may sound like an aside, but its significance will 
become clear. In Tomkin’s formulation, contempt-disgust describes the range of intensity this 
affect may take wherein contempt is a low-level disgust. 
 Tomkins also notes that shame-humiliation and contempt-disgust have political 
counterparts. He says: 
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Shame–humiliation is the negative affect linked with love and identification, and 
contempt–disgust the negative affect linked with individuation and hate. Both 
affects are impediments to intimacy and communion, within the self and between 
the self and others. But shame–humiliation does not renounce the object 
permanently, whereas contempt–disgust does. Whenever an individual, a class or 
a nation wishes to maintain a hierarchical relationship, or to maintain aloofness it 
will have resort to contempt of the other. Contempt is the mark of the oppressor. 
The hierarchical relationship is maintained either when the oppressed one assumes 
the attitude of contempt for himself or hangs his head in shame….Contempt will 
be used sparingly in a democratic society lest it undermine solidarity, whereas it 
will be used frequently and with approbation in a hierarchically organized society 
in order to maintain distance between individuals, classes and nations. (362-3) 
Other theorists (Ngai, Miller) concur, describing contempt as a lower, less insistent form of 
disgust, whereby the rejected object’s importance can be nullified through one’s indifference 
to it, rather than one’s need to insinuate a definite distance from it. It is for this reason, argues 
Ngai, that disgust is an affect most typically associated with right wing movements where 
misogyny, anti-semitism, racism and so on have all considered the other to be disgusting, 
vile, and something from which one ought to keep oneself separate, or risk contamination. 
Ngai goes on to argue that disgust is an affect rarely mobilized in literary theory because it 
seems to run counter to some of the discipline’s values, including democracy, relativism, and 
tolerance:  
In fixing its object as ‘intolerable,’ disgust undeniably has been and will continue 
to be instrumentalized in oppressive and violent ways. Yet its identification of its 
object as intolerable can also be mobilized against what Herbert Marcuse calls 
‘repressive tolerance’: the ‘pure,’ ‘indiscriminate,’ or nonpartisan tolerance that 
maintains the existing class striation of capitalist society. (Ngai 34) 
If contempt’s indifference to its object is what renders that object politically impotent; disgust 
with an object would mean that the object was impossible to ignore. If the significance of 
disgust is that it clearly identifies a thing as repulsive, Ngai argues that it is an affect that 
ought, perhaps, to be taken up with more regularity by literary theorists who wish to generate 
politically engaged academic work. True disgust is something that requires action. Thinking 
back to the previous chapter, the intimate public is a tolerated enclave, a space defined by 
cruel optimism: the shame of being a minor class and the hope something might change. 
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 The significance of this for How Should a Person Be?, a book which involves many 
clearly disgust-infused moments including scenes of sexual encounter that produce vomiting, 
or parties that inspire constant shitting, is that disgust might, in a sense, be a mode of 
rescuing art from its tolerated place on the sidelines. Ngai says: 
the object of tolerance in any affluent, market-centered democracy is perceived to 
be harmless or relatively unthreatening. Its ability to be tolerated in this 
sociopolitical context thus becomes an index of its sociopolitical ineffectuality—
in particular, its ineffectuality as a mechanism for dissent and change. From the 
vantage point of this market society, the best example of such a feckless thing—a 
thing taken as so ineffectual, harmless, and ‘safely disattendable’ that it can be 
absently or even benevolently tolerated—is art. (341-2) 
Art is stripped of its power to provide an important critique to society as long as it remains 
tolerated by society. In this way, the tolerated thing--art, literature, literary criticism--
resembles the intimate public of the previous chapter. The tolerated thing is always the 
subordinate thing. To tolerate is a choice only the dominant classes can make.  
  With this in mind, I turn to a short section of How Should a Person Be? entitled 
“Interlude for Fucking.” Barely ten pages long, the interlude is found between acts two and 
three of the book. The piece is central for an understanding the role of shame, humiliation, 
and contempt in Heti’s book. The interlude involves Sheila and her lover, Israel. He is a 
mediocre painter, but an outstanding lover. He is the only character in the book who does not 
have an identifiable real-world counterpart. Their affair began shortly after Sheila left her 
marriage and though she tried to avoid entangling herself with a new man, she was unable to 
resist. Initially, she tells him that she is celibate, but when he kneels down beside her to 
whisper, “I’ll decide if you’re celibate or not,” she happily agrees that the decision is his (78). 
This pattern is repeated throughout their affair such that it is clear that his dominance is 
something to which she is happy to submit. A good example of this dynamic is the phone call 
that precedes the Interlude. She and Margaux are at the art fair in Miami, where Margaux is 
presenting some of her art to international buyers. They are talking to some rich people when 
he calls: 
‘Are you having a good time?’ Israel asked. I said that I was. I tried to explain that 
we were talking to some rich people. ’Would you like to have my cum in your 
mouth right now, talking to those rich people? That would be pretty good, 
wouldn’t it?’ Not knowing what else to say, I stammered, ‘Yes.’ When I got off 
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the phone, I made a new rule for myself: that I would never again take his call—
or, anyway, not until I finished my play—so never. (Heti 110)  
The play is what Sheila “should” be doing; Israel is precisely what she shouldn’t. That she 
chooses him over her play, then, is the first indication that Sheila will choose freedom over 
slavery even if it means choosing ugliness over the beautiful.  
 In the first reading, I situate the interlude in relation to Sheila’s notion of herself as a 
person with an essential “shittiness” at her core. In the second reading, I explore the 
potentially positive ramifications of the affect of contempt as Sheila extracts herself from 
their affair. In the third and final reading, I analyze the relationship as a political allegory 
where Israel is not the man but the historical nation and their relationship is about Sheila’s 
notion of herself as a kind of Moses figure, a cowardly leader to ‘her people’. Despite its 
brevity, the interlude connects importantly to the way shame and contempt define Sheila’s 
relationship to men and to the political consequences of art.  
  
An essential shittiness at her core  
 
 This narrative begins very early in the book, with a play written by Sheila’s high 
school boyfriend. In a fit of jealousy, he wrote “an outline for a play about [her] life—how it 
would unfold, decade by decade" (Heti 24). In the play she continues chasing, getting, and 
dropping men as part of selfish ambition: 
While my boyfriend rose in prestige and power, a loving family growing around 
him, I marked on toward my shriveled, horrible, perversion of an end, my 
everlasting seeking leaving me ever more loveless and alone. In the final scene I 
kneeled in a dumpster—a used-up whore, toothless, with a pussy as sour as sour 
milk—weakly giving a Nazi a blow job, the final bit of love I could squeeze from 
the world. I asked the Nazi, the last bubble of hope in my heart floating up, Are 
you mine? to which he replied, Sure, baby, then turned around and, using his 
hand, cruelly stuck my nose in his hairy ass and shat. (Heti 25) 
What makes her boyfriend’s play so impossible to get over was the conviction that he could 
see her insides, “as he was the first man who had loved me," (Heti 25). Eventually, Sheila got 
married because she thought the very fact of it would correct everything that was wrong with 
her, correct the ugliness inside her, “which would contaminate everything I would ever do" 
(22). Yet, even married, the shittiness inside her persists. She leaves her husband, a man with 
whom, “there had [always] been an empathy…a sweetness. It was like we were afraid of 
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breaking the other" (43), and begins, almost immediately, the love affair with Israel. Read in 
this context, the relationship with Israel is one that does not expect anything of her. Unlike 
her marriage, the affair with Israel is one that allows her to be her worst. This freedom—to be 
ugly—is perhaps what explains the exuberant, clear tone of the writing across these ten 
pages:  
All right, Isreal, cum in my mouth. Don’t let me wash it out, so when I talk to 
those people, I can have your cum swimming in my mouth, and I will smile at 
them and taste you. (120) 
The interlude is addressed alternatively to Israel and to the reader of the book. As though to 
get the jump on any readers who would wish to judge her, she screeches: 
I don’t know why all of you just sit in libraries when you could be fucked by 
Israel. I don’t know why all of you are reading books when you could be getting 
reamed by Israel, spat on, beaten up against the headboard—with every jab, your 
head battered into the headboard. Why are you all reading? I don’t understand this 
reading business when there is so much fucking to be done. (121)  
Addressing Israel again, it gets worse: “I am indifferent to whether you turn me into a sow 
you lead around the house with a leash, or if you lash me nightly, or if you throw my body 
into the bed or out of it. If you want my cunt to take your cum, or to turn me into an animal 
who can take it, I’ll learn astrology. I’ll be the stupidest whore you ever met…" (126) And on 
its last page: “Whatever you want me to do, I will do it, and whatever I don’t want to do, I 
will do that too, and will want to." (127) In much the same way that the form of the novel 
was written as a point-by-point refusal of Wood's 2006 stipulations about what a novel ought 
to do, the Interlude is written as a point-by-point refusal of feminism's stipulations of what a 
woman ought to want.  
  Sheila goes to New York. She has had an argument with Margaux and has decided to 
go where the “important people” go (188-192). There, she receives an email from Israel in 
which he asks her to go to a patio, wearing a short skirt and no underwear. She should write 
him a letter “in the style of a letter home from a first-year university student or camper,” and 
should describe how much she misses his cum in her mouth and “also about how my cock 
has changed your life." (205) She should do this while spreading her legs for a deserving 
spectator, an old man perhaps. The next day, she goes to get stationary, finds a patio, an old 
man, and starts to write:  
I was about three pages into a detailed explanation of how his cock had changed 
my life, when an odd sensation began creeping through me, an awareness of how 
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sick it was that all this time I had been having so much trouble writing my play, 
yet instead of laboring away at it, here I was writing this fucking letter—this cock-
sucking letter of flattery for Israel! (226) 
At every moment prior to this, Sheila has chosen to put Israel ahead of her art. Writing has 
seemed pointless: it brought neither the mind-blowing satisfaction of sex with Israel nor the 
feeling of meaning that doing something good for the world might potentially bring. On the 
night she met Israel, for example, she had gone, “to a party to celebrate the appearance of 
three more books of poetry in the world,” (75). The tone suggests that the world doesn’t 
really need any more poetry and this suggestion is echoed in the sarcasm with which Sheila 
has described her own work, “If this play does anything short of announcing the arrival of the 
next cock—I mean, messiah—I will shit....” (87). Writing and art-making has been derisory 
and a source of shame because it has been unproductive; it didn’t produce meaning or 
pleasure. The scene in the café puts her prioritizing of Israel into question, and is, as such a 
turning point for Sheila’s development as an artist and a person. 
I glanced up and saw that the man across from me had gone, and in his place sat a 
chubby young boy—and he laughed up at me openly to see my whole cunt. My 
throat caught and my eyes leapt up to his parents, and, flushing red, I fumbled out 
some bills and threw them on the table…(226-227) 
While Sheila was writing, the old man left and was replaced by a young boy and his parents. 
Symbolically, the old and forgotten man whose hopes for pleasure were, in Israel’s 
estimation, severely diminished, had been replaced by people actively involved in the world. 
Exposing herself before the old man did not shame her, but exposing herself before the 
family did. Shame propels her away from Israel and back to writing. 
 The affair with Israel concludes in the following way. They have been out for a night 
in Toronto, drinking a little but not too much. They go home and start to have sex but don’t. 
We lay silently in my bed, and then my body felt it, deep and calm: what I wanted 
to do—something I had never done before. Without letting myself think about it a 
moment more, I shuffled down beneath the covers, saying to him as I did it, ‘I 
want to sleep beside your cock.’ I slithered down there and lay, my lips soft up 
against his dick. I felt his legs grow tense. ‘Get up,’ he said. ‘No.’ ‘Come up 
here,’ he said, more forcefully this time. But I knew that if I did, his desire for me 
might remain, and I wanted none of it left. I had to be so ugly that the humiliation 
I brought on myself would humiliate him, too…. (Heti 271) 
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This is the first moment in their affair when what he wants has not been, by mere virtue of his 
wanting it, what she wants too. What Israel wanted was to dominate her. And she wanted to 
be dominated, for a time. Until, that is, his domination of her became his humiliation of her.  
 In the “Interlude for Fucking” and as she sat at the cafe in New York, Sheila had been 
painting the ugly painting. Ugly has meant unfeminist. The ugliness of the relationship with 
Israel is textbook in much the way that ugliness in Sholem’s painting is textbook. For him, 
ugliness is “everything he’d tell his students he hated in painting.” For her, ugliness is 
everything a feminist artist isn’t supposed to want. About a recent book published by the 
literary journal n+1, in which women were interviewed regarding their college experiences, 
the editor writes: 
the word should has a special place in the lives of women, as it’s been a tool of 
their subjection through social strictures (“women should be X”) and their 
emancipation through feminism (“women should reject the authority of anyone 
who says they should be X, or Y, or Z, or anything else”). Should, in other words, 
gives us both The Rules and the injunction to break them. (Tortorici n.pag) 
I read the arc of this narrative as an articulation of and defiance of the ways one is meant to 
be feminist today. Feminism’s expectation that women challenge the authority of anyone who 
says they should be x, or y, or z is precisely what Heti is defying when she portrays Sheila so 
rambunctiously enjoying her interlude. Consider another passage from that section:  
Fuck whichever sluts it’s your fancy to fuck. You will find me in our home one 
day, cooking or doing your laundry, as you wish, washing your slutty underwear 
that some girl slutted on while you were out. I’ll make you your meals and serve 
you them, leave you alone to paint while I go into my room. (Heti 121)  
This is the horror show of the contemporary, female, feminist artist: that a relationship with a 
man with artistic ambitions would render hers null, that she would be reduced to a slave for 
his artistic ambitions, his sexual desires. Heti’s tone of delighted defiance points to the 
restrictive model feminism (or a mainstream version of it) sets out for women. But it also 
complicates our understanding of shame.  
 Heti brings us to the extremes of what ought to be shameful. Her character chooses 
humiliating sex, chooses a man over her art, and then chooses the most humiliating posture 
she can for herself because she knows that shame is catching: that her humiliation will be his. 
This is very far from the kind of shame that Leon Wurmser would describe, where all kinds 
of shame involve the admission of some kind of weakness or dirtiness because weakness and 
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dirtiness are inherently shameful. In How Should a Person Be? weakness and dirtiness 
provide a moment of triumph: 
I felt so alert as I felt his dick shrink away, disgusted or ashamed. A few minutes 
passed. Then he turned his back on me. My nose went into his ass, and I felt its 
tiny hairs on my skin. (271-272) 
She has brought us full circle. We have returned to the scene of the Nazi shitting on her face, 
but what is so different about this scene is that this time she has chosen it:  
What I had done in the night—it felt like the first choice I had ever made not in 
the hopes of being admired….Then, from inside of me came a real happiness, a 
clarity and an opening up, like I was floating upwards to the heavens. (273)  
The triumph is that she has acted independently of a world that would shame her. In this way, 
shame in How Should a Person Be? is the supremely flexible affect that Tomkins 
described—an affect sometimes inflected by the restrictions and mores of contemporary 
society, but just as often not. A shame, in other words, that is idiosyncratic. A shame, for 
example, that one might even be able to enjoy. Heti’s Sheila is independent of the feminists 
who would shame her for letting herself be so humiliated in front of a man and independent 
of the men who would tell her that it is up to them to decide. The conclusion to this narrative 
arc slips in at the end of Act 4 in a section entitled “Intermission,” where Sheila is at a play 
and runs into her ex-husband. The conclusion couldn’t be more simple. She says: “And for 
the first time ever I saw it: perhaps I was not fated to a life of loss and suffering—an end so 
degraded and mean. Those had been his thoughts and fantasies" (281). Not hers. 
 
Contempt and the Political  
 
 Another way of thinking about the scene with Israel is in terms of the political 
implications of contempt. As we have seen, Sheila’s aim in this final scene is to sever all ties 
with her lover. Imagining their dynamic in terms of a political system, every moment prior to 
her slithering down to sleep with his cock is a moment of shame-humiliation in which both 
parties maintain an interest in each other and in the humiliation of Sheila. Indeed, Israel’s 
desire to humiliate Sheila is part of what makes him interesting and desirable to her. Her 
deciding to sleep with his cock is the moment that she pushes this engaging play of 
humiliation into a disengaging play of disgust, something that he clearly registers in the 
morning when, “After buttoning his shirt, he looked down into his shirt pocket and pulled out 
a quarter. He placed it on the windowsill beside my head with real deliberateness, then turned 
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and walked away" (272). He has adopted the role of the oppressor, a role that rests upon the 
permanent renunciation of the relationship, as we saw at the opening of this section (Tomkins 
362). Tomkins imagines two possible scenarios when one has found oneself or another 
contemptible. Either: “the hierarchical relationship is maintained… when the oppressed one 
assumes the attitude of contempt for himself or hangs his head in shame” (362) or the 
oppressor teaches the oppressed to “have contempt for themselves," (362-363). Yet he also 
acknowledges that contempt can be met with contempt, signaling an absolute rupture in a 
relationship. What is most significant about this complete rupture is that it permits a positive 
use of disgust. Crucially, Sheila reciprocates Israel’s contempt; in fact, she invites it. This is 
the astonishing redemption contempt offers that shame does not. 
 
Israel as Place 
 
 In a final reading of this scene, I’d like to explore the possibility that the name Israel 
is meant to stand in for the country and for Sheila’s relationship to it. In some of the passages 
quoted above we have seen the repetitive use of Israel's name. In total, there are almost thirty 
repetitions of his name in under six pages. I have also mentioned that Israel, unlike the other 
key figures in the fictional Sheila’s circle, does not have a real-world counterpart. That is, 
unless we consider the country. The name, Israel, according to a comprehensive "baby 
naming website," is more common than France, Germany, Canada, or Spain, but less 
common than Jordan, and about on par with Georgia and Chad. At what point could we start 
to suspect an analogy of such direct proportion? Can we?  
 What we do know is that the character Sheila has been traveling through the dessert 
for much of the book: that journey began in the prologue. Sheila describes the journey “her 
ancestors” took as they “left their routines as slaves in Egypt to follow Moses into the desert" 
(4). Just as her ancestors had to leave a life of slavery, Sheila has had to leave a life of 
slavery. Her marriage is set in those terms: one night she looks around at the friends they had 
gathered and reflects that an outsider would surely look upon the scene and “ say, ‘That could 
only have been built by slaves’” (26). When she went to “football school,” Sheila fantasized 
about being able to lead her cohort, but realized “they weren’t going to let some withered 
wanderer with half a plan lead them" (34). In thinking about her ambitions for the feminist 
play, she fantasizes that it could lead people “out of bondage," (41). When her marriages 
ends, she writes “I knew from then on I would have to make decisions without any footprints 
in the sand to follow, without any hand guiding my path" (46). When she has a bad dream 
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and calls her analyst in the middle of the night, the analyst tells Sheila the story of the Puer. 
It’s a morality tale—don’t be a puer, or eternal child—instead, you should walk through the 
difficult things.  
“What’s wrong with walking?” asked the analyst, “It might take much 
longer…forty years as opposed to four hours. But you’re more likely to arrive 
there, safely." (83)  
And so she resolves to work, articulating how important she wants it to be by stating it ought 
to announce ”the arrival of the next cock—I mean, messiah" (87). 
 Israel, read as a geographical place, seems to stand in for freedom or for redemption. 
This reading accords with an understanding of Israel as a historic place towards which her 
ancestors marched: 
It took forty years for the Israelites to get from Egypt to the banks of the Jordan, a 
journey that should have taken days. It was no accident. That generation had to 
die. They could not enter the promised land. A generation born into slavery is not 
ready for the responsibilities of freedom. (247) 
The movement out of slavery requires learning several things, one of which is that, “It is 
cheating to treat oneself as an object, or as an image to tend to, or as an icon. It was true four 
thousand years ago when our ancestors wandered the desert, and it’s as true today when the 
icon is ourselves" (183). It is the leader of the Jews, then, that inspires her most: 
I hadn’t realized until last week that in his youth he killed a man, an Egyptian, and 
buried him under some sand….And he is king of the Jews—my king….I don’t 
need to be a great leader of the Christian people. I can be a bumbling murderous 
coward like the king of the jews. (188) 
And Moses is one reason for the language of the book: "I thought a lot about how Moses 
didn’t want the job — didn’t feel like he could speak well enough to be a leader. And so in 
this modeling oneself after the great leader, I think I wanted the language in the book to not 
be great, to be really plain and utilitarian” (Keeler, “Reality Fiction” n.pag). Throughout the 
latter third of the book, Sheila imagines herself in the desert: bits of sand are found in the 
spine of her book (189), on the surface of the table (225), on the seat of the Greyhound bus 
(239), and coming loose from her body on her return home to Toronto, when she showered 
and "washed everything away," (241). It is difficult to know what to make of their sexual 
relationship when reading Israel as a nation, until, that is, that one realizes that their 
relationship is actually quite ordinary. Sheila thought Israel was hot; they got together and 
had sex:  
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Sheila feels “faint” and “intoxicated” whenever Israel calls her, despondent when 
he is out of touch. The story of Sheila and Israel’s affair is entirely ordinary 
except for the fact that neither Heti nor Sheila seems aware of its 
ordinariness….what makes these natural heterosexual urges worthy of our 
contemplation? (Tennant-Moore n.pag)  
The ebb and flow between humiliation, domination, shame and contempt is, even when 
reading the interlude as an allegory for a historical relationship with the nation, nothing 
special, but the freedom Sheila gains is. 
 
Shame as Commitment in Leaving the Atocha Station  
 
 In this section, I discuss the way that shame works to reveal Adam’s ongoing 
commitment to two ideals—to the aesthetic and political importance of poetry and to the 
value of being American citizen. In the first section, I identify the way that perceiving and 
being perceived illustrate both Adam’s ideals and his shame at failing to attain to such ideals. 
As I have discussed in the introduction, shame is utterly idiosyncratic and when we notice its 
blush, utterly revelatory. There, I characterized shame as a figure of inadequacy and isolation, 
but also one that hopes for recognition. We may not know how important something or 
someone is to us until it is disparaged by another. If we come to its defense, it is clear that an 
identification of some sort is at work. Yet, sometimes our attachments are indefensible. In the 
case of Adam’s identity as a poet, Adam overcomes his shame by attaining to the ideal of 
writing a poetry that is both politically committed and beautiful. In the case of his shame at 
being an American, this is a shame that cannot end. In the final part of this section, I will 
examine the relationship between those two shames, asking whether Adam’s eventual 
recommitment to poetry amounts to a sublimation of his shame of being American. I will 
conclude that it does not: writing does not sublimate his shame, it manifests it.  
 
Profundity in the Gaps: Poetry and Citizenship as Manifestations of Shame 
  
  A recurrent trope in Leaving the Atocha Station is the way Adam’s hope for a 
profound experience is ritually found not in the thing that promises to deliver such profundity 
(a piece of art, a poem, a love affair), but into the gaps or absences that surround it. In the 
opening scene to Leaving the Atocha Station, we found our protagonist at the Prado art 
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gallery one morning, shocked to find that a man had taken up his usual post in front of Van 
der Weydon’s Descent from the Cross. Adam says,  
for a moment I was startled, as if beholding myself beholding the painting, 
although he was thinner and darker than I….I wondered if he had observed me in 
front of the Descent and if he was now standing before it in the hope of seeing 
whatever it was I must have seen. (Lerner 8) 
Up until this moment, Adam had ritually gone to see the Descent, happily unaware of how he 
might appear to other gallery visitors. Like Sartre at the keyhole, his absolute absorption in 
the “dimensions and blues" (8) of the painting had meant that he was unaware of himself. 
Now, he becomes aware of himself not because someone has come up behind him but 
because he has come up behind someone who is looking as he usually looks. Though he does 
not say it, the man’s repetition of Adam’s morning ritual has about it something potentially 
mocking. By virtue of the repetition, Adam suddenly reevaluates what he has been doing. 
When the man bursts into tears in front of the painting, Adam is intensely curious about what 
those tears mean to the man and what the absence of those tears means for Adam. Adam asks 
himself whether the man is “having a profound experience of art," (8) and then immediately 
reflects upon his own concerns about his incapacity to experience art in such a way (8). 
Adam identifies with the man, and this identification makes it possible for him to react 
shamefully about his own suspicions about art’s meaning, this despite the fact that he is a 
supposedly talented writer (8). His identification of himself as a writer means, for him, an 
identification also with ideals of what it ought to mean to be a great artist, namely, the 
capacity to create profound work. At the same time, he is ashamed by this assumption 
because if it were true, his writing would have to mean something and he doubts it ever 
could.  
 That Adam holds art to the highest ideals is what motivates his disgust with poets 
whose work fail those ideals, with audiences who do not recognize that failure, and with 
himself. Interestingly, when the experience of writing poetry fails him, Adam turns to 
interpretation as a mode of finding profundity. Interpretation becomes an artistic endeavor in 
and of itself. We see this in the way he discusses his own poetry, where he imagines 
profundity as something that exists in the gaps between whatever is stated. In this scene from 
early in the book, Adam has been slated to read some of his poems after a local poet named 
Tomás. Adam describes Tomás’ reading as follows, 
To my surprise this poem was totally intelligible to me, an Esperanto of clichés: 
waves, heart, pain, moon, breasts, beach, emptiness, etc.; the delivery was so 
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cloying the thought crossed my mind that his apparent earnestness might be a 
parody. But then he read his second poem, ‘Distance’: mountains, sky, heart, pain, 
stars, breast, river, emptiness, etc. I looked at Arturo and his face implied he was 
having a profound experience of art. (37) 
Because Adam respects Arturo, he tries to take seriously this “Esperanto of clichés,” an effort 
that requires heightened attention to the sound of each word, but the effort is exhausting and 
ineffective: at most, it permits Adam a momentary reprieve from disgust (37). Yet, when 
Adam looks around the room, he is shocked to see an audience whose faces all suggest that 
they are being profoundly moved:  
It was not until I considered the scene more generally that my interest caught: 
there were eighty or so people gathered to listen to this utter shit as though it were 
their daily language passing through the crucible of the human spirit and emerging 
purified, redeemed; or here were eighty-some people believing the commercial 
and ideological machinery of their grammar was being deconstructed or at least 
laid bare, although that didn’t really seem like Tomás’s thing; he was more of a 
crucible of the human spirit guy. (38)  
Note the disdain of Adam’s conclusion that Tomás is a “crucible of the human spirit guy.” As 
in the scene with the museum guards in the Prado, Adam finds himself more moved by the 
hopes the audience have of being moved than he is by the artwork itself. He says  
If people felt the pressure to perform absorption in the face of what they knew was 
an embarrassing placeholder for an art no longer practicable for whatever reasons, 
a dead medium whose former power could be felt only as a loss—these scenarios 
did for me involve a pathos the actual poems did not, a pathos that in fact 
increased in proportion to their failure, as the more abysmal the experience of the 
actual the greater the implied heights of the virtual. (38)  
Thus, “the perfect idiocy of Tomás’s poetry,” becomes a kind of accomplishment, having 
captured, as it were, the lamentable state of contemporary poetry and, even more powerfully, 
the terrible bind of those who gather to listen to it: when an audience recognizes the way the 
poems fail, they cannot show it; if they don’t recognize the failure of poetry, they fail 
themselves. What might redeem them is only the possibility that their looks of absorption are 
actually a result of them contemplating all that poetry has lost. As we have seen elsewhere in 
this book, Adam holds onto the possibility that there is such a thing as depth or beauty, but 
imagines that it is only expressible by way of its absence or gap. Here the gap is between the 
travesty of Tomás’s words and the transcendent experience they fail to express. We’ll see this 
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same trope at work when Adam discusses his own poetry where its negative power is not 
imagined in some sort of spiritual transcendence but rather in a kind of political potency.  
 There are two ways that Adam hopes to imbue his poetry with significance—first in 
his mode of delivery, and second in discussions of its interpretation. Interestingly, neither 
depend upon the language of the poems themselves. Here is how he describes himself 
delivering his poems: 
[I] read as if either I was so convinced of the poem’s power that it needed no 
assistance from dramatic vocalization, or, contrarily, like it wasn’t poetry at all, 
just an announcement of some sort: this train is delayed due to track work ahead, 
etc. I fantasized as I listened to myself that the undecidability of my [delivery] 
style—was it an acknowledgement of the poem’s intrinsic energy or a reading 
appropriate to its utter banality—would have its own kind of power. (39) 
After the reading is over, Adam goes outside to have a cigarette and is approached by several 
local artists, two of whom begin to argue about the significance of Adam’s work. They 
become impassioned, much to Adam’s surprise. One offers that his poetry was like an early 
20th Century Spanish poet “whose capacity to dwell among contradictions without any 
violent will to resolution formally modeled utopian possibility," (43). Another counters 
saying that such an interpretation was a  
knee-jerk association of formal experimentation with left-wing politics, when in 
fact the leading Modernist innovators were themselves fascists or fascist 
sympathizers, and in the context of U.S. imperialism…he argued, reestablishing 
forms of sufficiency complexity and permanence to function as alternatives to the 
slick, disposable surfaces of commodity culture was the pressing task of poetry. 
(43-44) 
The first countered that one could not “overcome the commodification of language by feeling 
into an imagined past" (44). The conversation goes on this way for some time, revealing that 
Adam is either already a highly sophisticated Spanish speaker and a theoretically versant 
poet, or merely the latter with a high capacity to project meaning onto those in his midst with 
a convincing degree of coherence. Eventually the two disputants turn to Adam to ask for his 
opinion. True to his modus operandi in this phase of his research, he opts for a position 
between the two, a synthesis of their dialectical opposition: 
I said or tried to say that the tension between the two positions, their division, was 
perhaps itself the truth, a claim I could make no matter what the positions were, 
and I had the sense that the smokers found this comment penetrating. (44) 
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Despite Adam’s professed disbelief that poetry or art could mean anything, his reliance on 
the power of undecidability tells us otherwise. He does believe that there is such a thing as 
profundity, he merely doubts that anything he has to say would ever attain to it. Yet his 
shame is his redemption: it signals both his hope for the ideal even as he knows he is failing 
it. His disgust with Tomás emphasizes this point. Tomás disparages the art by using clichés 
without even knowing that he is doing so. When Adam and Tomás are introduced, Adam 
doesn’t articulate his disgust but hopes that he can convey it without words: “I just smiled 
slightly,” says Adam, “in a way intended to communicate…that I in fact believed his writing 
constituted a new low for his or any language, his or any art” (42).  
  Adam’s hope that the unspoken or the undecidable will be read as depth is important 
in his political and aesthetic discussions with his love interest, Isabel, as well. Here we begin 
to get glimpses of how Adam’s identity as an American is a source of shame. In one scene, 
they stand before Picasso’s Guernica and Adam mutters a phrase suggestively, such as “To 
photograph a painting,” or “Blue is an idea about distance.” Isabel gladly completes the 
sentence, thus creating their own synergistic discourse that relies entirely upon his being 
unable to thoroughly articulate his thoughts. To his dismay, this changes when she starts to 
ask him about the real commitments behind his poems. His glib explanations for why he 
would want to study poetry at the time of Franco is met with her cold assessment: “‘I’m sure 
the people of Iraq are looking forward to your poem about Franco and his economy" (50). 
Suddenly, the nature of their misunderstanding is not the wellspring of profundity but 
something terribly banal: “much more of the actual than the virtual" (50-51). His Spanish has 
become too competent to hide the fact of his essential inadequacy—that he is not profound, 
that he is nothing more than “a typically pretentious American" (50). When Isabel and Adam 
go on a road trip, Adam describes his impressions of seeing fellow American tourists: 
My look accused them of supporting the war, of treating people and the relations 
between people like things, of being the lemmings of a murderous and spectacular 
empire, accused them as if I were a writer in flight from a repressive regime, 
rather than one of its most fraudulent grantees. (48) 
That last line, where Adam admits his own fraudulence is what prevents his disdain for 
Americans from festering into full grown contempt. He is one of them and he knows it:  
I reserved my most intense antipathy for those Americans who attempted to blend 
in, who made Spanish friends and eschewed the company of their countrymen, 
who refused to speak English and who, when they spoke Spanish, exaggerated the 
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peninsular lisp. At first I was unaware of these subtler, quieter Americans, but as I 
became one, I began to perceive their numbers…(48) 
Adam will return to America at the end of his fellowship year. The Americans who evoke his 
ire are not those who differ from him—not those with the fanny packs or the guidebooks—
but those who are exactly like him. Shame, as an emotion, is always linked to our identities 
and to the stories we tell about ourselves.  
 These two shames—that of being a poet and that of being an American—coalesce in 
the latter half of Leaving the Atocha Station. The book we are reading manifests this shame 
by being exactly what he has foresworn. This begins with him realizing that he is the kind of 
poet who gets inspired by his environment and writes his notes down. Throughout Leaving, 
Adam has carried around a satchel whose purpose is to transport his white pills and hash. In 
order to give the bag weight and, in the eyes of others, a legitimate purpose, he also uses it to 
carry his pens, notebooks and a few collections of poetry. When Adam finds that his Spanish 
has improved too much for it to continue insinuating a coquettish fragmentation into his 
conversations with Isabel, he finds that the notebooks can do more than simply weigh down 
his bag: now Adam turns to writing in his notebook in an effort to “preserve [his] aura of 
profundity" (53). Isabel cannot read English, so the notebooks reinstate the distance they lost 
once he could properly communicate in Spanish. One night, however, Adam is shocked to 
find himself turning to the notebook to record a thought even though he is alone. He stops 
himself, asking:  
Why would I take notes when Isabel wasn’t around to see me take them? ….the 
idea of actually being one of those poets who was constantly subject to fits of 
inspiration repelled me; I was unashamed to pretend to be inspired in front of 
Isabel, but that I had just believed myself inspired shamed me. (57) 
His lack of shame in performing for Isabel indicates that as alluring as she may be, her 
estimation of him matters little. His shame when he is alone might be an indication of the 
opposite: that despite all the ways he seems burdened by a lack of self esteem, his standards 
for himself—strange as they may be—matter very much to him, and shame him when he 
forsakes them. Instead of writing down the observation, Adam rolls a spliff. Yet the 
observation was obviously noted, the book is a manifestation of it.  
 In a similar instance, Adam is alone in his apartment, reading about the war in Iraq. 
He says, 
And when I read the New York Times online, where it was always the deadliest 
day since the invasion began, I wondered if the incommensurability of language 
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and experience was new, if my experience of my experience issued from a 
damaged life of pornography and privilege, if there were happy ages when the 
starry sky was the map of all possible paths, or if this division of experience into 
what could not be named and what could not be lived just was experience, for all 
people for all time. Either way, I promised myself, I would never write a novel. 
(64-65) 
As above, Lerner’s book is the punchline to Adam Gordon’s joke. Later, after Madrid’s 
Atocha station has been bombed and protests have erupted throughout the city, Adam finds 
himself at a friend’s apartment where a man comments that it must be an interesting time to 
be an American in Spain (133). Adam thinks that he is being mocked but isn’t sure until the 
man says, “Are you going to write a poem about the bombings?" (134). Adam says he won’t. 
But he does write a book about them and the protests that followed. 
 This is where we see that Adam cannot overcome his shame of being an American, 
nor of the shame of writing about that shame, but he can overcome his shame of believing 
that poetry can be profound. After an unspecified period of time during which Adam has 
doubled and then tripled his dosage of white pills, he finally says that he wanted to write 
great poems (101). He recognizes that he has been fooling himself and admits that: 
I wanted my ‘work’ to take on the United States of Bush, to shed its scare quotes, 
and I wanted, after I self-immolated on the Capitol steps or whatever, to become 
the Miguel Hernández of late empire….This was a structure of feeling, not an 
idea, which made it harder to dismiss, and I felt it more intensely in direct 
proportion to its ridiculousness….I began to read and write feverishly. This was 
less a new faith in poetry than a sudden loss of faith in pure potentiality. (101-
102)  
Though there is an element of self-mockery even in these drug-induced idealizations, they are 
mirrored by the fact that the world of Madrid is no longer content to let him continue riding 
on his negative power. It is the first time that he has felt like a writer and his hopes for his 
writing start to reflect the ongoing presence of the Iraq war and the travesty of Fox News 
(103). He hopes that he can become (or be seen as) “a poet who alone was able to array the 
fallen materials of the real into a song that transcended it" (104). While this might sound, in 
content, much like Heti’s hopes that her play would change the world, the tone of it and the 
quiet beauty of the writing already adds a level of sincerity that Heti’s “if I don’t, I will shit 
into my oatmeal,” purposely forecloses. 
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Friendship 
 
 While this chapter has focused on the way shame emerges in relation to the ideals one 
has for oneself, shame often emerges also in much more social contexts, and especially in our 
most intimate relationships. Yet, when one thinks of selfhood in terms of performance—as 
both Adam and Sheila do—intimate friendship is difficult to come by, and shame has a 
tendency to emerge in more idealistic than social terms—as it has. Indeed, it is only in the 
latter half of Lerner’s book that Adam finally begins to look at the woman he has been 
dating—Isabel—as a real person. He discovers, for example, that she has a long term 
boyfriend named Oscar and that her brother died when she was sixteen, leaving behind 
nothing but a notebook full of dates: “1066, 312, 1936, 1492, 800, 1776, etc" (96). Mistaking 
them for an elaborately coded message meant specifically for her, the notebook became her 
prized possession, until Oscar pointed out that the notebook must have been a study aid—the 
dates are all historical. Adam is devastated to find out that Isabel has had a life that preceded 
(and will continue without) him but must mask his feelings as he responds to Isabel’s painful 
memories. It is a turning point in his capacity to think of someone besides himself as real.  
 Similarly, the idea that the self is performance has hamstrung most of Sheila’s 
relationships. How Should a Person Be? begins with the narrator admitting she hadn’t had a 
real friend until the age of 25, and even then she realizes, in the awkward phrasing so typical 
of the book that, “she’d never had a woman either,” by which she means she’s never had a 
woman friend (31). Heti’s book has been widely praised for being a model of feminist 
writing in the 21st century, in part because it passes what is called the Bechdel test. The 
American cartoonist and recent recipient of a MacArthur Foundation “genius grant,” Alison 
Bechdel says that a work of fiction passes the test when its main protagonists are women who 
do not spend all their time talking about men. In How Should a Person Be? the most central 
relationship is between Margaux and Sheila; their conversations are usually about art, art-
making, or friendship. However, Heti’s preference for superficiality—personas instead of 
characters and talk so lacking in substance, “one occasionally [have] to remind oneself that 
the book’s author is thirty-five and not twenty," (Wood 68)—means that even the relationship 
with Margaux lacks depth. It is hard, in this aesthetic context, to take seriously this central 
relationship and the way that shame emerges there. Nevertheless, I would be remiss if I 
overlooked it altogether.  
 When Margaux and Sheila become friends, they try to make each other feel famous (3): 
Sheila records Margaux, Margaux paints Sheila (93). Then Sheila betrays Margaux in two 
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ways. First, Sheila buys the same yellow dress as Margaux. This leads to their first fight. 
Second, Sheila uses all of the recorded material from their conversations not, as she had 
promised, to write the play, but to write about them. Margaux is outraged. In what is the most 
emotionally wrought—read: melodramatic—section of the book, Sheila recounts her shame 
at having betrayed her friend’s explicit wishes about what should happen with those 
recordings: 
I had come too close and hurt her….Instead of sitting down and writing my play 
with my words—using my imagination, pulling up the words from the solitude 
and privacy of my soul—I had used her words, stolen what was hers. I had 
plagiarized her being and mixed it up with the ugliness that was mine!….Shame 
covered my face and hands. I would abandon my play for good. I would never 
tape us again! (179) 
This betrayal is described as creative cheating. Sheila has poached her friend’s being and is 
ashamed of it. She flees to New York. When she returns, she finds a numbered note from 
Margaux that reads, in part:  
3. To be my closest friend and record me, then as soon as you’ve learned how a 
person should be, you’re done with me! ….  
5. I always feared that one day you would forget why we wanted to see each other 
all the time, once you know longer felt it or wanted to… 
6. Why would you still hang out with me? You’re already off to the next thing that 
will help you be a genius. (242) 
Sheila lies in bed and contemplates slitting her wrists in the shower (242). She writes, “I 
wanted to shoot myself in the face with a gun that released so many bullets at once, which 
would fan out and hit every part of my face and explode it into nothing, into mush" (242-3). 
Sheila’s dreams that night are horrifically violent: countless knives are delivered to an 
apartment; an orgy begins; girls get “skinned alive and kept alive,” and then are destroyed, 
“ripped away, so that you could not tell one girl from the other …[they were] just bloodiness, 
like animals turned inside out" (244-45). In the morning she wakes and concludes “I had hurt 
Margaux beyond compare. The heat of shame was the heat of my body. There was not one 
cell in my body unsullied by what I had done" (245). When she finally meets Margaux and 
does what she can do to repair the damage, Margaux demands that Sheila finish the play: 
“Does it have to be a play?” asks Sheila (262). As I noted above, Margaux says no. This is 
the turning point that brings Sheila back into harmony with Margaux; by writing the book, a 
process she describes as “throwing her shit,” she overcomes her shame (277). She becomes, 
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she says, “a real girl" (277). Writing has manifest Sheila’s shame, but it is also (by way of it 
signaling the fulfillment of a promise to her friend), shame’s overcoming. 
 Crucially, Ben Lerner’s book ends the same way. When the Atocha station is bombed 
and protests erupt in the street, Adam struggles to join the chanting crowds but finds that his 
“voice sounded off" (123). His friends, all of them Spanish and involved in Madrid’s art 
scene, participate in the protests without irony, detachment, or suspicion. Adam eyes them 
curiously: amazed at how easily they belong, at how forcefully they say something and mean 
it. Finally Adam seems to make peace with meaning. Although he maintains that he is no 
genius, “No duende here, I would think to myself, checking my body for sensation, no deep 
song" (164), he does find himself surprisingly protective of his poetry and of the self that it 
represents: “my research had taught me that the tissue of contradictions that was my 
personality was itself, at best, a poem, where ‘poem’ is understood as referring to a failure of 
language to be equal to the possibilities it figures” (164). And, it is within the nature of 
friendship that he comes to realize not only that he speaks the language he has enjoyed mis-
understanding for the majority of the book, but also that he might even be capable of saying 
something about literature, “in [his] second language without irony" (168). Isabel has left him 
and he has begun seeing Teresa. She asks him “When are you going to stop pretending that 
you’re only pretending to be a poet?" (168) which prompts him to consider the possibility 
that “maybe only [his] fraudulence was fraudulent" (168).  
 The final pages of the book abandon irony completely. Kisses without irony, speeches 
without irony, friendships without irony. Adam returns to where the book began, in the 
Prado, “standing before The Descent, oil on oak, hash and caffeine; I hadn’t been there in a 
while and the blue was startling" (179). For the first time, Adam evokes history in a sincere 
way:  
It was the deadliest day since the invasion began. Unmanned drones made 
sorrowful noise overhead. It was 1933. The cities were polluted with light, the 
world warming. The seas were rising. The seas were closing over future readers. 
Confused trees were blooming early; you could view the pics from space online. It 
was 1066, 312. (178)  
For the first time, Adam permits the weight of history to fall on him without irony as refuge. 
He goes to the panel discussion, speaks his second language, reads his poems and all of it 
with a surprising lack of nervousness. The book concludes: “Teresa would read the originals 
and I would read the translations and the translations would become the originals as we read. 
Then I planned to live forever in a skylit room surrounded by my friends" (181). 
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  Similarly, How Should a Person Be? returns to where it began. The friends—Misha, 
John, Sholem, Margaux and Sheila—convene to judge the results of the Ugly Painting 
Competition. The hard work of ugliness has been evident throughout How Should a Person 
Be? and in the concluding pages, this reigning aesthetic is again held up as an ideal, with 
Margaux as its principal philosopher: “Well, everything I like is ugly-beautiful…I think 
anything tight is truly ugly for me" (291). By “tight,” Margaux means anything that follows 
the rules of what is meant to be beautiful. After a friendly art critique of both pieces, the 
friends agree that Sholem’s painting is probably uglier than Margaux’s. The deciding factor 
is pointed out by Sholem:  
But see, the saving grace is your touch. The nonugly is your touch. I knew it 
would be like this! The way this line sort of whorls in on itself, and you have 
these two beautiful streaks of this gorgeous red….Again, so special. Your touch is 
all over this painting. " (Heti 294)  
The surprising turn at the end of both books could have been written by Montaigne: they are 
unlikely odes to friendship. 
 
 Numerous critics have noted the similarities of Sheila Heti’s How Should a Person 
Be? and Ben Lerner’s Leaving the Atocha Station, and some have come to the conclusion that 
what negative criticism Heti’s work did receive is illustrative of an ongoing gender bias in 
literary criticism, a poor explanation in my estimation. While both books offer original and 
highly contemporary responses to whether or not art, poetry or novels can be meaningful, and 
by this they usually mean “in the face of war, capitalism, racism, or poverty,” Lerner’s book 
takes this question seriously and in doing so far surpasses Heti’s intentionally superficial 
book. Heti’s novel is, as its UK edition proclaims, a “novel from life.” Yet anyone who has 
ever tried to write dialogue by transcribing a taped conversation will know that human 
speech, no matter how intelligent the speakers, is wrought with redundancies, pauses, ugly 
turns of phrase and dropped threads. In life, stories never end; arguments never conclude. 
Heti’s prose preserves the awkwardness of recorded speech, while Adam’s prose is 
transcendently artificial. The difference between the books reveals that art needs artifice for it 
to ever hope to represent something meaningful about this, our shamed human condition. 
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Shame's Lyric: Maggie Nelson's Bluets 
     Perhaps writing is not really pharmakon, 
but more of a mordant—a means of binding color to its object—or 
feeding it into it, like a tattoo needle drumming ink into skin. But 
‘mordant,’ too, has a double edge: it derives form mordere, to 
bite—so it is not just fixative or preserver, but also an acid, a 
corrosive. 
 
Maggie Nelson, Bluets 
 
 Ecstasy and dullness; blindness and the gaze; the prevailing pains of the body, heart, 
and spirit; and what-does-anything-ever-mean-anyway: these are the motifs that ebb and flow 
in Maggie Nelson’s Bluets in cycles so rhythmic, they almost feel liturgical. The form of the 
book has been described as fragmentary, poetic, or, in her words, “propositional” (Nelson 
interview with DeFord BOMB n.pag). Her propositions are part autobiography, part 
quotation, creating an impression of Nelson that is sometimes aphoristic and inconclusive, 
and sometimes intellectual and crass. Of all the possible ways critics have tried to pin Bluets 
to a genre, the lyric essay seems most apt, if only because that genre, itself, defies genre 
(Lorsung, Schlegel, Rooney). When critics have tried to define the genre, they become lyrical 
themselves, saying that the lyric essay “partakes of the poem in its density and shapeliness, 
its distillation of ideas and musicality of language. It partakes of the essay in its weight, in its 
overt desire to engage with the facts, melding its allegiance to the actual with its passion for 
imaginative form” (Tall and D’Agata n.pag). Yet it bears at least some resemblance to lyric 
poetry, which typically involves an isolated speaker (Frye 54), so in Bluets, a solitary speaker 
stands before us, uttering, in one of Helen Vender’s coy descriptions of lyric, “an utterance 
that is ours” (qtd. in Jackson 88). In her meandering, Nelson engages and disrupts all of the 
emblems of the lyric, yet it is the pursuit of epiphany that pulls the reader ever forward. This 
is especially true if by epiphany we mean a sometimes mystical revelation, arrived at after a 
difficult time of pilgrimage or meditation. In Bluets, our wandering is our reward because the 
epiphany, to its credit, never quite arrives. Through an aesthetic that is, in turns, exposing and 
reclusive, defiantly shameless and too-ashamed-to-even-say-so, Bluets embodies the 
dialectical (and lyrical) nature of shame in a secular world. 
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  In earlier chapters, we’ve looked at efforts to curtail the affects of shame, but now I’d 
like to explore more carefully the way shame appears in our relations with the world—how 
we perceive it and how we express such perceptions. This chapter is about looking and 
storytelling. It is about blighted sight and the forms of writing that try to come to terms with 
it. This chapter enacts shame theory as a mode of reading. We look for shame, and voilà: 
there it is! One of the things we’ll be on the lookout for, then, are what I’d call an aesthetics 
of shame: an aesthetics of the dialectic, masking, confession, and withdrawal. This is an 
aesthetic that tacks the way a sailboat does, back and forth across the wind where the wind is 
a sailboat’s ally and its enemy; despite the wind and because of it, the boat moves ever 
forward. Shame is like the wind: we must contend with it, even if no one else can see it. 
Contend in the right way, and it can be a source of tremendous power. Tacking is the term for 
how a sailboat steals the wind’s power, but to one standing on the shore, tacking can make a 
sailboat look a little lost. It is all a matter of perspective.  
 Though the primary focus of this chapter will be on Bluets, I begin the chapter with a 
discussion of looking and love as they appear in the work of psychologists Silvan Tomkins 
and Leon Wurmser. In the introduction we saw Tomkins and Wurmser as complementary 
thinkers in that both engage with shame as something an individual feels. Here we look at 
how their discussions diverge on the topic of love’s relation to shame.  
 Silvan Tomkins tells us that looking, or especially the look-look of intimate 
connection can be a source of shame. Shame is paradoxically produced by looking, registered 
in the face even when one wishes one could hide it, and produces, in the shamed person, the 
desire to hide away. Visuality—our perception of ourselves and of ourselves being perceived 
by others— is at the heart of this affect. We look because we are interested; we look away 
because we are ashamed. More than any of the other affects, shame takes place in the realm 
of the visual. While all of the affects register on the face—and therefore are visible—only 
shame’s visibility increases the phenomenological experience of the affect. Knowing that we 
are blushing makes our shame all the more intense. At the same time, shame is closely related 
to the experience of looking or wanting to be looked at.  
 For Tomkins, shame explains the age-old taboos against looking, exposing and 
interocular looking, or, looking into another person’s eyes. The latter expresses shame in 
intimacy because when one looks into the eyes of another, one sees affect and one can share 
it: 
…the taboo on mutual looking is reinforced by its specific linkage with sexuality. 
To the extent to which there are taboos on the free expression of sexuality, mutual 
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looking, which is an important part of sexual exploration and contagion, also 
comes under taboo. (Tomkins 374)6 
Looking is dangerous. Whole graveyards in the Middle Ages were thought to have been full 
of victims of the evil eye and no less than two Popes were accused of having it. Pope Leo 
XIII’s evil eye was “believed responsible for the death of a large number of cardinals and the 
assassination of King Humbert of Italy" (Tomkins 375). Despite ample “evidence” that men 
can possess the evil eye, it is women who are most often associated with it (378).  
 There is also a way that fascination has to do with infatuation. Both are something 
one does to another and that indicates a morally suspect love, and both are predicated on a 
tantalizing power imbalance. Fascination is way of looking at another person that wants to 
hold them in your grasp: paralyze them, render them dizzy, blind, and unable to break away. 
Fascination is what the predator does to its prey. Is what a snake does to a little mouse: it 
establishes a position of power.  
 Infatuation is the opposite. Infatuation is what the prey does even when the predator 
has lost interest: it keeps looking. Infatuation is absolutely passive, except for one thing: it 
chooses that passivity. It adopts a position of weakness, but enjoys it, perhaps because of the 
risks it entails:  
Infatuation is idealization and admiration based on a spurious assessment or a vain 
hope of what the other should be. True love respects and admires because of 
knowledge, not illusion. (Wurmser 308) 
Both fascination and infatuation can feel wonderful and we may submit to them willingly and 
without real harm. The only harm is when we make a related perceptual mistake: when we 
confuse fascination or infatuation with love. The problem is that we make this mistake too 
often:  
It has become evident that, just as shame as two logical levels (function versus 
content), genetically it may have two roots. To put the distinction as simply as 
possible, shame originates on the one hand in anxiety related to theatophilic and 
delophilic impulses—in traumatic failure in the perceptual-expressive fields—
leading to many layers of defenses and wishes. (Wurmser 168)  
                                                
6 It’s beyond the purview of this chapter to discuss this aspect of Affect, Imagery, Consciousness in 
any more detail than this, but Tomkins’ list of manifestations of the taboo on looking is extensive and 
entertaining. Instances of the fear of the evil-eye, for example, are found in the sayings of Jesus, in 
ancient Iraqi civilization, and in the poisonous filth left on a mirror by an old woman’s evil gaze. 
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In other words, shame operates in the world of perception and expression. One’s incapacity 
to accurately perceive the world can be a source of shame. Likewise, one’s incapacity (or 
shame-induced unwillingness) to express oneself is at once a manifestation of shame but also 
its source. The divide between what one seems to be (to the world) and what one knows of 
oneself is always a source of shame, especially when one’s interior knowledge reflects a 
further gap, a distance between how one would like to be and how one knows one is. There 
are three parts: how the world sees us, how we see ourselves, how we would like to be. 
Sometimes we manage to project our ideal, which means that the world sees us as we would 
like to be seen: in which case the only hidden aspect is the truth we know of ourselves.  
 To complicate matters further, the power and weakness expressed in infatuation and 
fascination that are typically intersubjective, that is, between two people, are also blunted 
modes of seeing that we can turn on ourselves, that is, intrasubjectively. One term we have 
for this is narcissism. Looking at others is dangerous, but so is looking at oneself: 
Plutarch thought it possible for a vain person to thus fascinate himself, citing the 
case of Eutelidas, who lost his beauty and health by looking at his own reflection 
in the water. Ovid’s account of Narcissus is similar. (Tomkins 376) 
The centrality of these various modes of looking and how they relate to good love and bad 
love (infatuation, fascination, harmful narcissism) are all central to understanding shame in 
Bluets. 
 
 Shame relates, according to Leon Wurmser, to a basic flaw (or a fear that we exhibit a 
basic flaw) that would render us unlovable. We fear that we are “a loser, defective, weak, or 
dirty” (168). Shame, says Wurmser, “is the night side of love. When love is eclipsed by 
power, the somber hues of shame darken life" (309). Shame and love cannot, in Wurmser’s 
estimation, co-exist, or at least not for long. He says,  
Love’s enemy is neither shame nor self-loyalty, but the precedence of power, of 
self-concern. Where the other is used, partially or fully, emotionally or physically, 
unconsciously or consciously, love flees and shame enters. (309) 
Though shame and love are not precisely antithetical, they do not nourish one another. Shame 
is symptomatic of love’s absence and of the lack then, of love’s power to recognize and 
accept our every dark corner. As Joseph Adamson puts it: 
This is the ultimate wish of all human beings perhaps: to be recognized for what 
one is, by a loving eye from which the need to hide or cover oneself, with all 
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one’s flaws and defects, imagined or otherwise, is absent, without the fear of 
judgment or shame. (Adamson 73)  
Love is a freedom from the critical eye of shame. To the extent that one’s romantic 
relationship fails to fulfill one’s ideal—of total acceptance, for example—it too can become a 
source of shame. 
 Silvan Tomkins characterizes the relationship between love and shame somewhat 
more subtly. While shame might, in one instance, be a corollary of a fear of unlovability, this 
is by no means its only appearance in life. Instances of shame, in Tomkins, extend far beyond 
the realm of love and interpersonal relations. We can experience shame before an ideal just as 
well as we can before a person. In his assessment, shame emerges in love as it does in work, 
as it does in ones desire to write, sing, or perform anything well. Shame emerges in relations 
with loved ones and with strangers and can be both intensely idiosyncratic as well thoroughly 
the result of socialization. Shame is always, in Tomkins’ work, a partial reduction of the 
affect of interest joy (138). The “partial” part is important. It is a bandaid only partially 
removed. Shame is on the way to contempt, but it isn’t free like contempt is. Contempt has 
severed the ties from the individual who hurt them, but shame keeps us hanging around, like 
a stray dog that once had a home.  
 Consider the innocuous situation of running into a friend on the street, a friend who 
ends up being a stranger who looks like a friend. If intense excitement or joy is akin to the 
pleasure of exploration,  
… any barrier to it, whether because one is suddenly looked at by one who is 
strange, or because one wishes to look at or commune with another person, but 
suddenly cannot because he is strange, or one expected him to be familiar but he 
suddenly appears unfamiliar, or one started to smile but found one was smiling at 
a stranger—any of these which involve an interruption and incomplete reduction 
of interest or smiling will activate the lowering of the head and eyes in shame and 
thereby reduce further exploration powered either by excitement or joy. (142-3) 
I include this passage here because it serves two purposes: not only to show the subtlety with 
which Tomkins addresses the topic of shame, finding it in degrees of retreat rather than in the 
more dramatically sketched withdrawal we see in Wurmser, but also because it captures the 
very dialectical movements of the affect, the way it both extends itself out into the world with 
a beautiful vulnerability and then retreats with a withered downturned gaze. And yet, that 
downturned gaze—as we know, and Tomkins knows, and most advertising executives, 
models, and seductive people know—can be read as coquettishness. Our embarrassment at 
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being caught looking can be so attractive that a species of that downward gaze is actually 
often replicated or feigned, even in the absence of the affect that usually inspires it. Shame 
can be very alluring. 
 Where shame exists in relationship to love, the potential to be ashamed is increased, 
not lessened. This is because love is a condition of very high attachment to another person 
and, oftentimes, to the ideal of love itself. The degree to which one feels an intense interest, 
joy, or excitement at being around another person (all typical affects associated with love) is 
also the degree to which one is vulnerable to shame. The attachment is a precondition for 
shame. Tomkins explains that “Defeat is most ignominious when one still wishes to win. The 
sting of shame can be removed from any defeat by attenuating the positive wish" (Tomkins 
361). If we fall out of love, in other words, we can fall out of shame. Not so easy, but still. 
 One can imagine, given the flexibility of what is shameful in Tomkins’ system, that 
the question of shame’s relationship to unlovability might become utterly idiosyncratic. If we 
imagine shame as a register of our fear that we might be unlovable, then, in Tomkins’ system, 
our unlovability could be due to an infinite array of failures: To the extent that Tomkin’s 
shame is highly idiosyncratic, so too are the potential explanations for what makes us 
unlovable. At the very least, they extend far beyond the sources of shame catalogued by 
Wurmser, where most shame amounts to a failure to attain society’s standards—of 
cleanliness, sexual attractiveness, sexual orientation, or intellectual, physical, emotional 
strength. Given a strong enough shame theory, any idiosyncratic source of shame could 
render one (in one’s own eyes) unlovable. Luckily, others see us differently than we see 
ourselves. To a degree.  
 Despite these differences, they are differences of degree. Both Wurmser and Tomkins 
agree that because love promises the very deepest kind of connection—the recognition, 
acceptance, interest and freedom to be ourselves, whatever that may be at any given 
moment—it is, in both Wurmser’s work and in Tomkins’, the site of shame’s most 
debilitating maneuvers. As models for thinking about shame’s relation to subjectivity, 
Wurmser and Tomkins provide interpretive rather than diagnostic tools. Whether or not a 
core self exists isn’t the question here. The question is how these conceptions help us to 
better understand the working of shame in Maggie Nelson’s Bluets. 
 
 In much the same way that looking concerns two types of perception—the 
phenomenology of perception, or the idea or feeling that seeing creates internally, and a 
phenomenology of epistemology, where the fundamental gain from looking is thought to be 
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knowledge, or facts—shame operates dialectically. On this point, Tomkins and Wurmser 
seem to agree. Wurmser, true to the redemptive narrative he tells about shame, looks at 
shame’s dialectics in a positive light: 
Philosophically speaking, profound theoretical insight moves dialectically. 
Seeming opposite truths may complement each other, and only so can they be 
fully appreciated. And is not this old philosophy of dialectic…itself an 
epistemological prototype for our more narrowly defined conflict model in 
psychoanalysis? Is not shame itself, then, part of overarching dialectical 
movements? (Wurmser 28) 
Wurmser’s shame moves dialectically, and one of the directions a healthy shame can move in 
is in the direction of creativity and originality. (The sailboat, out there in the bay, tacks back 
and forth, looking lost, but moving ever forward). Even the masks we wear in an effort to 
conceal our shame could be considered within a dialectical framework. When we wear a 
mask, we are two things at once, both of them true: 
The most accessible, largely preconscious, level of shame contents is a 
characteristic duplicity, one probably inherent in every one of us, a doubleness of 
‘how I want to appear’ and ‘how I really am.’ (Wurmser 169) 
The self monitoring that Tomkins identifies as the acting of a strong shame theory identifies 
itself most strongly dialectically, either between the self and society or between the self and 
the self. 
 
 At the end of Wurmser’s book, the dialectics of shame have been resolved in two 
ways: through romantic love and self love. In the first, our lover has leapt past our 
deficiencies and seen through to our core self, loving every dark circle it passed along the 
way. In the second, self-love has been achieved through a heroic transcendence of shame 
that, paradoxically, benefited from the kind of protective withdrawal shame provided prior to 
the heroic leap. And the leap was, indeed, creative: something new exists where nothing did 
before. The leap has overturned the status quo through a scientific, artistic, or intellectual 
achievement. The dark night of the soul led to the triumph of the day. In this way, Wurmser’s 
assessment of shame and the way out can, paradoxically, create a new ideal, and therefore, a 
new source of shame. Wurmser’s hero, finally able to express its core, original, unique 
selfhood, is nothing short of the romantic ideal of the individual. That is, at least, how the 
solitary hero reads in Bluets. 
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 The most fundamental ideal in Bluets is that of independence. It’s not an explicitly 
foregounded ideal, but it’s there, in the interstices, lurking, even. Its most evocative and 
repeated presentation is in questions about perception. Bluet’s speaker experiences anguish 
over the fact that knowledge and perception are not the same thing. What she’s after is a kind 
of perceptual independence: a way of looking that would mean that one could trust that what 
one saw was real. Perception would be epistemological. It would lead to knowledge. Being 
able to trust one’s sight would mean that falling in love would no longer have anything to do 
with going blind. It would mean that colour, and especially blue, would be a measurable 
thing. The problem is expressed here: 
As in Humboldt’s Travels (Ross, 1852): ‘We beheld with admiration the azure 
colour of the sky. Its intensity at the zenith appeared to correspond to 41 degrees 
of the cyanometer.’ This latter sentence brings me great pleasure, but really it 
takes us no further—either into knowledge, or into beauty. (Nelson 40) 
We’ll see this problem repeatedly in Bluets, where independence is held up as a kind of ideal 
with various guises: the objective scientist, the detached lover, the sexually liberated woman, 
and the one who can bear pain. Scientific, romantic, artistic, sexual, spiritual, and emotional 
independence are Bluets’ ideals. We turn to those ideals now. 
 
 
 The three forms inspire Bluets: the philosophical tract, the lyric poem and 
autobiography weave together a compelling rethinking of shame in women’s writing 
particularly as it relates to love, loss, depression, and physical pain. In interviews, Nelson has 
described how Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations inspired the structuring of Bluets:  
 I basically took half of the book’s locutions from Wittgenstein, and the other half 
from Goethe: the anecdotal locutions about perception come from Theory of 
Colours, and the relentless form of self-questioning, of pulling the rug out from 
under the speaker each time she has come to perch, comes from Philosophical 
Investigations. (Nelson in interview with DeFord)  
This method, of relentless self-questioning aestheticizes the workings of a strong shame 
theory and makes it possible to explore what the consequences of a strong shame theory are 
for political engagement, friendship, and autobiography.  
 Even if Bluets does not trace the development of the author’s personality as Lejeune 
would expect in an autobiographical work, the author’s circumstances certainly correspond 
with those of the speaker. When the speaker is interviewed for a position at a university, she 
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tells them that she is writing a book about the color blue: “One of the men asks, Why blue? 
….We don’t get to choose what or whom we love, I want to say. We just don’t get to 
choose.” (Nelson 5) Later, when the speaker describes scenes from the academic institution 
where she works, we can imagine it is Pratt, in Brooklyn, or Cal Arts in California: places 
Maggie Nelson has worked. And when the speaker addresses her depression, narrates the way 
the Prince of Blue disappointed her or how the Princess of Blue inspired, readers connect 
these moments to a real life lived by a real person. Bluets is not the first autobiographical 
book Nelson has written. Two of her books—The Red Parts and Jane: A Murder—recounted 
the murder of her aunt. Another, Something Bright, Then Holes is a poetry collection that 
speaks, in part, of her friend’s motorcycle accident; this friend reappears in Bluets. Maggie 
Nelson, the writer, is the writer and speaker of these propositions and the stories they tell are 
Nelson’s stories, taken from her life. I will return to the question of genre at the end of this 
chapter. 
 The book opens with a rhetorical device designed to create sympathy between the 
reader and the writer, and to teach us a thing or two about how to read the text. It is a 
confession, a model that she will, throughout the course of the book, dismantle. She knows 
that the confession reads, in Western culture, as the “prime mark[er] of authenticity, par 
excellence the kind of speech in which the individual authenticates his [or her] inner truth" 
(Brooks qtd. in Jamison 165). The opening preposition is: 
Suppose I were to begin by saying that I had fallen in love with a color. Suppose I 
were to speak this as though it were a confession; suppose I shredded my napkin 
as I spoke. It began slowly. An appreciation, an affinity. Then, one day, it became 
more serious. Then (looking into an empty teacup, its bottom stained with thin 
brown excrement coiled into the shape of a sea horse) it became somehow 
personal. (1)  
The repetition here is incantatory, and a paradox is at work. What is the nature of the 
paradox? The repeated word is “suppose.” Its repetition enchants and dizzies. Its repetition 
and its tentative meaning bring to the text a sense of orality, the intimacy of a whisper, but 
the truth of the matter is that the speaker of this first proposition is beyond the stage of 
supposing anything. The reader knows this. The reader holds in her hands a blue book 
entitled Bluets, and the first proposition confesses the truth of the matter: Bluets is a love 
letter to blue. Yet the word suppose suggests that “it could be like this, or it could be like 
that.” Said aloud, in conversation, the word suppose means what it says it means: it really 
could be one way or another. In text, however, the word suppose has been inked, 
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permanently, onto the page. Suppose, in text, is only rhetorically suggestive. What then, is 
the rhetorical purpose of this word? Perhaps its purpose is to dazzle, but read alongside the 
use of the subjunctive mode, this italicized, subordinated whisper reads like a secret— a coy 
one, a secret for pleasure’s sake, but a secret all the same. It suggests that if we ever do get a 
confession here, it won’t be one that seeks redemption or forgiveness, it will be one that is 
confessed for our reading pleasure, because it is time that we be honest: confession doesn’t 
seek redemption here and autobiography doesn’t have to be true to be meaningful. The main 
purpose of foregrounding the word suppose is to invite the reader into the dialectical logic of 
Bluets where words and their meanings shift, slip, slide. 
 Perhaps an even clearer illustration of this technique can be found in Nelson’s use of 
the word “you,” and again, this technique appears in the book’s earliest propositions. As with 
“suppose”, the “you” serves a dual purpose of creating a feeling of intimacy between the 
speaker and the reader and of emphasizing the slipperiness of language, meaning, and 
address. The first “you” addresses the reader, wherein the reader is imagined as a skeptic: 
“Well, and what of it? A voluntary delusion, you might say." (2) Nelson knows she has her 
work cut out for her: the reader is not yet ready. Nelson is hospitable to her skeptic reader. In 
proposition 5, the speaker includes the reader in the investigation at hand, saying, “But first, 
let us consider…" (2) but in proposition 7 she is playfully antagonistic, admonishing the 
reader, saying “Don’t fool yourself," (3). In proposition 7, she challenges the reader: “Admit 
that you have stood in front of a little pile of powdered ultramarine pigment in a glass cup at 
a museum and felt a stinging desire" (3), even going further, 
You might want to reach out and disturb the pile of pigment, for example, first 
staining your fingers with it, then staining the world. You might want to dilute it 
and swim in it, you might want to rouge your nipples with it, you might want to 
paint a virgin’s robe with it…. (4) 
And so the reader is included in the ecstatic desires evoked by a powdered blue and, here 
again is the incantatory anaphora that makes our inclusion in the text as a sort of interlocutor 
all the more powerful.  
 But I said that Nelson’s use of the word “you” is dialectical. The first “you” is us, her 
readers. The second “you” is someone else. Notice the subtle shifting of the possessive 
pronouns in this proposition:  
4. I admit that I may have been lonely. I know that loneliness can produce bolts of 
hot pain, a pain which, if it stays hot enough for long enough, can begin to 
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simulate, or to provoke—take your pick—an apprehension of the divine. (This 
ought to arouse our suspicions.)(2) 
Nelson includes us throughout this proposition, first by her forthright admission of loneliness, 
an admission that seems totally guileless, second by the use of “your” and, even more 
strongly “our,” and, so the dialectical process of swinging from one idea to its opposite or 
negation becomes ours. Bluets is warming up. Consider the personal pronouns here: 
8. Do not, however, make the mistake of thinking that all desire is yearning. ‘We 
love to contemplate blue, not because it advances to us, but because it draws us 
after it,’ wrote Goethe, and perhaps he is right. But I am not interested in longing 
to live in a world in which I already live. I don’t want to yearn for blue things, and 
God forbid for any ‘blueness.’ Above all, I want to stop missing you. (4) 
In this proposition, Nelson establishes the full range of “yous” she will use in Bluets. Because 
the previous “yous” have consistently addressed the reader, when, at the end of proposition 8 
the “you” suddenly becomes someone else—the Prince of Blue—she has already developed a 
sympathetic relationship between us and this means that the switch to a different you 
becomes our switch to a different you. When the ‘you’ suddenly becomes a figure we’ll 
come to know as the Prince of Blue, the I, the speaker of the text, becomes ‘us,’ and ‘we.’ 
Her Prince of Blue is Our Prince of Blue. The man that she wants to stop missing becomes, 
simultaneously, our object of longing. And she has taught us how to read her: the move from 
one you to another is already so well established that she need not give the reader the space 
of several sentences to cope with that change, as we see in proposition 9: 
9. So please do not write to tell me about any more beautiful blue things. To be 
fair, this book will not tell you about any, either. (4) 
The first “you” is addressed to her Prince of Blue. The second “you” is to him, but also the 
reader. This practice will be one way that shame is seen, but not heard, in the text. It is a 
shame that is incarnated in the body of the text, not spoken aloud. In these propositions and 
throughout the book, Nelson establishes a dialectical aesthetic that enacts the ‘yes, no’ 
structure of shame. 
 
 This section begins and ends with one of Bluets central stories, that of the erotic, 
romantic attachment the speaker feels toward the Prince of Blue. We begin with them apart, 
flash back to them together, and then end with her having renounced him completely. In 
between, perception and perceptual errors come into Bluets’ exploration of the history of 
colour, the speaker’s attachment to blue, and a spiritual quest marked by both irreverence and 
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wonder. Throughout, we will see the speaker grappling with the shame of emotional 
dependency. 
 
 This story begins in the first few pages of the book. It begins with interwoven 
descriptions of love, heartbreak, the depression that followed, and concludes with a sexual 
episode that, in and of itself, is marked with shame. Parallel to the love story involving the 
Prince of Blue is another love story involving the color itself, an affair that comes before and 
lives on long after the love story with the man has come to an end. The desperation played 
out with the Prince of Blue is all the more heightened with the colour, such that we see the 
desperate turns of fascination, thralldom, possessiveness, objectification, and finally a slow 
letting go play out more clearly with the colour than with the Prince, though the parallels she 
creates between them suggests that the stories are more similar than they are different.  
 As a result of her obsession with blue, she was introduced to a man “with the face of a 
derelict whose eyes literally leaked blue,” and she “called this one the prince of blue, which 
was, in fact, his name" (6). We have seen how Wurmser argues that a fear of unlovability is 
the core of shame. It is what he calls “the basic flaw,” but also, possibly, “the ‘mortal wound’ 
all tragic heroes have" (293). Their story goes like this: they meet, they fuck in the Chelsea 
Hotel, she dreams of him abandoning her, he does abandon her, she writes him a letter, he 
carries it around with him for months, unread. She doesn’t see him again. In one of the 
dreams he has escaped her, floating away down a river: “So I stayed behind,” she narrates, 
“and became known as the lady who waits, the sad sack of town with hair that smells like an 
animal" (8-9). She becomes, in other words, a rejected person, an outcast. Unlovability and 
shame, says Wurmser, spring from the painful exposure of one’s weakness or 
contemptibility—of the body that betrays us by smelling, looking, or desiring 
inappropriately. 
 Along those lines, the central problem with the Prince of Blue wasn’t even that he left 
her, it was that she should have seen it coming and that he became an object of obsession 
once he was gone. In other words, her errors were perceptual: a blindness in his presence and 
an obsession in his absence. “Above all,” she says, “I want to stop missing you” (4). There is, 
of course, something romantic about loving the wrong man. In speaking of both blue and the 
Prince of Blue she says, “We don’t get to choose what or whom we love, I want to say. We 
just don’t get to choose" (5). But she wishes that she’d been equipped to think more clearly 
about what she was doing. Part way into the story of the depression that ensued him leaving, 
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Nelson reports her therapist’s view of things: “If he hadn’t lied to you, he would have been a 
different person than he is," (17). And then,  
She is trying to get me to see that although I thought I loved this man very 
completely for exactly who he was, I was in fact blind to the man he actually was, 
or is. 
 
45. This pains me enormously. She presses me to say why; I can’t answer. Instead 
I say something about how clinical psychology forces everything we call love into 
the pathological or the delusional or the biologically explicable, that if what I 
wasn’t feeling wasn’t love then I am forced to admit that I don’t know what love 
is, or, more simply, that I loved a bad man. (Nelson 17-18) 
What pains Nelson is that an expert is telling her that she was mistaken: that what she saw 
wasn’t actually there. What she wants is knowledge: a perception that she can trust to deliver 
her the facts of the matter. At issue is the possibility that everything we see with our blunted, 
blue eyes, might not be what we think it is.  
 Midway through the book, Nelson explicates a secondary source of shame—
depression. Much as her obsession with blue led her to the Prince of Blue, her obsession with 
the colour led her to a book on depression, or so she says:85. One afternoon in 2006, at a 
bookstore in Los Angeles. I pick up a book called The Deepest Blue. Having expected a 
chromatic treatise, I am embarrassed when I see the subtitle: How Women Face and 
Overcome Depression. I quickly return it to its shelf. Eight months later, I order the book 
online. (33) 
There is an identifiable source (or sources) of the speaker’s shame in this proposition: this is 
shame-as-emotion at work and it explains itself through the cause-and-effect logic of 
narrative. It is one or more of the following: depression, women’s depression, the desire for 
help and self-help, the desire to hide that desire, the giving in to a shameful genre later on, in 
hiding. The shame of The Deepest Blue is not just its existence, and the fact that she buys it: 
the shame is also aesthetic: 
88. Like many self-help books, The Deepest Blue is full of horrifyingly simplistic 
language and some admittedly good advice. Somehow the women in the book all 
learn to say: ‘That’s my depression talking. It’s not ‘me.’  
89. As if we could scrape the color off the iris and still see. (34) 
Maybe, she seems to say, some people could scrape the color off their irises and call what 
they perceived sight. But, not her: “35. Does the world look bluer from blue eyes? Probably 
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not, but I choose to think so (self-aggrandizement)” (14). Self-help books in Bluets are an 
ongoing source of shame and shame’s sister—contempt: 
136. ‘Drinking when you are depressed is like throwing kerosene on a fire,’ I read 
in another self-help book at the bookstore. What depression ever felt like a fire? I 
think, shoving the book back on the shelf. (52-53) 
The aesthetic shame of the poorly wrought metaphor—of depression as fire—masks the more 
fundamental shame—that she would be reading such a debased genre in the first place. The 
genre itself shames her. Bluets attempts to unshame the story she is telling—of heartbreak, of 
depression—in part, by challenging the genre in which such stories are typically told. I will 
return to how she concludes her love affair with the Prince of Blue, but first I want to look at 
Science, the love affair with blue, and women’s right to look. 
 
 In Bluets, the prospect of scientific objectivity is—like love, like blue, like spiritual 
fulfillment and emotional freedom—a chimera. In its first third, Nelson’s exploration of 
perception relates to the physical, scientific configurations of it. Perception is what happens 
between the perceiver and the object perceived. That the perceiver can be mistaken about the 
perceived is a source of pain and confusion, and sometimes shame. The quagmires of visual 
perception—the way our eyes trick us—act as an entry point for even more difficult 
questions of perception, as we will see. Nelson’s approach is experimental: "Try, if you can, 
not to talk as if colors emanated from a single physical phenomenon" (20). Scientific 
locutions in these sections import the language of objectivity, certainty or truth-finding into 
her more metaphysical quests, but then her use of the language is poetic, and soon enough 
science stops suggesting surety. She says, about the question of colour, that we ought to: 
Keep in mind the effects of all the various surfaces, volumes, light-sources, films, 
expanses, degrees of solidity, solubility, temperature, elasticity, on color. Think of 
an object's capacity to emit, reflect, absorb, transmit, or scatter light. (20) 
This is the language and the advice of a scientist, but then her examples from scientists who 
have worked on such problems always undercut any hope of objectivity, suggesting that she 
hadn't hoped for objectivity at all. This is her account of Newton's investigation into color: 
in his zeal, in the 'dark chamber' of his room at Trinity College, Newton at times 
took to sticking iron rods or sticks in his eyes to produce then analyze his 
perceptions of color. (19) 
Pythagoras, Euclid, and Hipparchus proposed that our eyes "emitted some kind of substance 
that illuminated, or 'felt,' what we saw" (21). Epicurus thought the objects themselves 
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produced a ray (21). Plato "split the difference, and postulated that a 'visual fire' burns 
between our eyes and what they behold" (21). When we return to Newton, it is to find him 
referring to an "invaluable 'assistant'" who aided him in his discoveries, an assistant who 
many now consider a "rhetorical fiction”: Newton's own invention. It is within the logic of 
Bluets that we might imagine Newton's assistant was invented, perhaps, to offset the 
loneliness of his dark chamber. The question of what seeing is and what colour is remains, in 
Bluets, irresolvable, a "systematic illusion." The authorities she consults—from the 
Encyclopedia to an expert on guppy menopause—cannot help.  
38. For no one really knows what color is, where it is, even whether it is. Think of 
a honeybee, for instance, flying into the folds of a poppy: it sees a gaping violet 
mouth, where we see an orange flower and assume that it's orange, that we're 
normal. (15) 
The male guppy needs to be orange to attract a mate, but it doesn't care what orange is. We 
cannot know the answers to these questions, she seems to say, and the Encyclopedia agrees: 
"51. You might as well act as if objects had the colors, the Encyclopedia says” (19). Re-
reading these sections, we see that they are about the erotic thralldom with that which we 
cannot explain. Why else would Newton's laboratory be described as a dark chamber or the 
folds of a poppy as a gaping violet mouth? The central question is this: How do we know 
we’re not just like that honeybee, blazing towards a violet-coloured poppy or like the speaker 
of Bluets, in love with a bad man? If we can’t trust our eyes to see things clearly, what can 
we trust? 
 
 Blue is obviously the metaphorical centre of the book, but as metaphors go, it’s not so 
clear what it means. If the structure of a metaphor is that which involves a gestalt-like shift 
where two dissimilar objects are suddenly brought into a strange but true kinship, blue as a 
metaphor fails us because blue fails: we don’t know what it means, exactly, so we don’t 
know what it means when we say it’s like something else: “For a prince of blue is a prince of 
blue because he keeps ‘a pet sorrow, a blue-devil familiar, that goes with him everywhere’ 
(Lowell, 1870). This is how a prince of blue becomes a pain devil” (36). Blue is pain, a devil, 
a true love: Nelson assigns meanings to blue throughout the book, but it’s strongest link is to 
love. Bluets is the story of what it means to love someone or something. Sometimes we love a 
thing too much. Sometimes we objectify it. In the ways that Nelson tacks between one kind 
of love—the blinded love of infatuation, say—to another—the love of a friend who lets us 
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see her pain—we see the dialectical movement of shame as it leads us down what will 
ultimately be a redemptive path. Not all loves can be redeemed, but perhaps love, itself, can.  
 Following the blue in Bluets takes us through a story of gifts, commodification, 
sacralization, and ruin. It is what happens to all kinds of attachment, but it begins with an 
attachment that Nelson doesn’t seem able to escape, which is one reason the book opens with 
a confession. Attachment, especially one that is the result of self-indulgence or decadence, is 
one of the sources of shame here, and the story of blue is the story of the attempt to overcome 
it, or at least, accept it. The story she tells of shame, then, as we see its deft switchbacks from 
one notion of self to another, is a redemptive story: shame brings us back to ourselves.  
 Nelson’s blues are a collection that she has gathered in the course of writing the book. 
She says, “Over the past decade I have been given blue inks, paintings, postcards, dyes, 
bracelets, rocks, precious stones, watercolors, pigments, paperweights, goblets, and candies" 
(6). These blue objects have been delivered to her by her “blue correspondents, whose job it 
is to send me blue reports from the field" (6). Though she has many correspondents, two are 
most important: The Prince and Princess of Blue. The Prince of Blue teaches her about 
heartache (because he makes her heart ache). The Princess of Blue teaches her about pain 
(because she suffers a terrible accident and experiences terrible pain as a result, a pain she 
allows Nelson to witness) (38). 
 One of the disarming (or fascinating) aspects of Nelson’s propositions is the way they 
can be read to mean so many different things. I am tempted to say that this means they are 
pretty, in a formal way, but meaningless. A less cynical reading of this would be what Sartre 
has to say about freedom: we are holding hands, but unless we say so, it doesn’t mean 
anything. Isn’t this why her claim to see the world’s blues better due to her blue eyes can read 
as playful (when we read it immediately following the discussion of one of Viagra’s side-
affects: that it taints the world blue), or incredibly sad (where the effort to separate oneself 
from one’s depression is likened to an agonzing-to-imagine surgery—scraping the color off 
one’s iris: impossible in other words and akin to a kind of death: I see the world blue because 
I am this person with blue eyes and being in possession of these blue eyes permits me the 
extravagant divinity of seeing more blue, but also of feeling more blue too: separating myself 
from my depression would amount to suicide—even if I was still alive, it wouldn’t be me 
seeing the world).  
 I have already discussed the opening propositions, where Nelson admits to having 
fallen in love with a colour, and introduces a shifting “you” that draws us into a story that 
will become our own. Here I return to those opening propositions, citing them again in an 
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effort to draw out something new: the way that Nelson is suggesting that color has a magical 
power over her, in the way anything or anyone who fascinates can. Proposition two reads: “2. 
And so I fell in love with a color—in this case, the color blue—as if falling under a spell, a 
spell I fought to stay under and get out from under, in turns” (Nelson 1). 
She has nourished her infatuation with blue, indeed the book we are holding provides ample 
evidence of that. That she has done so makes her complicit in her dependency: she’s been 
foolish, and she knows it: 
3. Well, and what of it? A voluntary delusion, you might say. That each blue object 
could be a kind of burning bush, a secret code meant for a single agent, an X on a map 
too diffuse ever to be unfolded in entirety but that contains the knowable universe. 
How could all the shreds of blue garbage bags stuck in brambles, or the bright blue 
tarps flapping over every shanty and fish stand in the world, be, in essence, the 
fingerprints of God? (Nelson 2) 
In this proposition, Nelson begins the slow process of commodifying blue. I mean 
commodifying in Marx’s sense of the word, and I mean it as a means of getting us to the 
sacred: 
A commodity appears, at first sign, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its 
analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties. (Marx 27) 
The commodity is not just its use value and its exchange value. It is those values, and 
something else. An object that is the result of human labour, that can be exchanged for 
another object or can operate as a kind of currency, permitting further trade. This rational 
explanation does not explain, however, the secret of the commodity: that which makes it a 
fetish object, an object of unexplainable desire, but also the bearer of a “metaphysical 
subtleties.” In Bluets, the next proposition takes us from the fingerprints of God (the marks 
God leaves behind, if you will) to God itself (himself, herself, as you wish): 
4. I admit that I have been lonely. I know that loneliness can produce bolts of hot 
pain, a pain which, if it stays hot enough for long enough, can begin to simulate, or to 
provoke—take your pick—an apprehension of the divine. (This ought to arouse our 
suspicions). (Nelson 2) 
Here we see the familiar switchback, and an insouciant suggestion that loneliness—which is 
blue—can simulate (falsely) or provoke (truthfully) the divine. When she recommends a 
hermeneutic of suspicion, then, what would she like us to be suspicious of: the simulation of 
the divine, or its provocation? That is: should we doubt an image of God—because it isn’t a 
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real God—or the appearance of a real God—because there is no God? At this point, Nelson 
doesn’t want to have to choose. She’s content to have the appearance of something more, 
even if what that something is remains unclear. The something more is metaphysical, but 
what kind of metaphysical isn’t clarified. All we know is that the something more is the kind 
that takes hold of us and doesn’t let go. 
 That Nelson’s blues are as quotidian as torn scraps of blue tarpaulin, the turquoise of 
a robin’s egg, the moody blue of her very own eyes and as transcendent as the divine is what 
makes them so attractive to her. Fine, you might say, but why commodity, why not just say 
Maggie Nelson makes of blue a fetish object in the anthropological sense, where an object is 
invested with supernatural powers or a fetish in the Freudian sense, where a an object 
replaces a desired or missing object of sexual interest or desire? Or even, why not say simply 
that Maggie Nelson makes of blue a cipher, a wildcard? 
 One reason is simply that blue is a commodity. It has use value, exchange value, and, 
after Marx, something more. The painter Yves Klein “invented and patented his own shade of 
ultramarine, International Klein Blue (IKB)" (30), and the source of blue’s blue—lapis—can 
be mined, like gold. When “the miners use dynamite to bleed a vein, [they do so] in hopes of 
starting a ‘blue rush,’(31). The magical quality of a commodity is that it seems to be 
“endowed with life,” in a manner that cannot be explained (or is insufficiently explained) by 
the amount of human labour required to produce it, nor by its physical properties, nor by the 
use to which it can be put. Indeed, the liveliness of the commodity is what distinguishes it 
from a mere thing—a useful, exchangeable thing. The commodity in bourgeois society, for 
Marx, symbolizes the fact that “the process of production has [gained] mastery over man, 
instead of being controlled by man" (Marx 33). The power of objects to transform their 
owners is of central importance in Bluets. On this point, Nelson remarks:  
What kind of madness is it anyway, to be in love with something constitutionally 
incapable of loving you back? 
37. Are you sure—one would like to ask—that it cannot love you back? 
Bluets entertains the idea that the thing could love us back, but not really. Thinking about 
blue in terms of commodity speaks to the mystical surplus that confounds (and fascinates) 
our capacity to see. To the degree that the thing is fascinating, it is also partly imperceptible, 
or immune to looking. The commodity lures us in to such an extent that window shopping in 
french is called “lèche-vitrine”—window licking. We don’t lick the commodity itself, just the 
display of it. From the birth of the commodity we have a parallel birth of looking (Bowlby). 
And, now, in the contemporary context, our ongoing fascination with such imperceptible 
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things (our love of them, objectification of them, and misperception of them) becomes a 
source of shame. Writing about them—“admitting that we have fallen in love with a 
colour”—confesses that shame, even as it revels in it.  
 Yet Nelson doesn’t want blue to stay a commodity as such. She insists, for example, 
that “Generally speaking I do not hunt blue things down, nor do I pay for them" (Nelson 25). 
What market value they may once have had—24.99$ for a Blue Tarpaulin in the local REI—
is long gone. Yet, though the economy of blue may be short lived, it is an important way 
station for what blue can become: 
151. Ultramarine is not, of course, holy in and of itself. (What is?) It had to be 
made holy, by the wicked logic that renders the expensive sacred. So first it had to 
be made expensive. From the start, however, its preciousness stemmed from a sort 
of misunderstanding: ancient people thought the shining veins in lapis lazuli were 
gold, when really they are iron pyrite: ‘fool’s gold.’ (59) 
Tack, tack, tack. The stuff isn’t holy and couldn’t be until commerce (evil thing) made it 
expensive, but it wasn’t expensive until appraised as such, and of course (tack again) the 
appraisal was mistaken—the blue had fooled them into thinking it was rare, and then once 
again, into thinking it sacred.  
 So, blue has had the hint of metaphysical nicety, has become a commodity on its way 
to becoming the holiest of colours (though not before a quick detour wherein it “symbolized 
the Antichrist” (59). Now, at the end of the book, it is described in the most nostalgic of 
terms—as a ruin. Though it should have been clear from her descriptions all along that her 
collection of blue was more detritus than jewels—valuable because of their value to her—
towards the end of the book she starts to talk about the blues as pale markers of what they 
used to mean: “171. When one begins to gather ‘fragments of blue dense,’ one might think 
one is paying tribute to the blue wholes from which they came. But a bouquet is no homage 
to the bush” (68-9). Blue starts to decay. In one way, we return to the place we began. An 
early proposition positions us on the mountain, a solitary seeker in a sea of blue. She can say, 
“Don’t fool yourself and call it sublimity," (3), but she’s the one that mentioned sublimity to 
begin with. This is why, when we come to the following passage I see a nineteenth century 
Romanticism: the nostalgia captured most sentimentally in the nineteenth century love of the 
ruin. She says: 
204. Lately I have been trying to learn something about ‘the fundamental 
impermanence of all things’ from my collection of blue amulets, which I have 
placed on a ledge in my house that is, for a good half of the day, drenched in 
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sunlight. The placement is intentional—I like to see the sun pass through the blue 
glass, the bottle of blue ink, the translucent blue stones. But the light is clearly 
destroying some of the objects, or at least bleaching out their blues. Daily I think 
about moving the most vulnerable objects to a ‘cool, dark place,’ but the truth is 
that I have little to no instinct for protection. Out of laziness, curiosity, or 
cruelty—if one can be cruel to objects—I have given them up to their 
diminishment. (82) 
Or is this ruin something different—not nineteenth century nostalgia—but twenty first 
century detachment? This is possible. While, on the one hand, blue seems to have journeyed 
quite far—from love object to commodity to an embodiment of all things holy to a fading 
emblem of former obsessions—on the other, she wonders if “seeking itself is a spiritual 
error," (46). Or not an error, exactly, but simply the way it is. 
 As nightliness will in Nox, blue in Bluets operates as Nelson’s wildcard. It means a lot 
of things and nothing at all: “I am trying to talk about what blue means,” she says, “or what it 
means to me, apart from meaning" (Nelson 16). Blue is the thing you most want to possess; 
blue is an ephemeral beauty; blue will fade. Sometimes, when it is indigo, or a pale matte 
turquoise, it betrays. Blue is what Bluets is after, yet, she admits, she has avoided “writing 
about too many specific blue things—I don’t want to displace my memories of them, nor 
embalm them, not exalt them." (77) On the one hand, writing cages blue and on the other, it 
sets it free: “I think it would like it best if my writing could empty me further of them, so that 
I might become a better vessel for new blue things." (77) 
 
Nelson’s treatment of the female gaze is a perfect example of the dialectical zigzag of the 
self-monitor as it tacks and tacks and tacks again around the idea of women’s right to look. 
Nelson knows that looking is more shameful for women than it is for men. Of course there is 
Oedipus who loses his eyesight out of shame and Milton, whose blindness let him think, but 
Nelson is more interested in the stories of the saints. Saint Lucy, Saint Medana, and Saint 
Triduana, in particular, all lose their eyes: they pluck, gorge or tear their eyes from their 
heads in order to “prove that they ‘only have eyes’ for God." (22). Nelson quotes from the 
religious accounts that say: 
these women [were] announcing, via their amputations, their fidelity to God. But 
other accounts wonder whether they were in fact punishing themselves, as they 
knew that they had looked upon men with lust, and felt the need to employ 
extreme measures to avert any further temptation. (23) 
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In the first tack, Nelson says, 
59. There are those, however, who like to look. And we have not yet heard 
enough, if anything, about the female gaze. About the scorch of it, with the eyes 
staying in the head. ‘I love to gaze at a promising-looking cock,’ writes Catherine 
Millet in her beautiful sex memoir, before going on to describe how she also loves 
to look at the ‘brownish crater’ of her asshole and the ‘crimson valley’ of her 
pussy, each opened wide—its color laid bare—for the fucking. 
Her diction here refuses all the subtle euphemism that whispers about sex and, instead, adopts 
a raucous, shameless attitude. It’s a knowing effort which is immediately followed by another 
turn: 
60. I like to look, too. ‘Saint Lucy, you did not hide your light under a basket, 
begins one Catholic prayer.’ (23-24) 
Saint Lucy’s light isn’t normally understood to be anything like a crimson valley, but Nelson 
draws the parallel in order to make fun of ecclesiastical euphemisms but also to remind us 
that even if Saint Lucy’s light wasn’t sexual, plenty of other biblical imagery surely was—
one has only to think of King Solomon’s odes to peaches. More importantly, Nelson’s 
trickery here counts as shamelessness of the irreverent sort. Cultures of shamelessness, says 
Wurmser: 
simply shift their sense of shame (as typically occurs with reaction formations)—
from violence and dishonor, from betrayal and sexual exhibition to feelings of 
kindness, of loyalty, of tender regard and tactful restraint. These now become 
viewed as signs of worthlessness and feebleness and have to be shunned. 
(Wurmser 262) 
Perhaps we might agree. Nelson seems to think so, at least in the subsequent proposition 
where sexual prudishness has replaced sexual promiscuousness as shameful: 
61. In his book On Being Blue, William Gass argues that what we readers really 
want is “the penetration of privacy”:”We want to see under the skirt.” But his 
penetration is eventually tiresome, even to himself: What good is my peek at her 
pubic hair if I must also see the red lines made by her panties, the pimples on her 
rump, broken veins like the print of a lavender thumb, the stepped-on look of a 
day’s-end muff? I’ve that at home.” After asserting that the blue we want from life 
is in fact found only in fiction, he counsels the writer to ‘give up the blue things of 
this world in favor of the words which say them." (Nelson 24) 
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But Nelson tacks again by accusing Gass (of all people!) of puritanism: “This is puritanism, 
not eros,” she says, though we ought to note the moralism of her accusation (Puritanism is 
bad! Eros is Good!), not to mention the Gass-defying, glossy magazine-defying, effort to 
celebrate every imperfect female everything:  
For my part I have no interest in catching a glimpse of or offering you an 
unblemished ass or an airbrushed cunt. I am interested in having three orifices 
stuffed full of thick, veiny cock in the most unforgiving of poses and light. (24-
25) 
 Remember the “fingerprints of God”? Those are blemishes too. Yet another reading must be 
that Nelson’s call for more of the female gaze is an ethical call. Nelson knows that the gaze is 
a position of power, and Nelson wants women to adopt it. Shamelessness here is a refusal of 
shame-as-diagnosis. The shame she is refusing in these passages is the shame that has 
privileged the male gaze and enlisted patriarchy in a taming of women’s sexuality (Mirzeoff). 
She is also refusing the shaming male gaze which would want to hide the imperfections of a 
body being a body. Women should have the right to look at what they want and they should 
have the right to be seen as they are. The shamelessness here is political defiance; it is 
feminist.  
 But there are exceptions. In a head-to-head with William Gass, Nelson can declare her 
intention to look at whatever she wants, but she won’t make a general rule of it: even her 
gaze and her desires ought to be tempered. This is most clear in her discussion of the Tuareg.  
141. I have also imagined my life ending, or simply evaporating, by being 
subsumed into a tribe of blue people. I dreamed of these blue people as a child, 
long before I knew that such people actually existed. Now I know that they do, in 
the eastern and central Sahara desert, and that they are called Tuareg, which means 
“abandoned by God.” I also know that many Westerners—including several 
Western women—have shared in this fantasy. (54) 
She invites us into this exoticism, relishes in it, aestheticizes it, and then provides a 
corrective: “I know that it bears all the marks of an unforgivable exoticism," (54). This 
exoticism is what made first Muslims (who named them “Abandoned by God”) and later 
Christians want to convert them in the first place. By acknowledging her exoticism and then 
dwelling on the consequences of such exoticism—“In Virginia, in 2002, for example, a group 
of Southern Baptists organized a day of prayer exclusively for the Tuareg, ‘so that they will 
know God loves them’" (58), Nelson is indicating that she knows that her right to look 
extends—indeed, ought to extend—only so far. Westerners should not idealize the other by 
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wanting to sleep with them or disappear amongst them, nor should Westerners other the other 
by praying for them, nor by calling them forgotten by god. She concludes the story of the 
Tuareg with one final turn: 
149. It should be noted that Tuareg do not call themselves Tuareg. Nor do they call 
themselves the blue people. They call themselves Imohag, which means ‘free 
men.’(58) 
Nelson leaves the subject there—with the Tuareg in possession of their own agency and their 
own name—and moves on to something new. This is a strong shame theory in action—it 
pushes as far as it can in one direction before making an absolute about-face. First it allows 
us a fetishized object, and then it removes it as it ought to be removed. First we please one 
part of ourselves, then we please the other. 
 
 Although this episode with the Tuareg and with the crater-obsessed looking that 
preceded it is most revealing about the shame-sanctioned switchbacks of the female gaze, I 
think it also reveals something about the spiritual quest in Bluets and the way it, too, is 
imbricated in looking. With the above episode in mind, then, consider the following 
comparison. In his writing about Jean Genet, Sartre noticed something which Sontag neatly 
summarized in her “Sartre’s Saint Genet,”: 
Crime, sexual and social degradation, above all murder, are understood by Genet 
as occasions for glory. It did not require much ingenuity on Sartre’s part to 
propose that Genet’s writings are an extended treatise on abjection—conceived as 
a spiritual method. (Sontag 95) 
Something similar is at work in Bluets. Nelson elevates the abject to the level of spiritual 
quest, but before we go too far, we must acknowledge that it’s not all that abject. In Sontag’s 
conclusion to her essay, where she has described Sartre’s Saint Genet as philosophy posing as 
literary criticism, she says: 
Sartre correctly describes Genet’s spiritually most ambitious book, Funeral Rites, 
as ‘a tremendous effort of transubstantiation.’ Genet relates how he transformed 
the whole world into the corpse of his dead lover, Jean Decarnin, and this young 
corpse into his own penis. ‘The Marquis de Sade dreamt of extinguishing the fires 
of Etna with his sperm,’ Sartre observes. ‘Genet’s arrogant madness goes further: 
he jerks off the Universe.’ Jerking off the universe is perhaps what all philosophy, 
all abstract thought is about: an intense, and not very sociable pleasure, which has 
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to be repeated again and again [and] a rather good description, anyway, of Sartre’s 
own phenomenology of consciousness. (Sontag 99) 
In keeping with this tradition of a consciousness that is world-creating, world-devouring and 
ultimately world-procreating, the story of the speaker’s sexual freedom, (mis)perception and 
love/desire for the Prince of Blue concludes in this way:  
231. That month I touched myself every night in my narrow bed and came 
thinking of you, knowing all the while that I was planting the seeds of a fresh 
disaster….The most I can say is that this time I learned my lesson. I stopped 
hoping. (Nelson 93) 
Masturbation is a strange shame. Speaking of it aloud is a way one signals one’s awareness of 
Havelock Ellis and Sigmund Freud, of the Kinsey Report, of Foucault, and of all of the other 
disciplinary measures to which sexuality and especially female sexuality have been 
subjected. Artists speak about it like they sometimes do about violence: in full knowledge of 
its toxicity, they speak of it loudly so as to proclaim their immunity to society’s conventions. 
Indeed, Nelson’s latest book, The Art of Cruelty: A Reckoning, addresses just that. Yet their 
loud voices betray them: they need their activities to read as transgressive: they are thankful 
that masturbation retains at least some shame, so that they can defy it. It is similar to the way 
Sartre described Baudelaire: 
Baudelaire is analyzed as a man in revolt whose life is continually lived in bad 
faith. His freedom is not creative, rebellious though it may have been, because it 
never finds its own set of values. Throughout his life, the profligate Baudelaire 
needed bourgeois morality to condemn him. (Sontag 96) 
Similarly, Nelson’s Bluets requires the moralizing of contemporary society in order to have 
something to defy. She defies constraints on female sexuality without deciding to transgress 
too far; she defies the silence imposed upon admissions of depression, but does so in a 
whisper; she develops a form of writing that seems to defy narrative autobiography, but it 
doesn’t, and a form of thinking that suggests philosophical relativism but that is nevertheless 
staunchly moralistic about women’s right to look and be looked at.  
 That is, until she changes her mind. The story of the Prince of Blue may conclude 
with masturbation, but the story of Bluets concludes with love. 
 
There is one important strand of Bluets that I have left out. It is the story that anchors 
Bluets in its belief that life will improve. The tone of this section is characterized by 
tenderness, dedication, and unwavering commitment. Recall Wurmser’s cry about shameless 
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societies where sex and violence are no longer shameful but friendship and tenderness are; in 
my reading so far, Bluets has likewise defied any notion of the meaningful. Yet, there is 
meaning: the real counterpoint in Bluets is the story involving the speaker’s recently 
paralyzed friend. 
 
Friendship is the corrective to patriarchy, commodification, the allures and betrayals of 
organized religion and it is the only place in Bluets where perception perceives what is. 
Friendship is Bluets response to shame. (It’s Leon Wurmser’s response, too). A friend of 
Nelson’s had been in a near-fatal accident, resulting in the horrible combination of a 
complete paralysis of her limbs and a pain so searing she said it made, “her skin feel like 
crinkly, burning Saran Wrap" (38). Like all pain, her friend’s pain is not exactly visible. It 
registers in side affects. The color drains from her face. Nelson says: 
I’m sorry she is in so much pain, pain I can witness and imagine but that I do not 
know. She says, if anyone knows this pain besides me, it is you (and J, her lover). 
This is generous, for to be close to her pain has always felt like a privilege to 
me…(39) 
Unique to this situation, Nelson is content to say that witnessing and imagining are enough. 
She may not know her friend’s pain, but she doesn’t need to: she can perceive it all the same.  
 What has been missing for Nelson throughout this book is dignity, yet dignity is 
precisely what her friend never loses. Nelson says “I have been trying, for some time now, to 
find dignity in my loneliness. I have been finding this hard to do," (28) and shortly after that: 
“Mostly I have felt myself becoming a servant of sadness. I am still looking for the beauty in 
that" (29). When she spends a night weeping while staring at herself in the mirror, all she 
sees at the end of it is a “rite of decadence" (34). She admits this to a friend who says, " 
(kindly) that she thinks we sometimes weep in front of a mirror not to inflame self-pity, but 
because we want to feel witnessed in our despair" (35). Strikingly, these passages sit 
alongside passages that describe her friend’s excruciating physical pain:  
after a few months in the hospital, my injured friend is visited by a fellow 
quadriparalytic as part of an outreach program. From her bed she asks him, If I 
remain paralyzed, how long will it take for my injury to feel like a normal part of 
my life? At least five years, he told her. As of next month, she will be at three. 
(36-37)  
If these passages operated along the same logic as those we’ve seen previously, the purpose 
of her friend’s physical injury would be as a corrective. But the friend is smarter than that and 
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uninterested in shaming. She allows her friends to care for her and to witness her pain. When 
thinking about why her friend’s pain has brought them closer, Nelson muses, “Perhaps this is 
because she remains so generous within [her pain], and because she has never held any 
hierarchy of grief, either before her accident or after, which seems to be nothing less than a 
form of enlightenment" (Nelson 39). This is not the only friend in Bluets who is represented 
this way—under the sign of enlightened being or oracle, though to detail the other instances 
of this would only belabor the point. It is friends who have brought her blue, and included 
amongst her friends are those who are living and those who are gone: they are Wittgenstein, 
Goethe, Marguerite Duras, Joni Mitchell, Stéphane Mallarmé, William Gass—friends who 
have written or painted blue before her. These are the correspondences that matter most since 
she admits that almost everything she writes is written as a letter (41). Some will read that 
letter (us). And some will not (The Prince of Blue): 
177. Perhaps it is becoming clearer why I felt no romance when you told me that 
you carried my last letter with you, everywhere you went, for months on end, 
unopened. This may have served some purpose for you, but whatever it was, 
surely it bore little resemblance to mine. I never aimed to give you a talisman, an 
empty vessel to flood with whatever longing, dread, or sorrow happened to be the 
day’s mood. I wrote it because I had something to say to you. (71) 
Bluets is that letter. One of the last propositions returns to the ‘you’ that is the Prince of Blue, 
only to speak, for the first time in a tone that is no longer bitter. What remains may be the 
ruin of blue, the nostalgia of it—“there was a time when I would rather have had you by my 
side than any one of these words…than all the blue in the world,” but that time is over.  
 Though she ends the book just one page after the account of pure decadence—the 
month long period of touching herself every night—she ends it on an entirely redemptive 
note. The penultimate proposition cites Simone Weil, whose self-effacement is legendary. An 
unidentified interlocutor seems to correct Nelson, saying: 
239. But now you are taking as if love were a consolation. Simone Weil warned 
otherwise. ‘Love is not consolation,’ she wrote. ‘It is light.’(95) 
Nelson accepts this, providing a conclusion to Bluets when we might have expected anything 
but: 
240. All right then, let me try to rephrase. When I was alive, I aimed to be a 
student not of longing but of light. (95) 
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  Bluets is so perfectly tuned to contemporary progressive culture that it manages to 
capture the way shame is felt in the discourse of academe and the world of art even as it also 
captures the way one educated in such schools of thought might knowingly refuse to be so 
shamed. In Bluets, feminist thought demands the right to look, but even women can be guilty 
of exoticism. Christianity canonized lustful Saints and evokes contempt through the mere 
mention of Southern Baptists. Up until its final pages, Bluets seems to want to stay free of 
meaning, even the meaning of writing: “For better or worse,” she writes, “I do not think that 
writing changes very much, if at all." (74) Should we believe her? Is Bluets nothing more 
than pretty intellectualism? Is it merely beautiful to read, a book full of quasi-challenging 
references, and a well-bred, well-educated awareness of what one should or should not 
fetishize, a momentary defiance of political correctness that is swiftly (though politely) 
brought back into line and beneath it, a quiescent cynicism? “Fucking leaves everything as it 
is” (Nelson 8). At this reckoning, I don’t think so. 
 
I began this chapter by suggesting a vast array of genres in which Maggie Nelson’s Bluets 
participates. One of them was the lyric, a famously difficult to define genre: Northrop Frye in 
1982, commented that it was high time for critical theory to come to terms with it (Cureton 
n.pag). Lyric genres, according to Helen Vendler, are variously elegies, nocturnes, and 
pastorals; they are spoken in apostrophe, prayer, debate and apology; and almost always from 
the perspective of the first person (116, 120, 126). In the figure of the solitary speaker; in the 
sublime—if dystopic—settings of mountaintops, valleys, sky rises, and the detritus of 
Brooklyn in the Winter; and in the way the fragments of Bluets accumulate, pulling the 
reader and the speaker towards epiphany, Nelson draws on traditional elements of the lyric, 
but modernizes them, bringing the lyric poem into conversation with both autobiography and 
philosophy. In a description that could easily apply to Bluets, The Seneca Review described 
the lyric essay as follows: 
its voice, spoken from a privacy that we overhear and enter, has the intimacy we 
have come to expect in the personal essay. Yet in the lyric essay, the voice is more 
reticent, almost coy, aware of the compliment it pays the reader by dint of 
understatement. (Tall and D’Agata n.pag) 
The lyric essay is personal without being sentimental, confessional without seeking 
redemption. The lyric essay, in Nelson’s hands, hints at shame, but it doesn’t blush. If the 
philosophical tract seems devoid of subjectivity, the lyric poem is overwhelmed by it. 
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Nelson’s mingling of these forms produces a startling portrait of shame and the way it 
redeems and is redeemed by the recognition that comes from love.  
 By approaching autobiographical subject matter in such a way, Nelson’s utterances 
become ours. Nelson never demands identification, but she makes the invitation, allowing her 
sadness to be ours in an act of generosity that is both dignified and wise. This differs 
drastically from what we saw in Heroines where Zambreno’s unrelenting insistence on the 
universality of her experience—for women writers—was more alienating than inviting. Like 
Zambreno, Nelson’s work has been described as self-indulgent (Schmid), but the form of her 
writing makes it a gift, not an imposition. Nelson’s approach to grief differs drastically, also, 
from what we will see in the next chapter. There, in Nox, Anne Carson will come to terms 
with the disappearance and death of her brother. Though Nox does not situate its deepest 
feelings in the voice of the solitary speaker, some elements from Bluets will be familiar: the 
poets and philosophers of yesteryear will read like contemporaries; night, like blue, will 
become a wildcard; and an aesthetics of fragmentation will whisper of shame’s secret dignity. 
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On Shame and the Scholarly Girl: Anne Carson's Nox 
 
They ask us to see their forms of feeling as a pattern that can be 
unraveled, a writing that can be unwritten, a story that can be 
ended—not by bringing it to the usual happy or unhappy ending but 
by ending the storytelling life. If stories are learned, they can be 
unlearned. If emotions are constructs, they can be 
dismantled….[These thoughts] are especially subversive, 
dangerous, and necessary for anyone who wishes to claim that 
fictional narratives play a central and, so to speak, a positive role in 
self-understanding, a role that is not adequately played by texts that 
lack narrative form. 
 
Martha Nussbaum, “Narrative Emotions” 
  
 In this chapter, I analyze Anne Carson’s Nox, a book she described as an epitaph for 
her brother. I examine the relationship between the form of Nox and its content, particularly 
as they relate to shame and subjectivity. As an elegy, Nox is as much about the person 
mourned—her brother—as it is about the person writing, herself. Shame is a central theme 
here, but not primarily as an element of personality (though it is sometimes that), but rather 
as a formal mode of writing. Nox illustrates the various shames a self can feel but also the 
way shame can emerge as an aesthetic or poetics independent of the feeling self. Shame in 
Nox is both an emotion felt by individuals and an affect that emerges in the very aesthetic of 
the book. Through figures of space, distance, and repetition, Carson lends dignity to a life 
(Michael’s) and form (autobiography) that might otherwise have been overwhelmed by the 
shame of subjectivity.  
  What is Nox? Already this question asks the impossible. Anne Carson’s Nox defies 
description. We might call it a book because it was purchased there, in a bookstore, alongside 
other books, some of which are Anne Carson’s. We might call it a box with a single page 
inside, a page that has been folded back and forth upon itself so that it resembles an 
accordion. We might call it an epitaph because that is what Carson has called it: a replica of 
the notebook that she made for her brother upon receiving the news of his death. The 
notebook had tea-stained letters, aged photographs, quotations, sketches, and childlike 
paintings of hands, legs, and, of all things, eggs. Carson typed out verbatim transcripts of 
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conversations she had with her brother and narrated scenes with her mother. Its media 
included tempura paint, crayons, crinkled paper, overhead transparencies and the familiar 
black of a photocopier that copies nothing: in short, the ready-made aesthetics of a suburban 
scrapbook. We might also remark that Nox looks like a tombstone, and, for a book, seems to 
weigh almost as much. It could be considered a translation of a Latin poem that Carson, a 
classicist, has loved for most of her life, or we could say it is a book about history or what it 
means to be a historian. All of these descriptions would be apt; all of these descriptions 
would fail to capture its whole. Grasping Nox, in the sense of understanding it, starts by 
physically grasping it: Nox must be touched, held, carried. To read Nox is to clear your desk 
and unfold the pages so that the book becomes but one very long page, a page that then 
refuses the confines of your desk top and spills over either side. To read Nox is to step back 
and enjoy the impossibility of being able to describe it. We can revel in its parts and, of its 
whole, admit that it remains, in many ways, illegible. Indeed, this illegibility is of central 
importance for its themes. In its illegibility we confront the opaqueness of the self and our 
human incapacity to articulate what it means to shame and be shamed, love and be loved, and 
finally, to grieve. 
 As we will see, Carson’s use of narration is emotional, but not in the way one would 
expect: where Nox is its most emotional is in it’s repetitions and its affect-laden aesthetic, 
something I’ll will describe in detail. Carson’s choices are striking because the emotional, 
then, is apparent despite the absence of a subject that feels. Identification—usually essential 
for fellow feelings such as empathy and sympathy to occur—is absolutely impossible. The 
reader does not identify with the sadness of the writer nor the shame of the brother, even as 
the book itself is saturated with both feelings. This is the kind of reading I would like to 
perform with Nox. What this would mean is an attention to the way that Nox articulates the 
various shames of personality, subjectivity and identification, but also to how the form of 
Nox gestures to a less domesticated kind of shame: to the physiology of a book that blushes, 
averts its gaze, hunches its shoulders. As we will see, such figures of shame will include 
those identified by Tomkins: figures of distance and withdrawal, of blushing and turning 
away. They will also exemplify one of the redemptive aspects of shame identified by 
American psychologist Leon Wurmser: the way such figures/gestures protect creativity and 
dignity. 
 
Nox as Elegy 
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 If the physical dimensions of the book are clear, and I hope they are, I can now turn to 
its visual and textual scraps: the pasted-in objects that speak with and against each other 
throughout the book. In ordering these scraps, Carson set one rule for herself and then broke 
it only once. Perhaps twice. The overall structuring device of Nox is that of a bilingual 
dictionary. Nox, in this reading, is a translation of a Latin poem written by the poet Catullus 
in the waning years of the Roman Republic. Poem 101 is an elegy written for the poet’s 
brother who died sometime before 57 BC and on a distant shore. The rule that Carson set, 
then, was that every left-hand-page of the book would be given over to a lexical entry that 
would help in the translation of Catullus’ poem. The poem appears in full on the first page of 
the book. It is short, so I quote it in full: 
 Multas per gentes et multa per aequora vectus / advento has miseras, frater, ad 
inferias ut te postremo donarem munere mortis et mutam nequiquam alloquerer 
cinerem. / quandoquidem fortuna mihi tete abstulit ipsum, / heu miser indigne 
frater adempte mihi, / nunc tamen interea haec, prisco quae more parentum / 
tradita sunt tristi munere ad inferias, / accipe fraterno multum manantia fletu / 
atque in perpetuum, frater, ave atque vale. (Italics here and elsewhere are hers)7 
The fully translated poem appears twice in the book—at the end, where it is so soaked in tea 
that the bleeding ink has rendered it indecipherable—and earlier: 
Many the peoples many the oceans I crossed - / I arrive at these poor, brother, 
burials / so I could give you the last gift owed to death / and talk (why?) with mute 
ash. / Now that Fortune tore you from me, you / oh poor (wrongly) brother 
(wrongly) taken from me, / now still anyway this — what a distant mood of 
parents / handed down as the sad gift for burials - accept! soaked with tears of a 
brother / and into forever, brother, farewell and farewell. 
In including this translation so soon, I have already betrayed one apparent purpose of the 
poem’s inclusion in Nox: its illegibility. Carson understands Latin, but she also understands 
that most of her readers do not. Her inclusion of the bracketed “why?” and “wrongly” suggest 
something permanently incomplete about her translation, just as her act of mourning her 
                                                
7 Nox has no page numbers which makes the work particularly resistant to academic standards of 
citation. Where possible, I will include the numbering system that Carson uses, where the right-hand 
pages are numbered as a philosophical text might be (1, 1.2, etc.) However, that these numberings 
serve purposes that are more aesthetic than practical will be clear when we come to the repetition of 
Section 2.2. Citations that come from the left-hand pages have no associated numbering system, but 
are recognizable as left-hand pages because they are in a combination of Latin and English. 
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brother will never end. That illegibility is one of its virtues is clear in Carson’s choice to 
include the indecipherable version of the poem on the last page rather than what we’d 
anticipate: her completed translation. Nox does not pursue completion. Whatever conclusions 
we reach, she seems to suggest, will later fade or blur. The poem provides the scaffolding for 
the book and is as important in its architectural role as it is in its thematic affinity. The lexical 
entries on the left-hand pages become rooms through which we will pass. 
 On the right-hand pages, then, we find the fullest expression of the scrapbook 
aesthetic. She cites classical texts by Herodotus, Plutarch, and others who muse about the 
meaning of history and translation. There are narrative entries, stamps, and photocopies of a 
letter written in her brother’s hand. The disordered rubbings, transcripts, child-like paintings 
and italicized reflections all act as a counterpoint to the seeming rigidity of the lexical entries. 
Once, there is a sketch of a garbage bag. Many of the photographs have been torn or cut into 
fragments; some of them are stapled together. If there is a logic to the ordering of the 
photographs, it seems to be one of increasing fragmentation, especially of the once-nuclear 
Carson family. The closest we get to a family portrait comes early on. It captures the two 
children and their mother in front of a white house on a winter’s day. In the foreground of the 
picture is a large shadow—the photographer has caught himself in the act of taking the photo, 
and one can safely assume that the photographer is Carson’s father. The apparent garbage bag 
which was sketched on the previous page turns out to be an exact outline of this shadow. This 
is the only image of the father that we have, unless we count the bright yellow egg we come 
across later and the comment about his sweater, yellow, on the day he was buried. ⁠
8
 The visual 
correspondence of his outline to that of the garbage bag is no accident. The overall 
impression these scrapbook images leave is one of randomness: the sporadic inclusion of this 
quotation or that photograph seems to be without design. However, either by virtue of design 
or by virtue of my interpretation (or both), there is an order to be found.  
 The three governing aesthetics of the visual and textual scraps are, then, the Catullus 
poem, the lexical entries and the scrapbook materials. Before I analyze the latter elements in 
detail, I’d like to inch my way through the first few pages of the book so that something of its 
flavour can be captured. Carson establishes her modus operandi on the book’s second page, 
with her translation of the poem’s first word: multas. In a form that plays with the structure of 
                                                
8 Carson’s father appears very rarely in her works. It is only in Plainwater that we find out that he was 
a gruff man who, late in life, suffered from dementia and spoke in those years in a  word salad whose 
words changed meaning from day to day. 
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bilingual dictionaries but entertains etymology, Carson provides what appears to be a 
straightforward translation of the word until the entry’s last line: “multa nox: late in the night, 
perhaps too late.” This line is typical of Carson: gnomic and carefully stylized. “Late in the 
night, perhaps too late” is an example of epanalepsis: a figure of repetition as old as the 
Greeks and used, then and now, to deepen feeling in a text. Subtle efforts such as these are 
typical of the way Carson suggests feeling without lyricism or confession. She manages this 
careful balance throughout Nox—indeed throughout her oeuvre—through such formal 
techniques as well as various modes of distancing that sometimes come off as cold 
cleverness, though I will argue that they make room for a more philosophical reflection on 
the nature of the self and the self that feels.  
 On the third page, Carson establishes herself as the speaker of the text and then, just 
as swiftly, retreats into the reserved posture of the academician, a posture that affords her a 
distance from the story she will tell and the pain that it will convey. She says,  
1.0. I wanted to fill my elegy with light of all kinds. But death makes us stingy. 
There is nothing more to be expended on that, we think, he’s dead. Love cannot 
alter it. Words cannot add to it. No matter how I try to evoke the starry lad he was, 
it remains a plain, odd history. So I begin to think about history. 
It would be too simple to say that Carson’s turn to history is mere rhetoric. She is, after all, a 
classics scholar. History, especially ancient history, where history is poetry and story, is a 
quite natural mode of enquiry. Yet, musings on history are hardly typical fare for elegiac 
poems. In Carson’s hands, history looks quite unlike the modern day discipline. In her words, 
a historian is: 
one who asks about things—about their dimensions, weight, location, moods, 
names, holiness, smell…But the asking is not idle. It is when you are asking about 
something that you realize you yourself have survived it, and so you must carry it, 
or fashion it into a thing that carries itself. (1.1.) 
Carson then recounts a story written by Hekataois which was about the phoenix, whose 
activities mirror that of Carson’s historian: “The phoenix mourns by shaping, weighing, 
testing, hollowing, plugging and carrying towards the light.” It is through careful repetition 
that Carson aligns the figure of the phoenix with the historian. The historian asks about 
dimensions; the phoenix mourns by shaping. The historian asks about weight; the phoenix 
weighs. Similarly, the figure of the phoenix is the figure that rises out of the ashes. The 
phoenix is, like the historian, one who has survived. Thus it is through a series of kinships—
Carson as historian, historian as survivor, survivor as phoenix—that we can see Carson 
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establishing herself in the text, even as she maintains her distance from the death of her 
brother. As for the questions of ash, Carson will insert herself even there: “this ash was a 
scholarly girl.”  
 Carson’s description of the historian changes over the course of the book from one 
who asks about things to one whose answers may not (ever) satisfy. Though the figure of the 
historian inserts distance into Carson’s elegizing (through time, through shadow), at least at 
the beginning, she asserts that the historian deals in facts: “1.2. Autopsy is a term historians 
use of the ‘eye witnessing’ of data or events by the historian himself, a mode of authorial 
power. (1.2.)” Though I’ve never heard of the term autopsy used by any practicing historian, 
it is still a significant gesture towards history as a practice of truth-telling. The term fits here, 
of course, in the context of establishing the cause of her brother’s death, though if that 
autopsy were ever conclusive, we don’t know it. The speaker’s expectation of certainty is 
unsettled later in the text.  
3.3 We want other people to have a centre, a history, an account that makes sense. 
We want to be able to say This is what he did and Here’s why. It forms a lock 
against oblivion. Does it? 
 A repetition of this sentiment comes later beneath a blurred photo of a door, when, in italics, 
the text reads “Always comforting to assume there is a secret behind what torments you.” 
History, she will come to admit, is not so sure of itself. Historians distance themselves, too: 
10.1 When Herodotus has got as far as he can go in explaining an historical event 
or situation he will stop with a remark like this: “So much for what is said by the 
Egyptians: let anyone who finds such things credible make use of them.” (2.123.1) 
Carson does little with these remarks, indeed, the form of the book requires her readers to 
make sense of how such incredulity relates to the sad story of the starry lad that was her 
brother. Is it with a sense of resignation that Carson quotes Plutarch’s critique of Herodotus? 
“Such sentences moved Plutarch to denounce the author of history: ‘It seems to me that just 
like Hippokleides doing his headstand upon the table, Herodotus will dance the truth away 
and say: That’s no concern of Herodotus.’ (Moralia 867b).” Is Carson like Plutarch—
concerned with Herodotus’ irresponsibility? Or is she, perhaps, like Herotodus—unconcerned 
with all that cannot be known? 
 The other figure Carson adopts in this elegy is that of the translator. As with the 
historian, this is a strange kind of translator, and one who is bound to fail. First, with regards 
to the translation of the Catullus poem she explains: 
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7.1. … I have loved this poem since the first time I read it in high school Latin 
class and have tried to translate it a number of times. Nothing in English can 
capture the passionate, slow surface of a Roman elegy…I never arrived at the 
translation I would have liked to do of poem 101.  
This she admits as she is about half way through a translation of that very poem. Is she telling 
us that she continues to fail? This seems a legitimate reading given that entry 7.1 continues: 
“But over the years of working at it, I came to think of translating as a room, not exactly an 
unknown room, where one gropes for the light switch. I guess it never ends. A brother never 
ends.” The failure to translate, if we can call it that, never ends. Translation, then, becomes a 
metaphor for mourning, as does history.  
 To return, then to the overall structure of Nox, we can see that the bilingual dictionary 
becomes an apt form for an elegy that is as much about the failure—to know, to love, to 
grieve—as it is about any attempt to capture a true portrait of her brother who died. In an 
interview with CBC’s Eleanor Wachtel, Anne Carson said she had spent, “a lot of [her] life 
looking at books with left-hand-page Greek or Latin, and right-hand-page English, and you 
get used to it, you get used to thinking in the little channel in between the two languages 
where the perfect language exists” (Carson, Interview in Brick Magazine n.pag). If we 
believe Carson that Nox is another example of her failure to translate poem 101, can we also 
believe her that its structure, composed of right-hand and left-hand entries and drawing from 
the aesthetics of the bilingual dictionary, embodies, somehow the perfect language? Is the 
space—the distance—between the pages, then, the embodiment of the perfect language for 
mourning? The perfect language for failure? Might the space in the book be the place we find 
the perfect language for the failure to mourn? These are questions I will return to. For now, 
we must simply hold onto the idea that Carson establishes, through the figures of the 
historian and the translator, her own distance from the subject of the book—her brother.  
 I hope that I have sufficiently established that distance is an essential trope in Nox. 
There are the distancing personae that the narrator adopts, the scrapbook technique that, 
especially when the book is laid out as a single page, relies as much upon white space as it 
does on the pasted-in scraps to tell its story, and there is the little channel between the two 
languages where something perfect exists. Though an interest in gaps, lacunae, and space is a 
hallmark of our postmodern age, I think it significant to note that here the space speaks not to 
a horrible aporia but rather to something more positive, more perfect, more mystical. 
Distance, like nothingness, can be considered from the perspective of the things it 
separates—wherein the separated objects provide the substance to the image—or, in a sort of 
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gestalt shift—distance can be considered as a defining feature of the image wherein the 
distance defines the image’s shape. Consider Sartre’s example of the road, here summarized 
by American philosopher Vincent Spade, though with different cities: 
(1) We can think of it as the road, which is terminated at one end by [Montreal] 
and at the other end by [Toronto]. If that is the way we are looking at it, then the 
road itself appears as a positive, whereas the end-points are negative: they are 
where the road terminates. 
(2) Or we can think of the same configuration as consisting of [Montreal] on the 
one hand, and of [Toronto] on the other, and the road is what separates them. If 
that is the way we are looking at it, then the two end-points appear as positive, and 
the road itself now comes on as a negative. (125) 
In Nox distance emerges as theme, form, and figure. In its physical form, as a book with 
many distinct pages or just one, Carson provides us with the equivalent of a road that 
constitutes by making space and a road that separates the essential figures. We see many 
pages when we choose to read it that way; we see just one when we step back. A similar 
process is at work thematically. When Nox is read as elegy, these figures of distance express 
grief and the impossibility of mourning. However, Nox is not just about Carson’s desire to 
find the right form for mourning her brother. It is also about shame, and, as we will see, it is 
about the self. 
 What is shame’s relation to distance? At first glance, there is little to recommend this 
pairing. Shame, after all, is associated with looking or being looked at, with exposure and the 
desire to expose. Above all, shame seems to be associated with closeness more than with 
distance. The blush cannot be seen from afar. Yet, within the painful proximity wherein 
shame appears, there is the paradoxical and often futile attempt of the self to gain some 
distance. Silvan Tomkins describes this as the desire to disappear. The effort to withdraw, the 
downturned gaze: these are the manifestations of shame’s desire to hide, fail as it may. As I 
have discussed elsewhere, shame can occur between conflicting parts of the self or between 
the self and an external figure or idea. Sartre’s maxim that one feels shame of the self before 
the other articulates the tripartite structure of shame when we experience it in the world. On 
another level, we saw in the previous chapter how Leon Wurmser described shame operating 
as a dialectic, which another mode of inserting distance (28). Dialectics, also based on a 
three-part structure, are made up of a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis. Between these 
three parts, though, there must be some distance. Every theory of shame requires some 
element of distance; all self-awareness is predicated on the capacity to step back. 
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  Now I would like to return to the narrative element of the scrapbook pages, those that 
appear on the right-hand-side. As I discussed at length in the introduction, many theorists 
claim that narrative—the notion of beginning, middle, and end—is to be held responsible for 
emotions whereas affect is the shimmering sensation that appears in such literary elements as 
style and form. I have already discussed the theoretical distinctions between emotion and 
affect elsewhere. Suffice it to say that here, in Nox, Carson effectively makes use of both the 
formal expectations of narrative—and the emotional impact it provides—and the unexpected 
hit that comes of more affect-laden prose. While affect, on its own, can seem detached and 
abstract, lyrical but subject-less, emotions tell us why they mean what they do. Emotions, 
according to most theorists of feeling, “must be about something" (Terada 196). They involve 
objects and beliefs, and as with narration, they involve expectations whose eventual 
fulfillment or disappointment explains the resulting sensation (Terada, Altieri). Narrative 
form—with its beginning, middle and end—tends to situate feeling within a more well-worn 
literary path, a path Carson typically avoids. Yet, like Picasso and Dali, Carson is a classicist: 
Picasso and Dali could paint a classical portrait and Carson knows how to tell a good story. 
In Nox, Carson turns to very straightforward narration to deliver the most obvious emotional 
content of the book.  
 Yet, what is most revealing about Carson’s use of narration is that the sympathy, 
emotion, and attachment it creates is not for the brother. The first instance of such narration 
appears in entry 2.1 on a right hand page that has been etched with the words, “WHO WERE 
YOU.” The entry tells of her mother on her death bed telling her daughter (our narrator) that 
there is a box at home with all of her letters in it. There is only one letter the narrator’s 
mother would like to keep: “The one your brother wrote from France you know that winter 
the girl died.” In an elegy, one might expect to find an affecting death-bed scene, but here, it 
is of the narrator’s mother, not of the long-lost brother. A similar scene finds Carson’s mother 
perpetually looking out the kitchen window, always hoping and praying that each 
approaching car might be bringing back her son. Later, Carson also employs narrative to tell 
the story—limited as it may be—of her brother. Section 2.2. reads: 
2.2. My brother ran away in 1978, rather than go to jail. He wandered in Europe 
and India, seeking something, and sent us postcards or a Christmas gift, no return 
address. He was traveling on a false passport and living under other people’s 
names. This isn’t hard to manage. It is irremediable. I don’t know how he made 
his decisions in those days. The postcards were laconic. He wrote only one letter, 
to my mother, that winter the girl died. 
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What emotions emerge in this narration? On first read, Carson’s language here is cold and 
detached, replicating Nox’s first reckoning with the death of the brother: “There’s nothing 
more to be expended on that, we think, he’s dead.” Yet Carson provides us with not one but 
four opportunities to read section 2.2.    
 In the first and second instances of 2.2., the entry appears on the right-hand side of the 
page. Above the first, is a letter that has been folded in half; above the second, the folded up 
letter has been turned over such that the sentences begun in on the first page are completed in 
the second. Above the third 2.2., the same section of letter has been unfolded; above the 
fourth, we find the reverse page of the letter. When these pages are opened up and spread out, 
so that instead of seeing only two facing pages, we can see eight, the fragments of the letter 
start to become a whole. Michael writes of the girl, of how she’d met some “out to lunch 
head shrinkers who take advantage of weak people.” He writes that he’ll “never know how 
she met them. Six days later she was dead. I went crazy.” The letterhead is from a company 
in Kashmir; the stamp is from Denmark; who knows where it was written.  
 In the first instance of seeing entry 2.2 and the corresponding letter, the arrangement 
upholds the reading that what we are seeing is a replica of the original notebook Carson 
made. Yet, by the time of the third 2.2. we start to question such a reading. 2.2. remains in the 
bottom right hand corner of that page in the notebook, but the letter has shifted place and is 
now unfolded so that its width reaches beyond the border of the page and out into the black 
space that comes of a photocopier copying nothing. The final 2.2. is paired with the obverse 
side of the letter, thus confirming that the letter exists separate to the pasted-in section and 
that this “replica” of the notebook contains repetitions and additional black and white space 
that the original would not have had. Through this repetition, Carson emphasizes the 
centrality of the narrative told in section 2.2. By juxtaposing this repetition with the unfolding 
letter and the invading blackness of a photocopier copying nothing, Carson also insists upon 
the difference inherent in repetition. We re-read section 2.2. and though its words are 
unchanged, what it says is always somewhat new. The effect she achieves, then, resembles 
the emotional weight of a well-told story without the easy explanation that the difficulty of 
the brother’s death is the result of something we’d expect in grief, namely that the brother 
was a good brother, a brother she loved dearly. The narration Carson provides does not paint 
a delicate, honorific portrait of the brother. But its repetition sets his disappearance as central 
to Nox all the same.  
 Another example of Carson employing more straightforward techniques of story-
telling, or, indeed, of historical writing, is in her use and description of a photograph from her 
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brother’s childhood. The photo captures her brother standing at the foot of a tree in which an 
elaborate tree-fort has been built and in which three boys—all older than her brother—are 
sitting, staring insouciantly at the camera (not down, as Carson says), haughty, perhaps, in 
their defiant awareness (shame) of how they are being mean. The boys have pulled up the 
ladder. They are being mean. Yet the existence and inclusion of the photograph itself seems 
to be a mean kind of exhibit, capturing the brother in a moment when he might better have 
been served by a hug. The photograph cements him in this moment of shame; it becomes 
exhibit A of his exclusion. Of this photo, Carson says:  
He is giving the camera a sideways invisible look. Years later, when he began to 
deal drugs, I got the old sinking feeling—not for the criminality of it, not for the 
danger, but that look. No one knew him. (8.2) 
That “sideways invisible look,” is the look of someone shamed, of this we can be sure, in part 
because of the accompanying narrative Carson provides: 
8.2 When we were children the family moved a lot and wherever we went my 
brother wanted to make friends with boys too old for him. He ran behind them, 
mistook the rules, came home with a bloody nose, it puzzled me from the 
beginning, it made my heart sink. 
Carson concludes this passage by saying that her brother was never known. From this we can 
conclude not only that Carson never knew him, but that perhaps no one in his first life did, or 
wanted to.  
 I began my discussion of distance by saying that it had something to do with shame 
and selfhood. This is not an account of the shameful body or of shameful desire but rather an 
exploration of how shame looks (to us, and at us). There is no easily identifiable cause for 
Michael’s shame; his experiences—of exclusion in childhood, of eventual drug-use and drug-
dealing in adolescence—are not the obvious beginnings of the shamed personality: they are 
too quotidian for that. Or are they? We need not find a singular cause, nor is that the purpose 
of my exploration here. These instances of exclusion and low-level criminality ring true as 
sources of shame even as they ring true, too, of a near typical narrative of childhood and 
adolescence in suburban Canada; their ordinariness speaks to the pervasive nature of shame 
in growing up. The evidence, as it is gathered by Anne Carson, is at once a portrait of shame 
and a reckoning with it. It would be too easy, Nox suggests, to offer a singular cause when 
shame is so elusively built into the fabric of ordinary human-ness. Nox is a description of 
Michael as he was seen by his sister. This is her account of his shame, but also of her own, at 
a remove. In Michael we have the first layer of shame, but in Anne we have a second.  
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 What does it mean to know someone and how does such knowing also feel like 
shame, or its opposite, recognition? Philosophy and critical theory have struggled with these 
questions, as has anyone who has ever loved, hated, or wanted something from someone else. 
The problem of selfhood, of what it means to be a self, will be attended to later, but for now, 
we can begin by a most simple answer. One way we know someone is by their name. 
Michael Carson fled Canada and began a life living under other people’s names. He went into 
hiding. And he stayed there. Nox never acknowledges his new name. Of his final resting 
place, Carson says, “There is no stone and as I say he had changed his name.” And even 
before he died, the family had considered him dead for many years, registered most painfully 
by Carson’s mother: 
4.2. She never got an address for him. Indeed during the last seven years of her life he 
wrote to her not a single word. Eventually she began to say he was dead. How do you 
know? I said and she said When I pray for him nothing comes back. 
Within the family, this declaration has the power of imperative. It makes his apparent death a 
fact.  
4.3. After that we didn’t talk of my brother. 
More than one person in Carson’s life has compared her brother to Lazarus, though the 
significance of the comparison is not the miraculous story of the dead returning to life but 
rather, that of, “a person who had to die twice." (8.4) The boy, Michael, who had grown old 
before his younger sister, old before his time, died and became someone else, reborn, perhaps 
into a place where someone could see him. 
 In addition to being nameless, Carson identifies her brother as mute as well. In Leon 
Wurmser’s Mask of Shame the fact of being expressionless or mute exemplifies the workings 
of shame. The inner turmoil of shame gets masked by the blank stare or the refusal to speak. 
At least as far as concerns Anne Carson, Michael is always a mute figure.  
8.1 Because our conversations were few (he phoned me maybe 5 times in 22 
years) I study his sentences the ones I remember as if I’d been asked to translate 
them. 
Again, Lazarus is an important corollary for her brother. Carson says, 
[Lazarus] is mute at the famous supper where Mary Magdalene spills spikenard on 
Christ’s feet (John 12). Mute in the ‘parable of the rich man and Lazarus’….Mute 
also throughout his resurrection. Even in the painting of it by Giotto, notice the 
person with raised hands and no mouth (perhaps his sister) placed behind Lazarus 
to load this space with muteness. (8.4). 
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Perhaps his sister. As with Michael’s shame, Michael’s muteness (Lazarus’s muteness) is 
catching. As we have seen, early in the text, Anne Carson has likened the act of writing 
history to asking about something one has survived. She casts herself as the historian of her 
brother because she has survived their childhood and she has survived death—her brother’s 
first and second death and, as later emerges, the death of their parents. Carson here casts 
herself as a storydog collecting bits of muteness as if muteness were material, a thing one 
could gather. Indeed, she has constructed such a thing in Nox, materializing the muteness of 
her brother, the truth of how he allowed himself to be seen hiding. 
  But, do muteness and hiding actually amount to something so bad? The narration we 
have of him in Europe suggests that in his new identity, he was able to find recognition, to 
speak out. The experience of shame is always an experience of measuring in which, in one’s 
assessment, the self or an aspect of the self fails to measure up to an ideal. This assessment 
can take place internally (intrapsychically) wherein one aspect of the self fails another. It can 
also take place externally, that is interpersonally, where one feels shamed by another person. 
In the case of familial relationships, the distinction between external shame (for example a 
parent’s discriminating gaze) and internal (a child’s own self-assessment) is blurred. The 
parent’s critical voice is, more often than not, one’s own. Long after our parents leave this 
world, their assessments (or the way we have perceived them) remain central to our own 
sense of self-value. One of shame’s redeeming qualities is that it protects our inner selves 
from these critical assessments.  
Shame protects privacy: it functions as a guardian against any outer power that 
might exploit weakness in the essential realms of the self and interfere with one’s 
own inner logic. (Wurmser 66) 
…shame as attitude (as anxiety, and subsequent ‘pattern of prevention’), 
precluding naive self-exposure and self-expression. (Wurmser 64) 
Michael Carson’s refusal to speak—“he phoned maybe 5 times in 22 years”—may be akin to 
him changing his name: an illustration of shame’s redemptive, protective qualities. Shame 
recognizes when self-exposure poses a risk—a dire risk—to the core of the self, and in such a 
case, it is shame that keeps us silent. Silvan Tomkins says, “the sting of shame can be 
removed [at any time] by attenuating the positive wish” (361). In other words, if we fall out 
of love with the one who shames us, we can fall out of shame, too. Not an easy task, but still. 
Maybe Michael tried this—falling out of his family, then his country, then his very name—
because he wanted to fall out of shame. 
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 As I have noted above, the opposite of shame in relationships is recognition. Though 
Nox shows many photographs of the two children together, there is no sense that their 
relationship was one of equals, nor of the children being on the same side. Carson relates: 
5.1. What he needed from me I have no idea. When I caught up to him in high 
school (he was older by four years) he liked me to do his homework but that 
wasn’t it. My moral advice he brushed aside, you’re different. He called me 
professor or pinhead, epithets implying intellectual respect but we never had a 
conversation about ideas in our life. 
What an astonishing perspective this captures. Carson is the younger sister, younger by four 
years, an incredible age difference in the first decades of life. Yet Carson clearly sees herself 
in a superior role. She offers advice and when her brother calls her professor or pinhead she 
hears in these names respect or admiration rather than say, an articulation of the social 
disdain typically meted out to over-achieving intellectual students in middle-class, suburban 
culture. Carson determines (or had determined then) that her brother needed something from 
her, though what it was she didn’t know. It wasn’t that he needed her to do his homework, 
but she is convinced that there was something he needed, and it is, perhaps, this conviction 
that keeps her in pursuit of him, as though she’s somehow failed him. In any case, this paints 
a portrait of her as the one who was responsible for this relationship, or at least of her as one 
who felt responsible for the relationship. But they did not recognize each other. Or did they? 
Pinhead, after all, seems to be his way of naming her in a way that they both enjoy. He may 
have meant it as an insult, but she didn’t take it that way.  
5.2. His voice was like his voice with something else crusted on it, black, dense—
it lighted up for a moment when he said “pinhead” (So pinhead d’you attain 
wisdom yet?) then went dark again. 
Pinhead might have been his way of recognizing something in her that she valued; for her, 
these epithets were a sign of recognition, while for him they were a sign of their distance. 
Perhaps he could see her, but she couldn’t see him. 
 Many thinkers have emphasized the role of recognition in the establishment of 
selfhood. Hegel, writing about self-consciousness, said, “the self is a self only by virtue of 
being defined as such by the recognition conferred by the other” (qtd. in Adamson and Clark 
7). Likewise, Lacan noted a profound “méconnaissance…at the core of neurosis, and ‘desir’ 
is, ultimately, the wish for reconnaissance, for mutual and reciprocal recognition in relation 
to the other” (qtd. in Adamson and Clark 7). Shame can be experienced internally, in that one 
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part of the self can be ashamed of or shame another. The opposite of this feeling is pride. The 
opposite of the feeling of shame we experience before the other is recognition and love.  
 In Anne Carson’s portrait of Michael, shame was a defining experience, and from 
Carson’s perspective, it was in his relationship with Anna, the love of his life, that he was 
able to share his shame, to recognize it in her, and have it be recognized in him. Of her, he 
wrote to his mother, “she missed a lot as a kid felt so different from others Anna was truly a 
gift,” and “I have never known a closeness like that.” Anna, like Michael, was always left 
out. That he is not so mute in his new life in Europe illustrates that Michael’s experience of 
shame in Canada, in his family, required a clear break. At his funeral, his widow says of their 
relationship, “I do not want to say that much about Michael you all know him in different 
ways. He and I led a turbulent life and had noisy arguments.” His muteness was a 
particularity to his life in Canada, and not something that carried over into his new identity. 
The closeness he experiences with Anna seems to have been what brought him back to life. 
This, at least, is the story that Nox tells of him. Whether or not Michael Carson would 
recognize himself in this account is impossible to say. In any case, Nox is part of Anne 
Carson’s ongoing autobiography, not his, and Carson knows better than most how likely it is 
that she is failing. 
 In the interview I quoted earlier, Anne Carson describes the structure of the book in 
relation to bilingual dictionaries, where the space in between the entries—or languages—
represents the place where the perfect language exists. In the case of Nox, that perfect 
language is the synthesis of the elegiac poem of a Roman Emperor, so long ago, and Carson’s 
increasingly imagistic scrapbook of mourning on the facing pages. If what we have seen 
captured in those scraps of letters and photographs, telephone calls and reflections is the story 
of a boy thoroughly excluded and shamed by his society so much so that he is willing to 
abandon his identity in search of new life, we can say that Carson captures the life of one 
who has lived through shame. What she fashions, then, is a heavy thing, a tombstone-shaped 
thing, an accordion-ing scrapbook that is both elegy and translation, about grief, but ashamed 
of it. 
 What I have argued for up to this point is that Anne Carson’s Nox is, loosely, a 
portrait of (elegy for) a shamed man. Narrative has played a primary role in this portrait. We 
know something of Michael’s beginning, middle, and end. Narrative is the handmaiden of 
history, yet even most historians recognize the reasons that govern their selections. They 
know why they chose one beginning over another, and the reason usually has something to 
do with persuasion. Yet, Carson has inserted herself into the portrait by being the translator 
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and historian of her brother. In both cases, these figures bring with them an element of failure 
in the sense that all translations and all histories fail because of a gap—in time, or between 
languages. And, Carson’s use of repetition allows feeling to accumulate in a more affective, 
less reasoned, manner. One of the most obvious ways that Carson uses style and affect to 
heighten the way Nox feels is in her use of the word night. 
 Nox, of course, means night in Latin, but the book’s title is not night’s only 
appearance. To the contrary: night appears in virtually every one of the lexical entries even 
though the word nox never appears in the original poem. Nox and its variations—noctis, 
noctes, noctua-, noctem, note, nocti, noctium,—appears throughout these lexical entries. 
Their apparent purpose is to illustrate correct usage of another word, making night slip in in a 
seemingly haphazard way, as if it were an accident that night were so pervasive. Night 
becomes Carson’s wildcard, as blue was for Maggie Nelson: a recurring figure that is 
variously a character, a time, a place, a feeling, a state of being, and an orientation (of mood 
but also of the body in space). Night becomes the Thingness of the poem: it is a Lacanian 
lack, a Sartrean nothingness, it is the unspoken grief that structures the book even as it 
remains unspoken, it is the brother who was so resolutely unknowable, it is Carson herself 
and all the ways that she finds herself impossible to know. It is the shame of loss, the shame 
of unknowability, the shame of survival, the shame of what it is to exist in the world where 
we must inevitably grieve someone we didn’t know but loved all the same.  
 In the space between her translation and her collected scraps, then, is her own night, 
her own shame. At several points, Nox associates death with the blush. The narrator says, “If 
you are writing an elegy begin with the blush,” and earlier, “Why do we blush before death?” 
These moments, at first, appear preposterous. I have never blushed before death. What are we 
to make of this association? Of the blush with death? What if she means by death the loss of 
self-hood that is associated with shame? What if she means our association with, 
responsibility for and recognition of shame-induced withdrawal? What if the blush is our way 
of saying that we, too, have withdrawn in such ways? What if the blush is her way of saying 
that she understands why he needed to withdraw? What if she withdrew? Is pretending one 
no longer has a brother just another way of saying that one has withdrawn from the search of 
him, given him up for good, for dead? The tendency to blush, says Darwin, “is inherited” 
(312). In an interview, Carson admitted that she herself didn’t understand the relationship 
between blushing and death. It had come from another poem by Catallus. It didn’t make 
sense to her despite her having thought about it for sometime; nevertheless it still seemed 
“true”, so she says she “secrete[d] it into writing and [hoped it would] work its truth by itself 
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without me knowing how to control it" (Interview in Brick Magazine n.pag). Carson trusts 
her readers to continue the puzzling. 
 In the same way that the garbage bag sketch speaks to the shadow of the father, the 
night passages speak to one another from entry to entry and to the facing texts and images. 
There is a playfulness about this, but also a meditative, liturgical quality that becomes 
increasingly somber as we near the end of the text. In this section, I’d like to read Nox only 
for its nightliness, creating a highly redacted text where everything but the night is gone. In 
doing so, I think this at once maintains the integrity and complexity of Carson’s observations 
and evocations of night, but also illustrates her orchestration of night’s movements and how 
these movements shape the affective tone of the entire text. 
 I have already mentioned night’s first appearance in the lexical entries—“late at night, 
perhaps too late,”—but here I’d like to emphasize how this first evocation establishes a 
familiar temporal relationship with night. The “perhaps too late” brings with it an element of 
visceral regret, the kind that can appear after one too many whiskeys, or of the apology we 
never uttered to the loved one we lost forever. Time, in this instance of night, permits of 
painful reflection, sober or otherwise. Nightime is initially familiar but soon enough, Carson 
makes it strange. She populates it with night people, and then addresses her reader directly: " 
(you know it was night).” Having been addressed directly means that when Carson uses the 
pronoun “we,” the reader can include herself. As in, “….inmensumne noctis aequor 
confecimus? have we made it across the vast plain of night?” Night becomes adjectival—
describing a people—and it becomes a location—“the vast plain of night”—so that the night 
people live in a time and place with corners that lead to nothingness. Though night does not 
appear in every single lexical entry, it does in the first nine entries. Carson teaches us that one 
way to read this gnomic text is by looking for night. The first entry not to reference night is 
frater, or brother.  
 Later in the entries, Carson’s night becomes an object or place of sadness. One can 
own night, and one can offer it. This is when Carson starts to make the link between the 
brother and night. Here, the first instance of night as object: 
noctis fratris quam ipso fratre miserior: made sadder by the brother’s night than 
by the brother himself…. ad noctem ready for night….inferias offerings (of wine, 
honey, flowers, night, etc)…. (All italics are in the original) 
Night can be a thing one suffers or a thing one offers: 
donarem ego te quid donem? What would I give you? nox nihil donat nothing is 
night’s gift…munere debita nocti munera— gifts owed to night… 
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This question—what would I give you?—is echoed a while later in the facing pages where 
Carson laments that she never knew what her brother needed from her. Night is a kind of 
nothingness that has shape.  
 Night is also a state. It is associated with death, with the unconscious, with 
speechlessness and with blushing.  
mortis in nocte death as a state….et dubitas quin sensus in nocte nullus sit? and do 
you still doubt that consciousness vanishes at night? mutam silentia muta noctis 
deep speechlessness of night….nequiquam et sero et nequiquam pudet late and 
pointlessly she blushes….cinerim Troia virim et noctium acerba cinis Troy, bitter 
ash of men and nights…. abstult quidquid nox aufert whatever night grabs 
….indigne (with nox) blushing.  
As we will see later, the dark unconsciousness of night seems, at first, to be a source of 
shame. It makes us blush. Yet, the nothingness in a shape that is night might also be a source 
of dignity. As with Michael and his sad history, the dignity of night might come later. It 
might come only after one has been a fugitive for a while. Or not. The lexical entries are 
intentionally gnomic. They have affective weight without the burden of narrative and should 
be read as one reads Joyce (the aptness of this comparison will become clear later):  
adempte nox diem adimat the day would not be long enough [night confiscates 
day] nunc nox! night now! tamen (strengthened by night) tamen nocte deadly all 
the same….interea contra ius interea solum nocte against the law yet only at night 
haec media nocte bis: hoc decet? you go away in the middle of the night: is that 
decent? ….parentum parenti potius quam nocti obsequi to obey one’s parent 
rather than night…  
These entries are meant to wash over the reader in a way that creates an affect of sadness and 
mourning without tying it to a subject (who, to warrant such sadness, might need to be 
portrayed as excellent or blameless): 
more more noctis a habit of sadness; without system, wildly… tradita tristitiam et 
metus tradam in mare I will consign sadness and fear to the sea…noctis satietatem 
trado here is my opinion of night’s satiety….sunt hoc est id est nox est that 
is…tristi (of shade, night-coloured things, etc) odor tristis night smell 
Finally, once night has a sad, fugitive side. 
….ad ad dextraim, laevam, noctem on the right, left, night side…. 
Having been evoked in all these ways, night then carries with it both the stars, visible at 
night—like the starry lad her brother once was—and the fugitive, sad, regret of a time that is 
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always too late. Night is just one of the ways that Carson introduces the feelings of honour, 
shame, and mourning into Nox without relying on the more traditional modes of story-telling 
that would situate such feelings within a narrative. Traditional narrative explanations of grief 
rely upon the goodness of the one we mourn; in Carson’s Nox, however, these feelings of 
grief exist independent of the need to elevate her brother’s character.  
  When Carson does align night to her brother more specifically, she also speaks about 
how much their nights resembled one another. Again, a redaction from multiple lexical 
entries:  
inferias accipe oculis aut pectore noctem accipit he lets in night at the eyes and 
heart….manantia omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manati the whole pointless 
night seeps out of the heart….atque similiter atque ipse eram noctuabunda just 
like him I was a negotiator with night….atque similiter atque ipse eram 
noctuabunda just like him I was a negotiator with night….atque similiter atque 
ipse eram noctuabunda just like him I was a negotiator with night…. 
In the same way that the significance of section 2.2 was highlighted through a repetition that 
did not stay the same, Carson includes the lexical entry for the word atque three times. 
Repetition is Carson’s most enduring technique for creating affect.  
 A similar method of redacted reading could be undertaken for other important themes, 
including shame. Themes of wretchedness, rejection, pity, and condemnation pile up in these 
entries: 
haec vituperare: to denounce your own day; this amount, this much of (often with 
depreciatory force)…laudatur ab his culpatur ab illis: he is praised by some, 
reviled by others…. miser misera miserum adjecctive (sic)….[cognate with 
MAERO, MAESTUS] (of a person) that is to be pitied, sad, poor, wretched, 
unfortunate, (applied to the actions of persons in a pitiable state) attended by 
misery, grievous, distressing ; miserrima Dido: most sad Dido; (in special use) 
wretched in health, sick, suffering; (also applied to those sick in heart); (with 
ablative of cause)… wretched in one’s social or financial circumstances; pitiful, 
mean, contemptible (as a term of contempt); solacium miserum: worthless 
consolation; (exclamatory) me miserum-eram: alas woe is me! (as substantive) the 
wretch…ad contemuliam omnia accipere to read everything as an insult 
Though these lexical entries are partly to blame for what makes Nox and other works by 
Carson so opaque, I think they must be quoted in the unwieldy forms they come in as 
opposed to in a more tidy, controlled manner. To do the latter would mean to disrespect the 
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stylistic choices Carson is making and would make it harder to understand the argument I 
will make later, namely that the unwieldy-ness of these entries captures something of what 
Lacan would call the singularlity of Carson as a writer: her own specific lack. 
 Within the entry for atque, Carson evokes shame, and between the repeated entries, 
Carson evokes lack. Atque is a conjunction, but here it speaks to the swift dialectical 
movements of thought and, finally, her own similarity to her brother. I quote this section in 
full: 
[AD+QUE] and, as well as, together with; honesta atque inhonesta descent and 
indecent; and…too, and what is more; and in fact, and indeed; yes and; 
(introducing a comparison); (introducing a new point) and now; (correcting the 
first term) or rather, and not rather; and when, and thereupon; (introducing a 
principal clause) forthwith, lo and behold; (slightly adversative) and yet; (in 
various collocations of pairs of words); alius atque alius one and another; etiam 
atque etiam again and again; longe atque late far and wide; (as a simple 
compulative) and; (in compound numbers); as; ac si as if; simul atque as soon as; 
statim atque from the moment that; (after comparative) than; similiter atque ipse 
eram noctuabunda just like him I was a negotiator with night. 
This is the dialectic as switchback. It races. Atque connects decency with indecency, a 
principal clause with its comparison, correction, and its slightly adversative contrast. Yet the 
road is still the same road. For all the ways Carson complicates her relationship with her 
brother and his death, at the end of the day she is “just like him.”  
 I have already discussed the way Nox slowly unfolds the one and only letter Michael 
to his mother, in which he told the story of the girl who had died. In that discussion, I 
describe the letter’s relation to the floating and repeated section 2.2 that began “My brother 
ran away in 1978, rather than go to jail.” Other pieces of the letter appear later in Nox as torn 
up scraps so that scraps of the story Carson has told are re-told, but in Michael’s own hand: “I 
have never known …like that. like wind in….” “I was away.” “(No charge).” In the letter’s 
last iteration, the scrap is folded over on itself so that we can see two typed notes that have 
been pasted onto the blank side of the letter. The first one reads “Or:” The second is a 
quotation (likely from Herodotus) that we can only partially read but easily decipher: “I have 
to say what is said what is said. I don’t have to believe it myself.” The second appearance of 
the note reveals the Herodotus quote in full. The last unfolding is in Michael’s hand: “Love 
you. Love you. - Michael.” The repetition of Herodotus’ disbelief alongside the repetition of 
Carson’s dialectical definition of a conjunction and, finally, the repetition of Michael’s last 
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lines all highlight the way that Nox wrestles with grief and Carson’s own relation to it. These 
entries shimmer with affect without the narrative content that would otherwise pin these 
feelings to a specific cause or effect. 
 I have established that repetition is one of the central strategies Carson employs to 
complicate the story she tells of her brother, her mother, and herself. I have already discussed 
the repetition of section 2.2 and of the lexical entry for atque, the first of which tells 
Michael’s sad history in a detached tone and the second of which aligns the narrator and her 
brother in their futile negotiation with night. Now I would like to reexamine repetition in the 
photographs. I earlier mentioned the way images of the family members slowly disappear 
from the text. Yet there are photographs right through to the last page. These latter photos are 
generally slivers or squares cut from the larger originals so that a firm process of selection is 
evidently at hand. What has Carson selected for in these latter images? Brick walls, 
stairwells, windows (from outside), the trunks of trees, the shadow of a man. The scrapbook 
aesthetic makes these selections seem accidental in much the same way that night seeps into 
the lexical entries, yet their repetition adds to the affective weight of the book. The stairwell 
is an especially potent repetition and is, in itself, a repetition—of self-same steps. The 
stairwell is where Michael met the wife who would become his widow, but that was not his 
first encounter with such a space: 
5.3. My brother’s widow tells me that when she first met him (Amsterdam) he 
was penniless….They lived together for two years on the street, sleeping in 
stairwells, eating once a week, this was after Anna, drinking a lot. Stairwell smell 
(I remember) him huddling in the stairwell where we kept our coats and boots 
winter Sunday blood on his face he was about nine and my mother around him 
with all her hands crying What now oh what now? 
This is the only instance where Carson creates such a time-shift. Those were the women who 
loved him, this passage seems to say, and they—his mother, his widow—always met him in 
the in-between hiding place of stairwells. None of the images of steps are of staircases: none 
of these steps are ever inside. These are exterior spaces, places of exclusion. We know how 
such stairwells smell; we know how they shame. Carson, too, loved him and it is in that space 
that Nox encounters him last: “He refuses, he is in the stairwell, he disappears.”  
 Far more than narrative, then, it is through various forms of repetition that Carson is 
able to introduce the affects of melancholy, sadness, mourning, and shame. Up to now, the 
object of this analysis has focused primarily on the brother who disappeared and then died. 
My study of repetition though, has prepared us for an analysis of style and the one who 
  
143 
collected these objects—the authorial figure of Anne Carson. Mari Ruti, writing of the 
repetition compulsion in Lacanian analysis says that it is a kind of benign trap: “a protective 
shield without which our lives would be much more difficult to handle,” precisely because 
repetition permits us to return to the familiarity of our story, of the thing that we know, rather 
than the nothingness that we don’t (The Singularity of Being 16). That the nothingness could 
bring us ecstasy is no real draw, for we know that pain is just as likely, and the 
‘overmuchlessness’ of either is what the repetition compulsion protects us from. Read ‘slant,’ 
like a rhyme, or like Emily Dickenson’s truth, I think these elements of repetition, lack, the 
unconscious, and the story of the shamed man and his sister who survived, speaks to a 
modern relationship to emotion and authenticity that is complicated by and inflected with the 
kinds of questions Freud and Lacan, Derrida and Foucault, Zizek and Ruti, would have us 
ask.  
 
Nox As Autobiography 
  In my initial description of Nox, there was one generic category that I purposely left 
off the list. Because Carson doesn’t describe Nox as autobiographical, I didn’t either. But, 
with this book, Carson has added her brother to the list of significant people in her life who 
have become the subjects of her writing. Her ex-husband, in The Beauty of the Husband: A 
fictional essay in 29 tangos, her mother, in Glass, Irony, and God, her father in Plainwater: 
Essays and Poetry. What makes Carson’s approach so distinctive is that these same texts 
could also be said to be about Keats, Emily Brönte, and Basho, or even, in all cases, about 
form, grief, walking, faith, what it means to be a self in the world and what it means to try, at 
all costs, to avoid the sentimental despite the loss and longing that propels much of her work. 
Speaking of her 2005 work, Decreation, Carson explained her use of Simone Weil’s notion 
that decreation was “an undoing of the creature in us—that creature enclosed in self and 
defined by the self.” In a sense, all of Carson’s work is engaged in this bipolar practice, that 
is of abandoning the self in works whose form could be accomplished by no one else. All of 
her work is personal without being sentimental, and autobiographical without relying on 
narration, emplotment and the coherent self that one normally associates with the genre. In 
this section of the chapter, I would like to explore how Nox exemplifies a new kind of 
autobiography based on contemporary ideas of selfhood that accept opacity, 
misunderstanding, emotion, affect and an ongoing attachment to or desire for coherence as 
parts of the self that compete and co-exist. Following this, I’d like to explore how this 
multivalenced self experiences shame in a way that can both humiliate and dignify. 
  
144 
 To the degree that Barthes, Foucault and Derrida have made an imprint upon literary 
culture, our belief in autobiography is now as shaky as our belief in the authenticity, even 
existence, of the author. Where some theoreticians of the genre have held fast to definitions 
that might settle the matter, most admit that autobiography is no more a clearly defined genre 
than is fiction or history. This is true even of figures like Phillipe Lejeune whose oft-quoted 
definition didn’t satisfy even him (Anderson 2). Despite Lejeune’s own reservations about 
pinpointing the genre, it provides a telling counterpoint to Barthes’, Foucault’s and Derrida’s 
autobiographical writing.  
 These thinkers were very anxious about the kind of identification Lejeune saw as 
defining the genre. Their autobiographies are marked by an aesthetic of anxiety. With regards 
to Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, Anderson notes: 
The text’s most salient break with tradition is achieved through discarding the 
first-person singular and substituting instead multiple-subject positionings: ‘he’, 
‘R.B.’, ‘you’ and ‘I’ exchange places almost arbitrarily in an attempt to reinforce 
the effect of distance between the writer and the written text: [said Barthes] ‘I had 
no other solution than to rewrite myself—at a distance, a great distance—here and 
now…Far from reaching the core of the matter, I remain on the surface. (70) 
By the end of the 20th Century, these sorts of textual games had become par for the course. 
Yet, far from thoroughly dismantling the idea of a core, authentic, coherent personality, these 
texts, by working so hard to provide an alternative managed, in a sense, to reify the very 
author(ity) they were trying to dismantle. Just as the presence of an originating self was 
suspect, so too was narrative order:  
The alphabetical order erases everything, banishes every origin. Perhaps in places, 
certain fragments seem to follow one another by some affinity; but the important 
thing is that these little networks not be connected, that they not slide into a single 
enormous network which would be the structure of the book, its meaning. (Barthes 
148) 
Autobiography, especially written by academics, was the source of much apprehensiveness. 
Furthermore, it was associated with death. Derrida posited that autobiography should be 
renamed thanatography because it was “a writing not of a living but a dead author" 
(Anderson 81). The intellectual maneuverings were so consistently a part of these works that 
they became their defining style, admitting, then, of an anxiety-prone, overly-intellectual 
consciousness behind every sentence, even as that consciousness was supposedly being 
written out of existence. 
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 It was at around the same time as these autobiographies-that-weren’t were published 
that Barthes argued that, in modern life, sentiment had replaced sex as a primary source of 
shame (178). Sentiment, associated with the lyric outpouring of an untarnished authentic self, 
or worse, overwrought and downright dumb—the stuff of mass-market melodrama—has long 
been jettisoned in the upper realms of literature. Along similar lines, the study of emotion has 
only in recent decades regained a footing in academe. Anne Carson, academic and poet, 
certainly belongs to and writes for a world suspicious of, indeed ashamed of, sentiment. Her 
work has been accused of such coldness. Yet, I hope it is clear from my reading of Nox that 
Carson’s work isn’t unfeeling so much as it feels in an unexpected way. 
 It’s not very original to comment upon the overlap between shame and autobiography. 
Nor is it very original to argue that autobiography—especially literary autobiography—has 
changed in keeping with poststructural skepticism about the coherent, authentic self. With 
regards to the former, Timothy Bewes has argued that autobiography, even when it 
participates in the confessional tendencies of the genre, always manifests the shame of 
privilege through the power inscribed in the act of writing itself. (We will explore this more 
fully in the next chapter). Elspeth Probyn’s Sexing the Self similarly asks, “whether a 
particular autobiographical speaking position can be sustained without it solidifying into an 
identity, with all the problems of privilege and exclusion that that raises" (Anderson 110). In 
Barthes, we’ve seen an anxious attempt to overturn that privileged identity. Yet these 
examples of shame, autobiography and a changing selfhood uphold a shamefulness that is 
always, in some way, effable.  
 Carson’s Nox, and the other creative autobiographies I discuss in this dissertation 
disrupt the role of shame as an articulate arbiter of all that is good or bad in the self or in the 
Other. Through style, these books are finally able to find a way out of the identity-difference 
quagmires that have caught autobiographical writing in such shamed and shaming territory. 
Shame is not outed or confessed, but rather sensed as a affective shimmer that can’t quite be 
pinned down. The authors may be able to articulate its outlines, notice their blush, say, but 
few of these books will pinpoint an originating source of the feeling. When they do, as in the 
case of Kate Zambreno’s Heroines or Cvetkovich’s Depression, such explanatory narratives 
read as histrionic or simplistic. In Ben Lerner’s Leaving the Atocha Station, Adam Gordon 
ritually manifest sources of shame, but his awareness of this made all of his activities 
comically sad. The shame-affects we see emerging in Nox are blameless. This is a refreshing 
move away from the confession as a model for self-understanding and a welcome 
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complication of the affect of shame. Ultimately, autobiography can stylistically reconfigure 
selfhood and, by doing so, reshape our understanding of shame.   
 If poststructuralism wounded our belief in the coherent self, Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
and post-Lacanian theory, has allowed for a different way to understand autobiographical 
writing: through style. Style, like shame, is aware of what constitutes normal. Tim Parks, 
writing for the New York Review of Books says: 
Style, then, involves a meeting between arrangements inside the prose and 
expectations outside it. You can’t have a strong style without a community of 
readers able to recognize and appreciate its departures from the common usages 
they know. (n.pag) 
Style that gets noticed is style that knowingly meets and departs from such expectations. The 
generic expectations of autobiography—that it be narrative, first person, retrospective and 
that the identity of author, narrator and protagonist correspond—also imply stylistic 
expectations that are usually similar to realist fiction. Style can be understood as guise, but 
we all wear masks, just not the same ones. In that sense, style admits of something unique in 
a given author. Sometimes we call it voice. It is a slippery topic, as D. A. Miller notes in his 
brilliant Jane Austen, or The Secret of Style: 
Here was a truly out-of-body voice, so stirringly free of what it abhorred as 
‘particularity’ or ‘singularity’ that it seemed to come from no enunciator at all. It 
scanted person even in the linguistic sense, rarely acknowledging, by saying I, its 
origination in an authoring self, or, by saying you, its reception by any other. (1) 
Austen, Miller is arguing, achieved a narrative voice that was utterly free of “not just body, 
but psyche, history, social position" (1). This is quite the opposite of Barthes’ insistence upon 
the I, the R.B., the you. Yet, sooner or later, the readers of Austen all discovered that to read 
Austen was to be a Woman, or at least an effeminate reader and therefore shamed as such. 
The apparent absence of style turned out to be style itself. In the same way that Barthesian 
trickery is stylistically true to some aspect of Barthes-the-writer, Austen’s out-of-body voice 
consistently resembled itself. I’m not saying that authorial style does not change. Of course it 
does. But style, especially in-so-far as it is hard to pin down, might be the closest we can get 
to the ever-retreating singularity of being that Lacan theorized in das Ding and Sartre in his 
’nothingness’.  
 Traditionally speaking, autobiography has always told a story of personality, but in 
Nox, as elsewhere, Anne Carson creates an autobiographical figure that is neither subject nor 
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personality but, of the three Lacanian figures, closest to Singularity. Literary theorist Mari 
Ruti describes these three parts—the subject, the personality, and the singularity—this way: 
The ‘subject’ comes into existence through symbolic law and prohibition. 
‘Personality’ can never entirely transcend the narcissistic fantasies of wholeness, 
integration, and the extraordinariness that buttress the subject’s imaginary 
relationship to the world. ‘Singularity,’ in turn, relates to the rebellious energies of 
the real that elude both symbolic and imaginary closure. (The Singularity of Being 
1) 
That Carson’s work consistently eludes symbolic and imaginary closure is exemplified by the 
inclusion of the blurred poem 101 at the end of Nox. Her autobiographical figure doesn’t 
wholly avoid the prohibitions and decrees of symbolic law nor of the narcissistic desires of 
wholeness, but she does not limit the self to those aspects. In the autobiographical forms she 
chooses, the modern self is more than mere personality. 
 Similarly, the shame experienced by the modern self goes beyond the narrative 
explanations where only a dark secret can explain its existence. Rather, this is a more quiet 
shame, less easily observed, but powerful nonetheless. In Nox we see the shame of narrative 
coherence itself. Carson’s strategy of distancing is just one way she makes space into a thing. 
Mari Ruti offers two examples from Lacan:”that capture the relationship between lack and 
signification, namely an empty mustard pot and a hollow piece of macaroni (‘a hole with 
something around it’)” (The Singularity of Being 127). While on one level, Nox tells us that 
her brother was something of an asshole (that this was his personality), that he abandoned his 
family and left his mother bereaved well before she needed to be (since her death preceded 
his), Nox also tells us that Carson has struggled with grieving for him just as she struggled 
with knowing him. When, for example, her mother finally declares that he must be dead 
because when she prays for him “nothing comes back,” Carson describes her reaction as 
follows: 
I wasn’t sure new feelings were finished arriving from him yet, but there was no 
practical reason to say so. It was a relief not to have him droppping (sic) through 
every conversation like a smell of burning hair, to be honest, from my point of 
view. (4.3) 
 Yet, the relief Carson feels does not sustain itself.  
 It is a hallmark of pop-psychology to try to reclaim shame’s redemptive qualities. 
Strategies for doing so involve claims that echo original sin—we all feel shame, it’s only 
human to do so—or that shame is what permits us to absorb the rights and wrongs of society 
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so that we will not embarrass ourselves, or at least are equipped to decide when, where, and 
in front of whom, we will do so. But while some of these may help us navigate the world 
better or know where to look for empathy in our darkest moments, I think the most useful 
element of shame is the way it grants us access to our own specific integrity. This is not the 
integrity we’re used to. This is not the integrity that an ethicist might speak about. Nor the 
self-sacrificing adherence to a noble value, nor the associated unwavering coherence we often 
demand of politicians and philosophers, where their changeability is a sign of weakness, and 
not, say, thought.  
 The kind of integrity shame permits is the kind that acknowledges our darkness 
without pathologizing it. Darkness isn’t only where we sin; it’s also where we dream. 
Wurmser argues that shame protects integrity by protecting the self’s deepest feelings and 
most supreme values from exposure (48). This kind of integrity doesn’t look like coherence 
or predictability. This kind of integrity actually can’t be predictable because it is the strange 
alchemy of the self that, when we dare, makes us our most original. The kind of art that 
emerges from this integrity is art that transcends the status quo. That art has a kind of bravery 
to it. Lacan argued that James Joyce’s inimitable style came from his singularity. Mari Ruti 
summarizes the point: 
If we accept Joyce as a paradigmatic singular subject, we might be left with the 
impression that only the obscure, ambiguous, fragmented, and to some extent 
indecipherable discourse of modernist (and postmodernist) literature fits the mode 
of singularity—that the singular, even when it is no longer fully allied with the 
asociality of the real, carries the mark of this asociality in the form of solipsism 
and nonreferentiality. (Ruti 124) 
Ruti calls this kind of writing “asocial.” Undoubtedly, many critics (and readers) have kept 
their distance from Anne Carson’s work for such reasons. Her style is demanding and often 
inhospitable. 
 Yet, throughout this chapter, I have argued that Anne Carson is a master of form. She 
is also a master of register. Only Anne Carson, after all, could unblinkingly begin a collection 
of translated Greek plays called Grief Lessons with an epigraph taken from Stevie Nicks: “It 
only thunders when it rains.” Unlike Barthes, Carson holds no attachment to making things 
difficult for difficulty’s sake. There is no anxiety involving alphabetization and, as I have 
shown, there is much that orders Nox even if, at first glance, it seems to exemplify the 
singular, asocial language of which Ruti speaks. That Nox speaks Carson’s language is clear: 
it could be written by no other.  
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  I hope that my reading of Nox demonstrates that Anne Carson has managed to write 
autobiography in a way that illustrates how shame can dignify. Dignity emerges as a central 
theme in Nox in several ways. First, through the beauty of the book itself; second, through 
Carson’s selectiveness that capitalizes on silence and privacy rather than confession and 
exposure; and third, through her use of affect rather than emotion, something most obvious 
here in her use of repetition rather than narration to propel the text. Carson also lends dignity 
to grief and to her own sorrow. If traditional autobiography most often betrays a narcissistic 
tendency, one of the ways it does so is by expecting autobiography to seal the wounds of a 
sad history: to provide some end to the hurt of the story. Carson refuses this, ending Nox, 
instead with disappearance and a blur. 
 Michael, a figure who hid out in stairwells, has warranted this object, this beautiful 
collection. Lacan once described a collection his friend had made of matchboxes. Ruti quotes 
him as follows: 
It was the kind of collection that it was easy to afford at that time….[The match 
boxes formed a decorative ribbon]: they were all the same and were laid out in an 
extremely agreeable way that involved each one being so close to the one next to it 
it that the little drawer was slightly displaced. As a result, they were all threaded 
together so as to form a continuous ribbon that ran along the mantelpiece, climbed 
the wall, extended to the molding, and climbed down again next to the door. I 
don’t say that it went on to infinity, but…(qtd. in The Singularity of Being, 131)  
Lacan’s friend had transformed the ordinary object. It had been eleveated to, “a dignity that it 
did not possess before.” As is the case with the matchbox, Carson’s brother is similarly 
elevated to the dignity of the Thing.  
 Nox, then, is a kind of sublimation. Leon Wurmser describes creativity and scientific 
achievement as heroic transcendences of shame. A work of art has, “meaning [that] is many-
layered, multidimensional and, in some few instances, possibly inexhaustible in meaning" 
(Eissler 298). I wonder if it is possible to see Lacan’s lack in Wursmer’s shame. Insofar as 
the shame arises from a disjunct we cannot quite name, and insofar as its protection permits 
creative and scientific transcendence, this might be possible. As we have seen, shame is 
incredibly flexible and utterly dependent on ideals, values, identifications and loves that one 
can and cannot choose. Sometimes shame knows itself and sometimes it does not. Nox is a 
beautiful objet d’art, and is all the more beautiful because it is made of scraps and uglinesses 
that usually remain hidden away.   
  
150 
 As a genre, an epitaph (to use Carson’s classification of Nox) must be one thing. It 
must be dignified. Carson could have told a different story about her brother. Section 3.2. 
tells us: 
3.2. I go to Copenhagen. My brother’s widow gives me some old diaries she 
found. From his wandering years, filled with photographs that he developed 
himself in hotel rooms of Hyderabad, Bangalore, Amsterdam, Kathmandu, Paris, 
Deinze, of the girl who died, usually naked except for some jewellery, a blonde 
delighted girl. She was the love of his life, his widow says calmly. 
An epitaph is written about the person who has died by the person who is still alive. An 
epitaph marks the distance between death and life in a permanent way; it is usually etched in 
stone. An epitaph is made public. Truth be told, most epitaphs don’t say much. Truth be told, 
most epitaphs are clichés, and so they only mean something for someone who can see round 
the bend, for one who knows the person, say, or for one who writes around the bend, like 
Anne Carson. Nox is both elegy and autobiography, but it is always dignified. 
 Some autobiographies betray. This is because all an autobiography has to do  
is offer the record of one person’s consciousness, one person’s interpretation of 
events that involved others, which is precisely what it cannot help but do. If and 
when it tries to speak for others, the sense of betrayal it provokes can be even 
stronger. (Nelson 147)  
Because Nox does not reveal much in the way of consciousness nor much in the way of 
events either, it also does not betray. Where Carson offers an interpretation—I’ve shown here 
how Nox can be read as a portrait of a shamed man—it is clear that this was her view, from 
her perspective. The snippets we have of the other brother, the one she didn’t know, don’t 
necessarily provide a counter-narrative, but they do provide ample room for one.  
 While Nox may betray a certain shame of sentimentality, it is not ashamed of feeling. 
Nox does point to her brother’s experiences of shame (and, by extension, the family’s), the 
book neither erases this sad history nor plunders it. Shame remains an elusive figure in Nox: 
as elusive as night, as elusive as Michael. Traditional autobiographical form remains 
similarly out of reach, even as an intertextual reading of Nox alongside Carson’s oeuvre 
makes it difficult to ignore the autobiographical slant of her work. Style and affect are 
Carson’s answer to confession and narration. These choices lend dignity to the shame she and 
those she has cared about have experienced without subjectifying them or their shame to a 
simplifying scrutiny. 
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Inadequacy and Transcendence: Shame’s Redemption 
 
 Timothy Bewes’ The Event of Postcolonial Shame begins with a prologue where he 
reflects on his person—from physique to personality to his aptitude for academic work—and 
then on the nature of the book we're about to begin. He is physically average, he tells us, with 
"a growing paunch and an incipient stoop, the effect of many hours spent each day at a desk, 
reading literature or working on a computer" (Bewes, The Event 1). His appearance, in his 
own eyes, is that of a misanthropic man, pointy and angular, and increasingly colourless: 
bland and pasty from too many hours spent indoors. He admits that he is unsuited for 
intellectual work. His pursuit of it, despite that, aggravates his own "sense of lifelessness and 
isolation…a state of misery that is sometimes apparent to others as an air of superiority" (1). 
This autobiographical gesture last barely two-thirds of the first page, yet its prominence and 
the degree to which it appears to contradict everything the subsequent two-hundred or so 
pages will argue makes it a mysterious opening. In this chapter, I will argue that this 
paradoxical opening is both The Event’s motivation and a formal manifestation of its 
arguments. The subtle melding of a personal register with a rigorous academic argument 
begins on the very first page: 
What better reason to write, asks Gilles Deleuze, than the shame of being a man? 
What better reason, one might add, than the shame of being born a European, of 
having been raised at the chilly hearth of an empire in decline by a family whose 
ancestry includes, within living memory, a history of Christian mission in the 
'Third World'? What better reason to write than the shame of living and working 
within the bounds of the largest political, economic, and military power in the 
world?(1) 
These questions articulate a shame of privilege, but their form, register, and resonance with 
the book that inspired them—Manhood, or L’Âge d’homme, the 1939 autobiography of 
French anthropologist Michel Leiris—foregrounds what Bewes will come to define as an 
Event of shame. The Event is about shame as a formal property, one that exists in (or as if in) 
response to the incommensurability of the aesthetic dimensions of literature and the ethical 
responsibilities to which it is always inadequate (Bewes 1). It is written in the first-person, 
and although the prologue is the only explicit instance of autobiographical reflection, I read 
its inclusion as an invitation. In an earlier article, Bewes remarks that “Leiris takes his self-
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absorption to a level at which it becomes reflexive, such that the failings of his project to 
anatomize the self become part of the project; at this point the text might be said to be no 
longer autobiographical at all" (Bewes, “The Shameful Order” 462). Leiris’s relentless self-
attention merges with an intense exploration of the genre of autobiography itself. For all its 
apparent narcissism, Leiris’ “acute awareness” of the limitations of the form are precisely 
what make his final text transcend those limitations. With a similar relentlessness, Bewes’ 
work seeks to overcome formal limitations. In echoing a text written by a self-reflective, 
shame-filled, intellectual observer of the colonial era, Bewes is reflecting on his own 
privilege and the shame that it entails. It is a gesture that invites the reader to turn The Event 
back on itself, to interrogate its claims as they relate not only to the field of postcolonial 
literature and its criticism but also to writing itself and the figure of the literary critic that 
undertakes it. That is the project of this chapter. 
 In the context of this dissertation, this chapter provides a counterpoint to my first 
chapter, where we saw two other illustrations of literary criticism inflected with the 
autobiographical. Ann Cvetkovich and Kate Zambreno turned to autobiography in an effort to 
dismantle the discursive—and, they argued, normative—register of academic thought. Their 
writing was “risky” because they exposed themselves, but they did so with a purpose. The 
purpose was political: they wrote on behalf of minoritarian communities—women writers, 
queer academics, the depressed, the emotional. Cvetkovich’s Depression explored the 
quotidian nature of systemic injustice in the United States: we saw Cvetkovich go to the 
dentist, we read about a black family being pulled over by a police man on a winter’s night. 
Zambreno wrote about the shame of being a minor writer; Cvetkovich wrote about the 
pleasure-pain of privilege in academe. I concluded that their efforts, when thought about in 
the context their political goals, failed. They mistook fellow-feeling for their goal, when what 
it should have been was a beginning (Jamison “Against Empathy Forum” n.pag). And, they 
failed to take seriously the way their writing manifest, rather than overcame, the wrongs they 
decried. 
 Writing, Bewes argues, is both a marker of privilege and, especially when a writer 
writes about one's shame, a marker of shame. Nevertheless, Bewes writes. This contradiction 
is merely the beginning of what makes The Event of Postcolonial Shame such a paradoxical 
work. Throughout, we will find that central to Bewes’ thought is a concern about inadequacy. 
The inadequacy of intellectual pursuits in the face of systemic injustice; the inadequacy of 
literature and art to fulfill the visions that inspire them; the inadequacy of readers to fully 
grasp the artistic vision pursued; the inadequacy of feeling shame or writing about it, even to 
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the most maximal amount, given that even the capacity to feel and write about shame all 
indicate privilege and therefore inspire further shame. These fears are not unique to Bewes’: 
we saw them in Adam Gordon as he sat through the esperanto of clichés that passed for a 
poetry reading in Madrid; we saw them in Sheila Heti’s anxiety about her failure to write a 
play about women; we saw them in Zambreno’s fear that she would forever be a minor writer 
and in Nelson’s fear that loving blue would never mean it would love her back. In Bewes’ 
case, these concerns precede The Event of Postcolonial Shame. In Reification, Or the Anxiety 
of Late Capitalism, there was the inadequacy of any word at all being able to articulate the 
fullest range of an affective experience—that which exists at the greatest reaches of our 
imagination either by extreme closeness—in our most intimate experiences—or by the au-
dela—in the figures of God, or of the proletarian revolution, or of the twentieth-century 
versions of those transcendental figures, the absences and gaps that have come to signal truth 
in and of themselves. Sometimes, the concern is the inadequacy of critical thought, and 
sometimes of literary criticism. I say concern, but one consistent (if irritating) aspect of 
Bewes’ thought is his delight in reversals, and so I could equally say that central to his 
thought is the celebration of inadequacy. 
Several years before publishing The Event of Postcolonial Shame, Bewes published an 
article entitled “From the Shameful Order of Virility: Autobiography after Colonialism.” 
There, he writes: 
The hypothesis behind this essay is that the popularity of the autobiographical 
register in contemporary writing, a register which frequently results in a literature 
of self-absorption, depression, solipsism, or abjection, may be read as the 
expression, variously, of a Europe that is attempting, and chronically failing, to 
process its colonial past; or a West in pathological conflict with its economic 
privilege; or a male heterosexuality radically ill at ease with its own preeminence. 
(Bewes, "The Shameful Order" 465) 
The roots of The Event of Postcolonial Shame are to be found in that article, which, like The 
Event, begins with an autobiographical statement that reflects upon Bewes' own position of 
privilege. It is a gesture that is imbued with shame: not simply the shame of a privileged past 
and present, but also the shame of self-exposure, and, moreover, the shame of continuing to 
assert "I" even as it is subjectivity that is at the root of the shame. The gesture invites the 
accusation of hypocrisy. Bewes knows this, and so it is a knowing gesture, and one he makes 
twice, at the beginning of the 2004 article and of the 2011 book, with adjustments for age 
being the only revision. Why does Bewes do this?  
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 There are a lot of reasons that other writers do this. The purpose of Bewes' 2004 
article, after all, was to reflect upon how insertions of the autobiographical had become 
something of a trend: writers sought absolution "at the personal level for crimes committed 
by the collectivity" (Bewes, "The Shameful Order" 467). Politicians, male novelists, cultural 
historians, and playwrights all did it. Academics like Bewes did it. “The academic’s gesture 
of using material from his own family history in order to examine his ‘cultural implication’ in 
the history of colonialism," signaled self-reflection and the hope that the shame of such 
‘cultural implication’ might be overcome through confession (Bewes, "The Shameful Order" 
467). American activist and intellectual Andrea Smith wrote about the prominence of such 
gestures in her essay “Unsettling the Privilege of Self-Reflexivity,” in an edited volume 
entitled Geographies of Privilege, remarking on the ephemeral nature of confessions of 
privilege in her anti-racism work, where, "The sayer of the confession [would confess and] 
could then be granted temporary forgiveness for her/his abuses of power and relief from 
white/male/heterosexual/etc guilt." In a society where self-reflexivity is closely associated 
with self-determination, shame’s capacity to make us see ourselves is supposedly what 
renders it one of our most powerful tools for change. Or so we like to think. Smith articulates 
one problem with such confessions: "Because of the perceived benefits of this ritual, there 
was generally little critique of the fact that in the end, it primarily served to reinstantiate the 
structures of domination it was supposed to resist." The individual confession leaves 
everything the same. Is Bewes statement of the same order? Is he seeking absolution? Are 
these admissions meant to be read as first steps toward undoing his personal privilege? First 
steps that might also happen to add to his publication record? First steps that might have 
earned him a tenure-track position at an Ivy League school, or that might have secured it? 
Are such cynical responses something Bewes hoped to elicit? To what end? The shame of 
privilege is perhaps the most difficult shame to write about: one cannot write about it in the 
hopes of eliciting empathy for it is a shame many will never have (but might like to), nor can 
writing about it elicit absolution, for to earn absolution in such a manner would be utterly 
hypocritical. What can writing do? What can writing admit? If the spoken confession was 
ephemeral and left everything as it was, can the written confession fair any better? Bewes 
says,  
Insofar as they fail to realize the connection…between self-absorption and the 
quest for absolution—such autobiographical literatures seem destined to 
reinscribe the very relations between self and other which made colonialism, for 
example, inevitable. (“The Shameful Order” 465) 
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If Smith’s problem with these confessions is that the social upset they create is merely 
temporary, Bewes problem with such confessions is that they uphold the self-other binary 
upon which the colonial order was based. Systemic injustice described by terms such as 
sexism, racism, and the colonial cannot be overcome through individual acts of confession 
precisely because the binary structure of confessor—confessee replicates the self-other binary 
upon which colonialism was predicated. So, why begin with writing in such a confessional 
mode?  
 If one possibility is that Bewes is hoping to absolve himself of his various privileges, 
another possibility is that these "confessions" are part of a larger project: an effort to imagine 
a new form for writing about shame in the postcolonial era. Part of that project might involve 
putting so much pressure on the truth-telling forms we've traditionally relied upon—the 
confession, the academic study, the objective voice—that they collapse. Part of that project 
might involve juxtaposing those forms of truth-telling within one long piece of writing such 
that they would push up against each other, so that the generic boundaries of these forms 
might start to crumble, permitting something else to emerge. 
 In his conclusion to "The Shameful Order," Bewes argues that what distinguishes the 
writing of the militant doctor, Franz Fanon, and the Christian missionary, Thomas Francis 
Cecil Bewes (Timothy Bewes' grandfather), is that, despite their use of the personal voice, 
"each writes in the name of something which annuls the opposition between self and other, 
which mediates and overcomes it, the significance of which is simultaneously universal and 
particular" ("The Shameful Order" 478). I am struck by the simultaneousness of universal 
and particular because of the way those terms have come together in descriptions of the 
beautiful, as well as in what Bewes describes elsewhere as a state of dereification 
(exemplified variously as the Christian incarnate God, the moment of proletarian revolution, 
or any time subject and object, theory and practice become one), and in writing about shame: 
"Shame is the most reflexive of affects in that the phenomenological distinction between the 
subject and object of shame is lost” (Tomkins qtd. in Sedgwick 136). What if writing in the 
name of The Event of Shame were something that might mediate and overcome the 
opposition between self and other, the significance of which could be simultaneously 
universal and particular? In order to see how this might be possible, we'll need to see what 
Bewes means by The Event of Shame and how it differs from subjective shame. Only then 
can we begin to answer why Bewes might introduce a book that so thoroughly rejects the 
“ethical” call to confession (of privilege and its attendant shame) with just such a confession.  
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 The critical aim of The Event is nothing less than a reframing of postcolonial studies. 
Rather than continuing in a critical tradition that has read postcolonial texts for what they 
revealed, through “certain cultural motifs, identity formations, historical struggles, or 
emancipatory goals," ( Bewes, The Event 7) Bewes proposes a new form of reading that 
would read around or beyond such motifs, formations and struggles. It would look less for 
what had been positively shown (by way of such motifs and struggles) and instead for what 
had been left unsaid. Incommensurability is the term he uses not only for the Event of shame 
but also for way it seems to emerge in the postcolonial novel as “a chronic anxiety toward 
writing itself" (Bewes, The Event 7). Bewes demonstrates this in his re-reading of key 
postcolonial writers— Caryl Phillips; V.S. Naipaul; Joseph Conrad, Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, and 
Zoë Wicomb; and J.M. Coetzee. Their bodies of work, even when Bewes’ admiration for it is 
clear (it isn’t always), are a means to a theoretical reformulation of postcolonial writing and 
its relation to shame rather than as an end in and of themselves: 
the novel, the dominant form of the postcolonial as well as of the colonial period, 
emerges from the same disparity between subject and object as colonialism itself. 
The same might be said, of course, of literary criticism, particularly in the mode 
of exegesis and interpretation. The further ambition of this work, then, is to point 
towards a mode of reading that would be faithful to the discrepancy between 
subject and object at the heart of the critical enterprise. The aim here is not any 
merely subjective escape from the shame of the critic, but the evolution of a 
method that will avoid projecting the shame onto the object of study. ( Bewes, The 
Event 7-8) 
As we have seen throughout this dissertation, shame wears many masks. So far, Bewes has 
identified at least two: a critic experiencing shame might try to absolve themselves of shame 
by confessing it, or try to escape shame by projecting it onto the object of study. Yet if shame 
can be a form, its form is one of absence rather than presence. This isn’t the mask of an 
expressionless face, but rather something one might not even be able to see: something more 
tonal or textural. You have to listen or feel for it, if it is there at all. And sometimes its 
absence is total—a nothingness made visible only by what surrounds it. Bewes’ project has 
required that he, as critic, adopt what Tomkins would call a strong shame theory. In order to 
detect the absences and gaps that are the basis of his argument, Bewes had to be able to find 
shame where it didn’t necessarily want to be found. The opening passage speaks to the self-
reflectivity that strong shame theories engender and laterally to the prominence of 
autobiographical literary criticism that has been on the rise for several decades.  
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 Two Types of Shame 
 
 As mentioned, the guiding question of Bewes’ The Event of Postcolonial Shame is the 
following: “The ability to write—is there any better reason to feel ashamed?” This question 
is an inversion of an earlier question posed by Deleuze and quoted by Bewes: “The shame of 
being a man—is there any better reason to write?” About this, Bewes writes: “Implicit in 
Deleuze’s question, although by no means obviously so, is the emblematic status of ‘man’ as 
the species, and the gender, that writes" (15). The male writer, then, is always implicated in a 
shameful economy because he benefits from a position of power just as soon as he is capable 
of mastering the forms of the powerful. Yet this privilege is not limited to men only. A 
mastery of narrative fiction, academic argumentation, or, more subtly, of the eloquent 
sentence or the rhetorical figure manifests the shame of the dominant classes, the shame that 
caused Lukács to equate the novel with “absolute sinfulness” and led Adorno and Primo Levi 
to lament literature altogether. At the heart of the shame that interests Bewes is privilege.  
 The claim is that writing that speaks about the shame of the (privileged) author in 
straightforward terms seeks absolution, exculpation. Such writing, by maintaining the "I" of 
the writer and his subjectively felt shame, replicates the structures of which he is ashamed. 
This problem was something about which Levi was painfully aware. For him, every sentence 
manifest the unfair fact of his survival. Levi was aware that his survival was the result of his 
own inaction—he had not, as another man had, attempted to blow up the crematoria and had 
not, as that man had, died as a result (Bewes, The Event 21). His very survival was 
emblematic of the shame of inaction and, everything he did afterwards, including writing, 
was seeped in that shame. Bewes writes: “Levi feels his very eloquence to be shameful: an 
emblem of the suffering he did not experience, and of the inaction that ensured his survival, 
as against the action of the worthier man who died—worthier, in some sense, for Levi, 
because he had died” (21). Writing manifests—renders material—Levi’s shame. It did not, 
nor would Levi have wished it to, free him of that shame. Yet many writers (and scholars), 
continue to write as if their capacity to write were something along the lines of “a call to 
witness,” a vocation, in other words, that exempts them from the shame of their capacity to 
write. I myself have, at one time, hoped that this were true. Regarding this, Bewes’ is 
unequivocally critical: “What better means of sublimation than the claim to write ethically, 
for the improvement of the world or in order to draw attention to inequality and injustice” 
(The Event 145). The privileged writer who feels ashamed of that privilege (not all do), does 
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wrong in thinking that writing is a means of escaping that shame. It may appear that Bewes is 
advocating an end to writing or to intellectual pursuits in general. It may also appear that 
Bewes is arguing in favour of unending shame. This is one possibility, but if that is the case, 
it is also possible that such a shame would be less the toxic feeling that inhibits us as 
individuals in our daily lives and more the dynamic structure composed of gaps, inadequacies 
and uncertainties that enliven one’s capacity to engage with the world in a manner Bewes 
called for in his 2005 essay: a mode which would “annul the opposition between self and 
other, which [would] mediate and overcome it" (Bewes, “The Shameful Order” 478).  
 In The Event, Bewes describes two types of shame which, taken together, begin to 
upset the opposition between self and other. The first type of shame is that which maintains a 
subject, the second vacates it:  
On one hand, there is a shame predicated on the category of the ego, a shame that 
preserves its own substance, its self-exemption, precisely to the degree that it is 
able to instantiate itself; on the other hand, there is an illimitable shame that 
includes itself among the categories by which it is ashamed. The singularity of this 
second shame is measured precisely by its inability to instantiate itself. (Bewes, 
The Event 188-189) 
The second shame is preferable to the first. Bewes refuses the notion that shame is a 
subjective feeling or an ethical response to systemic injustice on the grounds that such 
understandings of shame maintain the centrality of the “I” that feels shame. Maintaining the 
“I” replicates the founding myths of all forms of inequality where the subject and object are 
ontologically opposed:  
Shame is not a subjective emotion…[it] has no positive existence or provenance; it 
is not expressible, nor does writing resolve or enable us to 'work through' our 
shame….[this, in contrast] with certain treatments of shame that insist upon its 
subjective quality, for example, in the works of writers such as Giorgio Agamben 
and Emmanuel Lévinas, for whom we are ashamed for what or who we are. 
(Bewes, The Event 23) 
Bewes’ formulation here rejects one we have seen earlier, in the work of Silvan Tomkins, 
Eve Sedgwick and Jean Paul Sartre. Sartre’s formulation, remember, is “I feel shame of 
myself before the other.” In Bewes’ work we see a fully developed distaste for the 
formulation of shame in the subjective, a formulation that upholds the self even as it 
castigates it. "I apologize," that shame seems to say, "for being a self, but I have no plans to 
stop." Self-castigation may hurt, but it leaves the self (and the colonial structure) intact. So 
 159 
does the quest for self-absolution. Shame, in Bewes’ view of it, “is not an ethics predicated 
upon the obligation of the 'self' towards the 'other'; it is an occasion, rather, in which the 
ontological entity of the self may begin to be vacated entirely” (The Event 29). 
 The second shame is the Event of Shame. This shame exists in the gaps, absences and 
silences of prose. It may even exist alongside personal expressions of shame, but should not 
be confused with those. This Event of Shame is an affect, but not in the subjectively felt 
definition of the term. Rather, it is the affect of Deleuze. The purpose of maintaining shame 
as an affect rather than transforming it into an ethics is that to turn it into an ethics, “would be 
to turn it into an abstraction, to remove its corporeal quality, to make it fungible" (Bewes The 
Event 163). Such an abstraction of shame would mean that its subjective articulation—“I feel 
ashamed of my privilege”—could be traded against the myriad ways that the subject has 
benefited from that privilege. The shame, then, that Bewes finds most philosophically and 
aesthetically honest, is that which remains uninstantiated:  
Whereas responsibility or guilt would presuppose an ontology of the subject, 
shame is an experience of the subject's dissolution, of the fundamental complicity 
that, in the modern world, constitutes living…For Deleuze, what is shameful is not 
just the world in which we happen to find ourselves, but the very regime of what 
exists, the logic of ontology and of everything that attends it: expression, identity, 
subjectivity, volition. (28) 
One question we must keep in mind, then, is how Bewes’ own work constitutes an absence or 
a gap—how it, itself, manifests an Event of Shame.  
 Another way of thinking about shame is as a form of thought, or, even, a form of 
writing. Bewes says “understanding shame in structural rather than ethical terms will involve 
suspending the inclination to see shame as a problem requiring a solution, or as implicated in 
a relation of cause and effect," (166). In contrast with other forms of thinking, argues Bewes,  
what is distinctive about shame is its radical discomfort with itself as such; thus, 
the analysis of shame can help us understand the ways in which we are dependent 
on form, or forms, even as those forms restrict and limit our thought. Shame is the 
form in which we most directly encounter the necessity—indeed, the ethical 
necessity—to think in the absence of forms, which is also to think the absence of 
form. …what we have in shame, potentially, is an approach to reading that 
understands that the truth of the text cannot be present in it as a positive entity. The 
text is read, then, not as a vehicle—of thought, of atonement, of ethics—but as an 
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event, neither privileged over nor lessened in significance alongside other events. 
(The Event 46)  
As above, Bewes here seems to be articulating something we have seen throughout this 
dissertation where form—or genre—have themselves become sources of shame. The form 
could be a style of painting—as in How Should a Person Be?—or a form of writing—such as 
the discursive style of academia. Whatever it is, staying within the limitations the form had 
set became a source of shame and something one ought to transcend. When it comes to 
subjective shame, I read Bewes’ work not as a call to complete silence, nor to silence about 
the shame we may honestly, as individuals, feel. The Event of Shame is uninterested in 
hierarchy: in this way, although it may humble the subject, it does not silence it. 
 This is because the evacuation of the self in writing can only ever be partially 
accomplished. When it is, shame emerges in the form of incommensurability. An important 
nuance to Bewes’ two types of shame can be found in his discussion of work by South 
African Nobel Prize winner, J.M. Coetzee where Bewes says:  
This is not to say that shame in Coetzee’s works is not rooted in ethical horror at, 
say, the political system in which he grew up; nor that the psychodynamics of a 
personal or family history don’t supply a viable narrative of shame to place 
alongside this political or ethical one. It is to say rather that the logic of shame, 
considered as an affect that volatilizes its linguistic and conceptual forms, requires 
that we give up categories predicated upon the centrality and sovereignty of the 
human, in all their explanatory power. Shame is a revulsion from that sovereignty. 
(Bewes, The Event 143) 
What Bewes is proposing, then, is not a regime of absences, nor an abandonment of ethical 
responses or subjective feelings. Those exist. As do, presumably, assessments of injustice 
where guilt plays an important role, such as in trials for crimes against humanity. But the 
question here is how literature and literary criticism can adequately respond to our 
postcolonial world where writers are caught in the following quandary: “How is it possible to 
write conscientiously while also acknowledging the complicity of one’s writing in the 
conditions one hopes to bring to an end?…. How can I justify the supreme presumptuousness 
of writing?" (Coetzee qtd. in Bewes, The Event 139). On the most basic level, these concerns 
are common to many who dedicate their lives to academic study or artistic endeavors. This 
line of thinking asks what purpose study in the humanities or artistic activity has if it isn’t to 
improve the world. Directly following from that question is this one: “Who am I to say I 
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know how the world could be improved?” This is another version of the shame spiral and its 
centrifugal force is, as always, the pronoun “I.”  
 Yet, one continues to write. And what Bewes writes about, always, is how our forms 
of thinking might address the inadequacy of the “I” and the inadequacy of forms of thinking 
that circle around it. In The Event, one of the best examples he provides is his analysis of 
French film director Louis Malle’s L’Inde fantôme, a mini-series created some thirty years 
after Michel Leiris L’Afrique fantôme. Leiris, remember, is the author of Manhood, and the 
model for Bewes opening paragraph. Leiris’s L’Afrique fantôme was written in 1934. Malle’s 
L’Inde fantôme was made in 1969 and registers much of the same disenchantment with film 
that Leiris’ did towards ethnography. In it, Malle comments on his experience of filmmaking 
in India, then in the Seychelles when he was fifteen years younger, then again on the 
discrepancy between the filmmaker’s activities and the film itself :  
Malle's voiceover registers a discrepancy that exists throughout the film between 
words and images, a discrepancy that is alluded to so frequently that, even when it 
is not thematized explicitly, it is part of the fabric of the film. Words, of course, 
are not the only means of noting such discrepancy. One of the principal uses that 
Malle makes of words through all seven episodes is to inform of us their 
inadequacy. (179) 
Discrepancy, then, alternatively manifests the shame of ethnography in a postcolonial world, 
responds to Malle’s shame at wanting to express himself, and responds to Malle’s dismay at 
the ongoing inequality of the world and at his role as subject in it. Inadequacy and 
discrepancy become a poetics, a practice of writing and of criticism. 
 What I have summarized so far in The Event of Postcolonial Shame are the general 
academic arguments of the book. Much more could be said on these lines, of course: the book 
re-reads its writers in provocative ways, but my interest is in the overall challenge posed by 
the concept of shame as event. As an example of academic writing, The Event fulfills the 
expectations of the genre: it makes claims and then proves them. Genre dictates how we 
write, but it can also dictate how we read. In that sense, an academic reading of The Event 
ought to pay closest attention to its lines of argumentation, to its contribution to its field 
(postcolonial studies) or to study of the individual authors mentioned above. Yet, part of 
Bewes’ argument, especially in the chapter on British-Caribbean author Caryl Phillips, 
involves habits of reading. Phillips is the author of Cambridge (1991), Crossing the River 
(1993), Dancing in the Dark (2005) among others, and is typically read by academic critics 
interested the “black ‘diaspora’ in contemporary literature” (Bewes, The Event 49) and hardly 
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at all by mainstream book reviewers. The discrepancies between academic and mainstream 
critical response to Phillips work permit Bewes to use it as a foundation for studying habitual 
modes of reading: 
The wider argument of this chapter and this book, then, involves habits of critical 
reading that seem to have become entrenched in the literary academy, habits that 
presuppose a stable relation between what is present in the text and what is 
extrapolated from it: that is between the aesthetic and the ethical (or political) 
dimensions of literature. (Bewes, The Event 52) 
One way that academic critics have failed Phillips' work is that they have not paid attention to 
the materiality of his writing; on the other hand, critics in the press have, perhaps, laid too 
much emphasis on its aesthetics (Bewes, The Event 53). An implication of Bewes’ challenge 
to read differently might be that literary criticism could expand its scope—applying its modes 
of reading to not just literature but to literary criticism as well. If the overall hope in Bewes’ 
work is that a postcolonial writing might emerge, one where categories such as self and other, 
ethics and aesthetics, form and content, might cease to be thought of as ontologically distinct, 
it seems reasonable to add to the list of binaries that stand to be overcome, those of the 
literary and the non-literary or literature and its criticism. Reading academic work with an 
eye for what in the work exceeds or transcends the limitations of that genre might be one way 
to chip away at the very idea of genre. What exists beyond the assertiveness of the academic 
voice? The autobiographical opening of the text is merely The Event’s first gesture towards 
undermining the apparent authority of academic writing. Now I would like to look for where 
else this occurs, studying The Event of Postcolonial Shame as an Event in and of itself. The 
purpose here is not to insinuate myself as an objective, academic reader of The Event, but 
rather to read alongside it, past the lines of argumentation and into the words, sentences, and 
affect of the prose: the materiality, in other words, of the text. 
 In such a reading, it is hard to overlook the admiration that permeates Bewes’ 
discussion of J.M. Coetzee, nor of the generosity that slips into his discussion of Caryl 
Phillips. Academics have emphasized the postcolonial themes, images, problematics of 
Phillips’s work while ignoring what “critics and reviewers in the press…[have called] the 
‘irritations’ and ‘frustrations’” of his prose (Bewes, The Event 53). Bewes seems interested in 
treating what he calls “the difficulties and infelicities of the work,” with a more generous 
spirit. He argues that:  
Questions of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ in respect of such a piece of writing are 
invidious. It is tempting to surmise that Phillips has sought out the very subject 
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matter that was guaranteed to produce a shamed sense of the ethical deficit of 
literature; that the real subject of Phillips’s work is the inadequacy of his own 
writing; that the greater the dissonance between words and experience, the sharper 
the sense of shame, and the more closely the form of the work approaches its 
ethical substance. (Bewes, The Event 55) 
In this passage, Bewes is reading alongside Phillips rather than evaluating from an 
authoritative position wherein questions of success or failure would be paramount. It suggests 
a kind of patience and it believes in Phillips’ intentions: that whatever is infelicitous about the 
prose is something Phillips chose. Yet even within this generosity, there is an honesty. Bewes 
doesn’t rescue Phillips: there are no claims that Phillips’ prose is anything other than lifeless, 
say, or flat. Reading a text for what is there rather than what it ought or ought not to have 
been requires a kind of attentiveness that steps outside the self. Attending to what has been 
left unsaid takes this practice one step further. I have not, for example, managed to achieve 
such a thing in my evaluation of Sheila Heti's work nor of Kate Zambreno's, though I leave 
my failures there as failures because they illustrate something, or so I hope.  
 In a later chapter on Coetzee, much about the writing suggests that Coetzee is the 
writer with whom Bewes most identifies. Sometimes this identification comes in the form of 
a layering of voices, where Coetzee is made to voice an anguish we might otherwise say 
belonged to Bewes, or where one of Coetzee’s characters appears to speak for both of them. 
Sometimes this identification comes in the form of admiration: “Works that lack such self-
interrogation, after all, are easily found, works in which people with varying degrees of 
cultural and economic power ‘have their say’; but they tend not to involve the participation of 
figures with scruples such as Coetzee’s " (Bewes, The Event 142). Bewes admires not only 
Coetzee's self-interrogation but also a unique kind of integrity: Coetzee doesn't see self-
interrogation as an ethical, moral, or psychological end to the shame of his privilege. Shame 
does not end. Coetzee never suggests it will, nor that it ought to. If it did, our connections and 
commitments to community would end as well. Shame keeps us cemented in community, 
even if it feels, at times, intensely isolating (Bewes, The Event 21). The cement is 
identification. This means that the identification that registers in Bewes' readings of Phillips 
and Coetzee, readings imbued with attentiveness, generosity and admiration, puts Bewes in 
community with them: as a critical ally, rather than as a critical adversary. A further thing 
they might share, however, would be shame at this alliance.  
 This identification appears most strongly in Bewes’ discussion of Coetzee’s The 
Master of St. Petersburg, through a layering of voices. Bewes cites Coetzee who writes from 
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the perspective of Dostoyevsky. Of course, citations and summaries are the bread and butter 
of literary academic writing, but Bewes' use of these techniques goes far beyond the standard 
need to substantiate ones claims through citation. In one scene from the novel, for example, 
Dostoyevsky encounters his landlord’s young daughter who brings him tea, then flees: 
[Fyodor] is aware, even as it unfolds, that this is a passage he will not forget and 
may even one day rework into his writing. A certain shame passes over him, but it 
is superficial and transitory. First in his writing and now in his life, shame seems 
to have lost its power, its place taken by a blank and amoral passivity that shrinks 
from no extreme. It is as if, out of the corner of an eye, he can see clouds 
advancing on him with terrific speed, stormclouds. (Coetzee qtd. by Bewes, The 
Event 144) 
The advancing storm clouds are two things: Dostoyevsky’s epileptic fits, but also his next 
novel. "There is nothing mystical about this anticipation; it refers simply to the work's 
projected existence in the mind of the author, affecting his perception before any artistic 
transfiguration has taken place" (Bewes, The Event 145). Writing is like epilepsy for 
Dostoyevsky, "the burden he carries with him in the world" (Coetzee qtd. in Bewes, The 
Event 144). Dostoyevsky is portrayed as having resigned himself to this, just as he is resigned 
to the “superficial and transitory” shame. It is as though writing has taken shame from him, 
not in the sense that it has relieved him of it, it has robbed him of it. What is left is a blank 
and amoral passivity: a capacity to observe, describe, cannibalize, without any of this activity 
leaving its shaming mark on Dostoyevsky. A life without shame, in this sense, seems to be a 
life that lacks vitality, will, even agency. It lacks something mystical. The only agency that is 
left is the capacity to write: a blighted kind of agency, given that writing hardly does anything 
at all. But where is Bewes in this? On what grounds do these observations about shame and 
writing apply to him, as I have suggested? Generosity and attentiveness are not enough. 
  At some point, Bewes use of summary and citations become so insistent and resonate 
so clearly from paragraph to paragraph and chapter to chapter that their insistence takes on a 
life of their own. Oftentimes, Bewes makes his strongest points through the (seemingly) 
rhetorical question. At these times, it becomes hard to distinguish which questions are whose: 
is Bewes speaking for Coetzee, or Bewes speaking for Bewes? It is also difficult to know to 
whom the questions are addressed: are they questions for Coetzee? Or for the reader? These 
ambiguities are not accidental. In the following citation, I quote such a series of questions. In 
the rhetoric of the argument, the questions are summaries or extrapolations following a 
passage from The Master of Petersburg that dramatized Dostoyevsky’s anguish about the 
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shame of writing. The quote ended “A life without honor; treachery without limit; confession 
without end" (Coetzee qtd. in Bewes 145). Then Bewes begins:  
‘If I can find a way’: what is meant is a way, or a form, that will not levy too 
much shame; that will enable the fact of the ‘selling’ to be hidden from the seller, 
if only momentarily, and from the buyer. What better means of sublimation than 
the claim to write ethically, for the improvement of the world or in order to draw 
attention to inequality and injustice? And if that claim becomes corroded by too 
overt an appearance in the work, how about the claim to be writing the very lack 
of ethical substance, the shame of writing, into writing? Each time the shame 
returns, greater than before. Is there any truth to writing?(145) 
Whose anguish is this? Might this anguish be the Event of The Event? Might it sit between 
Bewes and Coetzee, Coetzee and Dostoyevsky, or between any writer who ever wanted to 
write something true and any reader who ever read in search of it? And what of the clause 
"How about the claim to be writing the very lack of ethical substance, the shame of writing, 
into writing?" This, of course, is the project of The Event of Postcolonial Shame. Shame 
never ends. The questions appeared rhetorical, but Bewes tries to answer them, returning to 
the declarative sentence and with it, the academic’s authority:  
The truth that Coetzee’s Fyodor imagines in his darkest moments is the truth of 
the body, the truth of the epileptic fits, but that truth has no positive content; it is, 
in its negativity, like the truth of writing and shame: ‘They are not visitations. Far 
from it: they are nothing—mouthfuls of his life sucked out of him as if by a 
whirlwind that leaves behind not even a memory of darkness’(69). (Bewes 145-6) 
For Dostoyevsky, the truth of the body, like the truth of writing, comes in visitations, in 
mouthfuls of nothing. For Bewes, the truth of the body, like the truth of writing, registers in 
the inadequacy we saw at the prologue—a body that is losing its shape and colour, eyes that 
are sunken, a coldbloodedness among other amphibious qualities, and finally a lack of 
suitability for intellectual work—a defect of the mind. But these truths as they pertained to 
Dostoyevsky, says Bewes, had "no positive content" (69). And as they pertain to Bewes, their 
truth content seems, equally, illusory: The Event is hardly evidence of a mind ill-suited to 
academic thought. What appeared at the outset as a frank autobiographical statement is losing 
its hold on truth. The writer’s authority is being overturned even as it is being asserted.  
 What is at work in such paradoxes is a principle Bewes refers to frequently in his 
work: a principle of reversal. In the conclusion to the 2004 article, the principle of reversal 
becomes something of an ethics:  
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Insofar as it tends towards abjection or self-loathing, autobiographical writing 
implies the reification of self and other, a reversion from the fundamental 
interrelatedness of human existence, and an unwillingness to take on board 
the alienating effects of colonialism and capitalism on the very conception of 
the self….If autobiography is to be a force for the betterment of the world, it 
must proceed on the basis of the reversible nature of the relation between self 
and other, and eventually to the elaboration of the self as other. (Bewes, “The 
Shameful Order” 480) 
In his 2002 study Reification, Or the Anxiety of Late Capitalism, Bewes defines reification as 
the process by which “the world as we encounter it, including our selves and the products of 
our labour, is transformed into a series of objects that are removed from us, and towards 
which we may feel a sense of reverence, or loss, or revulsion" (Bewes, Reification xi). 
Reification separates us from the real, from truth. A reified self is, therefore, not a real self; it 
is a self shorn of complexity and contradiction. It is a self that could be commodified or 
objectified, a self that could be subjected to racism or sexism. We don’t always feel the same 
way about the reified object: it can repulse us, but it can also enchant us. What we do always 
feel about the process of reification is anxiety. Just as the process of reification is supremely 
flexible, so to is the process of identification that creates the conditions for shame (but also 
love, community, recognition). Both concepts share an essential reversibility. If 
autobiography stands a chance of bettering the world, it will invite an “elaboration of the self 
as other.” If the opening passage permits a mode of reading The Event as an autobiography of 
Timothy Bewes, perhaps we are witnessing the elaboration of self as other throughout the 
work: where Bewes’s shame is Dostoyevesky’s shame, where Phillips’ ventriloquism is 
Bewes.’  
 One of the motors for making such reversals possible is the figure of the paradox and 
it is a persistent feature of Bewes’ prose. This appears on the level of the sentence, across 
paragraphs, and, as I have already suggested, throughout Bewes collection of work. A typical 
Bewes’ sentence begins strongly in one direction and then tacks, tacks and tacks again. He 
asks, in his chapter on Coetzee: 
How is it possible to talk, or to write critically, about a shame that is 
indescribable, unconceptualizable, and unnameable? Paradoxically, one place in 
which such a shame may be discerned is a text in which Coetzee writes about 
shame more directly and explicitly than anywhere else…(Bewes, The Event 146) 
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Bewes employs paradox and reversibility as literary figures but also as forms of thinking, 
forms whose key feature is that they seem to gesture towards the disintegration of all forms 
of thinking, paradox and reversibility included. In Reification, much of his argumentation 
depends upon such forms of thought:  
Reversibility implies a certain underlying assumption: that there is an other to 
language, something completely outside the text and inarticulable by it; that the 
text is as nothing, merely thinglike, in relation to this outside; and that to speak in 
the name of this inarticulable otherness is necessarily to elaborate, or simply to 
presuppose the contradictory aspect of everything that constitutes the here and 
now. (Bewes, Reification 202-203) 
Such examples illustrate not only a stylistic tic or a habitual form of thought, but also the 
importance of reversibility to the arguments, both in the work on reification, and in the work 
on shame. In a chapter called “On Reversibility,” Bewes shows how total reification is 
ultimately its complete absence “‘Religion’ implies freedom from all reification—including, 
in the final analysis, from religion” (Bewes, Reification 202). Circularity, paradox, 
reversibility: these styles of thinking and writing seem to be contemporary registers of both a 
poetic intelligence and an ethics of writing that might be described as a desire to reverse 
traditional claims that writing has made: that the world is knowable, that the self is 
representable, that writing must mean one thing for sure if it is to mean anything at all. 
Maggie Nelson, in Bluets says “I am trying to talk about what blue means, or what it means 
to me, apart from meaning" (16).  
 All of these elements serve to undermine the assertive/ omniscient voice that is 
academic writing. And, all of these elements posit a certain unknowability about the world. 
The predominance of this unknowability in contemporary criticism and literature can be 
found even in the terms that have expressed it, terms that speak either to barriers to human 
expression—ineffability, inutterability, ambiguity—or barriers to human perception—
incomprehension, incommensurability, undecidability, inadequacy. Reification reads, in 
many ways, as a study of these figures. Bewes notes, for example, the tendency towards 
paradox in Derrida’s writing: 
Derrida’s writing is characterized by the proliferation of mechanisms intended to 
insulate his work from violent misreading and from ‘metaphysical’ 
interpretations. The textual richness of Derrida’s writing, the words preserved 
‘under erasure,’ the endlessly paradoxical statements which simultaneously affirm 
and deny the possibility of eluding ‘metaphysical discourse,’ reinscribe the 
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concept as central to his work, at the very point of its exclusion and denial. 
(Bewes, Reification 115) 
Of course, one pleasure of reading such a sentence is the way Bewes’ uses a Derridean 
technique—paradox—against him, arguing that his anxiety about metaphysical 
interpretations made such interpretations all the more inevitable. A further pleasure is that 
Bewes’ observations about Derrida’s circularity open up a possible reading of his own. 
 The first time I finished reading The Event of Postcolonial Shame, I wondered if the 
work wasn’t imbued not only with a shame of privilege but with a shame of metaphysical 
longing. This is most evident in the book’s final chapter, entitled “Shame and Subtraction: 
Towards Postcolonial Writing.” I was reminded of Canadian poet and philosopher Jan 
Zwicky’s question in Lyric Philosophy 
Why are we academics so embarrassed when people earnestly assert that 
philosophy addresses eternal questions—the nature of goodness, beauty, truth, 
being, death, ‘the meaning of life’? Do we think such questions don’t exist? Have 
been solved? (36)9 
Indeed, in an earlier article, Bewes names the tendency to avoid asking such questions the 
“Metaphysical taboo” and, there, remarks upon the tendency of literary criticism to avoid 
transcendental interpretations of Flannery O’Conner’s body of work. He asks: 
To what extent has a ‘transcendental’ model of reading—that is to say, an 
approach to the text as a vehicle, a transmitter of truths that exist outside it—been 
replaced in the course of the twentieth century by materialist or ‘historical’ models 
of criticism in which the text is viewed as a homologue of ideological, nationalist, 
ethnological, or otherwise political interest? Is such a ‘historicizing’ or 
‘sociological’ reading necessarily more truthful—or more productive—than one 
predicated on its ‘transhistorical’ or ‘universal’ meaning? Why read at all, if not to 
discover something that in some sense transcends the text? (Bewes, “What is a 
Literary Landscape?” 64) 
As we saw earlier, a litany of questions reads differently than a series of declarative 
statements, creating an affective charge that suggests personal attachment rather than a purely 
                                                
9 Two of Jan Zwicky’s books of philosophy—Wisdom & Metaphor and Lyric Philosophy—insist 
upon the importance of space in their very presentation. Left hand pages feature often aphoristic 
observations written by Zwicky while the right hand pages cite thinkers whose thought compliments, 
contradicts or informs the aphorism. Both books lack the typical connective tissue of academic 
argumentation, relying on what Zwicky would call resonance, instead. 
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academic curiosity has motivated the work. Reading these questions in the context of The 
Event, however, one would think that he had changed positions because there he calls for 
what seems to be a different mode of reading: “The text is read, then, not as a vehicle—of 
thought, of atonement, of ethics—but as an event, neither privileged over nor lessened in 
significance alongside other events" (The Event 46). While the structure of that sentence 
suggests a reversal where the terms “vehicle” and “event” would describe antithetical modes 
of reading (a conclusion facilitated by Bewes’ style which creates the expectation of reversal 
at every turn), the terms are actually nearly synonymous. In the citation from the article, the 
clause “a transmitter of truths that exist outside it,” clarifies what Bewes means by the word 
“vehicle.” In citation from the book, the realm of vehicle has been tamped down to that “of 
thought, of atonement, of ethics,” truths, in other words, that one could nevertheless 
articulate. Event is different from vehicle because it really does exceed language and form. 
And, unlike vehicle, which might offer a too tidy summary of a text’s purpose or meaning, 
event is not interested in summary. Event lacks the authority of vehicle; this is its highest 
virtue. When Bewes’ asks “Why read at all, if not to discover something that in some sense 
transcends the text?” perhaps he means something more quotidian than beauty and truth, or 
perhaps he means the beauty and truth of the quotidian. Because Bewes’ conception of the 
Event of Shame exists beyond the realm of the instantiable, it seems to retain the mystery we 
once attached to transcendence. It becomes a mystery in our midst. Something words cannot 
explain, cannot attain to. “The ‘primary characteristic’ of what forces us to think,” said 
Deleuze, “is that ‘it can only be sensed,’ not comprehended" (qtd. in Bewes, The Event 171). 
  
 If perception and existing concepts do not provide a foundation for thought but 
impede it, what does this mean for writing? What can writing do to escape perception and the 
pre-existing concepts that often inform it through the expectations of genre, for example? 
One of the questions at the core of The Event is what kind of self is a writer. It shouldn’t be 
surprising that, in light of the link Bewes makes between privilege and the capacity to write, 
he is not all that drawn to conceptions of the writer that are framed in terms such as “genius,” 
“inspiration,” “expression,” or “bearing witness,”—all notions that Primo Levi and J.M. 
Coetzee found repugnant. The benign authority such terms imply are precisely what Deleuze 
wanted to overthrow when he “replace[d] the term philosophy with ‘misosophy,’ suggesting 
that violence, trespass, enmity, and necessity are all elements of thought" (Bewes, The Event 
171). Shame is implicated in figures of benign authority, no matter who adopts them. It isn’t 
that women such as Kate Zambreno are also privileged and ought also to feel shame for that 
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privilege (much as this might be true), it is that the very positioning of subject-object, or 
identity vs. difference, or even critic vs. writer or writer vs. reader is a structure that Deleuze 
would obliterate altogether.  
 All these terms—lack, subtraction, ‘no positive content’—suggest that there is no 
purpose in writing, but there is. It is hinted at in Wittgenstein’s famous advice: “only [if] you 
do not try to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be—
unutterably—contained in what has been uttered!” (qtd. by Zwicky 371). The image is 
structural where what can be uttered creates a space for what cannot. Only in that space can 
ideas or affects or events resonate. Or Zwicky: “What one needs then is not words that 
pretend they are doing justice. One needs words that convey an awareness of their own 
inadequacy," (Lyric Philosophy 531). There is a difference between knowing that there is 
something that remains ineffable (an unnameable wrong, for example), to which, or about 
which, we are unable to speak, and not knowing at all. Both amount to silence on the subject, 
but they are silences of a different order. 
 If Bewes’ shame were perfectly aligned with these other forms of the 
incommensurable or ineffable, on what grounds would it merit the name shame? Even though 
Bewes argues convincingly that the event of shame is neither an ethical response nor a 
subjective emotion, it seems that, in some ways, it depends upon the ethical demands and 
subjective feeling in order for it to be read as such. In the books Bewes studies, the historical 
and structural environs of the works are undeniably imbued with a feeling of shame and an 
injustice that calls for an ethical response. While the writers do not pursue the path of 
articulation which might lead to novels where the characters or narrative arc were puppets of 
some greater "lesson," nor a shame-drenched aesthetic where the novel felt like shame, it 
seems that, all the same, Bewes' form of shame depends upon contexts where the ethical and 
affective world surrounding the book's production imbue them with shame. Of course, 
capitalism alone provides such contexts on a daily basis.  
 Though the attributes he gives to shame-as-event echo the kind of non-subjective 
shimmer, movements, and swells of affect (rather than the heartache, rage, or boredom of 
emotion), shame, itself, as a word, retains its former connotations. What distinguishes Bewes’ 
shame-as-event from Wittgenstein’s ineffability and Bergson’s pure perception, is that 
Bewes’ shame retains traces of toxicity. In other words, it remains tied to subjectivity.  
Deleuze poses the following question: ‘How can we rid ourselves [nous défaire] 
of ourselves and demolish [défaire] ourselves?’ The question is irresolvable, as 
Deleuze realizes, for how is it possible to demolish oneself, or even disparage 
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oneself, without thereby positing, asserting oneself? The question makes less 
sense as an aesthetic or ethical project, therefore, than as a principle of thought. 
However, to name or conceive of this principle as ‘shame’ would interrupt the 
operation by subjectivizing it; consequently…Deleuze does not use the word at 
all. (Bewes 173, English Italics mine) 
But Bewes does use it. While ineffability and pure perception are useful principles of 
thought, they cannot be used as a basis for an ethics or politics of writing. This is what 
explains the prescriptive tone that concludes this work and emerges in some of his earlier 
work: it is the hope for a transcendental writing whose commitment to the political can 
emerge as much from its awareness of its own shame as it does from its incapacity to ever 
fully express it.  
 As a point of comparison, consider Brian Massumi’s justification for the use and 
misuse of scientific concepts by writers in the humanities. He says, “When you uproot a 
concept from its network of systemic connections with other concepts, you still have its 
connectibility. You have a systemic conductibility without the system. In other words, the 
concept carries a certain residue of activity from its former role….When you poach a 
[psychological or moral] concept, it carries with it [psychological or moral] affects." (20) In 
their new context, those affects must be negotiated with. They may, as with the scientific 
concepts Massumi is speaking about, be misused, but their misuse will be more effective if 
the writer knows how and in what ways the concept is being misused. This isn’t a warning: it 
is an encouragement. The affective and ethical pull of a concept like shame is enormous.  
Its ethical and psychological ancestry persists throughout The Event, in the tone of 
Bewes’ writing and in the ethical weight of his argument. When Bewes’ talks about 
Coetzee’s scruples, it would require a wilful misreading of the word scruples to read it as 
anything other than approbation along highly ethical lines. Those sentences know a thing or 
two about being good. Without the subject, shame would cease to be shame. Nevertheless, 
the subjective shame should not dominate but, rather, sit alongside, shame-as-event:  
The subject is not a centre of ‘determination’—that is to say, of action or 
perception—but rather of ‘indetermination’: the interruption of action and the 
blockage of perception….Shame would be a quality of any speech or writing in 
which an intimation of this fact—in however tentative a form, and whether 
acknowledged or not—is expressed in subjective terms. (Bewes 174, Italics mine) 
For shame to be shame, it must be tied to the subject, if ever loosely. The terms that describe 
human perception—subtraction, inadequacy, shame—are all connotatively negative, but must 
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that be the case? Mightn’t subtraction, inadequacy, intimation, and even shame, be something 
which tentatively adds to the world? “Deleuze writes, ‘As for our consciousness…it will 
merely be the opacity without which light, ‘pass[ing] on unopposed, would never have been 
revealed’" (qtd. in Bewes 174). The opacity which registers the passing light—blocking it, 
but also, in a sense, rendering it—is also the opacity which will attempt at representing it. 
“The real question of subtraction, says Deleuze, is that of ‘attaining once more the world 
before man, before our own dawn, the position where movement was…under the regime of 
universal variation, and where light, always propagating itself, had no need to be 
revealed,’(qtd. in Bewes, Event 176). The notion of a far-distant or long-lost world where 
light always propagated, is the postcolonial world that The Event hopes for, not the 
postcolonial world we currently live in, where the structures of colonial thought persist 
practically unchanged from the colonial era. It is also the dereified (or totally reified) world 
of Bewes’ earlier book on Reification. In both books, an affect—anxiety or shame—registers 
the impossibility of representation and in both books, truth is what is found in the remaining 
spaces, in the gaps and absences that are free of form. Even more importantly, anxiety and 
shame are affective divining rods that signal a moral, political, spiritual precariousness 
inherent to our present forms of thought. Anxiety and shame both seem, strangely, to be 
contemporary manifestations of hope for a better world. "Better" would be one where the 
ontological distinctions that made colonialism possible--self and other, primitive and 
civilized, this world and other worldly--had been overcome. In a longer argument where 
Bewes claims that anxiety “is the prevailing form of the manifestation of god,” he says that, 
"anxiety arises when there is a disjunction between the actuality of truth and the forms in 
which it resides—when those forms appear inadequate or too rigid. Hence the object of 
anxiety is always a nothing—a gap, a space, an absence" (Reification 247). The inadequacy 
of form is the inflexibility of form. In The Event, "Shame is the form in which we most 
directly encounter the necessity—indeed, the ethical necessity—to think in the absence of 
forms, which is also to think the absence of form" (46). By way of concluding, I wonder if 
what this similarity speaks to is the possibility that shame, which seems inseparable from 
what it means to be human, might be our most important tool for overcoming the distinction 
between self and other because it is an affect as powerful as the moment of revolution or, 
even, as a God. "God," says Bewes, is "the prevailing signifier of spiritual truth, is produced 
by human beings; he is therefore as real as human beings themselves, and the hinge between 
our universality and our particularity." (Reification 246).  
 Bewes concludes The event by saying that  
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If a truly postcolonial writing is to evolve, a writing unburdened by the shame of 
its partiality and inadequacy…it will take the form of a machinic writing…Such a 
writing is crystallized whenever an instance or a detail of the work cannot be 
explained in terms of the apprehension of an object by a perceiving, writing 
subject; or whenever the opacity of an anchored consciousness is felt, within the 
work, as the condition of its truth. (192)  
One form of the anchored consciousness might, then, be the situated human, the one ashamed 
enough to know his perspective is limited, subtractive, partial. In other words, perhaps one 
example of that “opaque anchored consciousness” is played out in this book in the figure of 
Timothy Bewes.  
 The autobiographical opening passage, whose tone initially read much like other self-
strafing, self-conscious memoirs of which Bewes was so critical can now be read as a signal 
of his own subtractive consciousness. The truly postcolonial writing is not one that is free of 
shame but rather one that is “unburdened” by it. Shame cannot end. The opening passage 
speaks of true facts about Bewes’ biography—born in England, living in America, the 
grandson of a missionary in Kenya. All of these elements are instrumental to the grounding 
of a subjective shame, one that has identified and been identified with the inequalities that led 
to colonialism and, further, to ongoing inequalities in our present day. Yet, if the self can be 
strange to itself, or opaque to itself, and this much seems easy to accept after a century of 
Freud (even if his model of unknowingness is not what I mean, exactly), then isn’t this one 
way in which the reversibility of self and other might be possible even within the 
autobiographical form? What Bewes has done in The Event is declare that human 
consciousness is at once subtractive, limited, positioned and, that this limitedness is what 
renders the unlimited so visible. This is what makes The Event a surprisingly hopeful work: it 
not only calls for a postcolonial writing, it also begins to write it. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 In the introduction I proposed that shame could be thought of as a pharmakon. I meant it 
in the sense that Spivak refers to when she describes a pharmakon as a “poison that is medicinal 
when knowingly administered” (84). It can harm, but it can also heal. I went on to suggest that 
autobiography, especially in the ever-changing forms we have seen in this dissertation, might also 
be a pharmakon. In his essay, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Derrida says that, 
Operating through seduction, the pharmakon makes one stray from one’s general, 
natural, habitual paths and laws…The leaves of writing act as a pharmakon to push or 
attract out of the city the one who never wanted to get out, not even at the end, to 
escape the hemlock. They take him out of himself and draw him onto a path that is 
properly an exodus. (Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy” 429-430) 
Who doesn’t become, ever so slightly, someone else when they find themselves transplanted to a 
new land? Our name may not change entirely, but we introduce ourselves with an accent—we 
make ourselves strange to ourselves so that we might be more familiar to someone new. In Silvan 
Tomkins’ description of the affect, anything strange or unfamiliar can produce shame (Sedgwick 
Touching Feeling 97). Our name, in the mouths of foreigners, is mispronounced, but yet we see it 
as ours, we see that they are calling out to us. Shame is the affect of having been taken out of 
ourselves; we become strangers to ourselves, and it is precisely this that happens when we 
witness ourselves written on the page. “Writing is one of the major ways in which we place 
ourselves before the other, or (which amounts to the same thing) represent others to ourselves—
or, indeed, ourselves to ourselves” (Bewes, The Event 60). The pharmakon—poison, remedy, the 
thing that takes us out of ourselves—can be writing, and it can be shame. It can be the clay pot 
that delivers the drug, or it can be the drug itself. It can be a form, then, or it can be content.  
 
 When an interviewer asked about her writing process, Anne Carson quoted John Cage: “I 
wanted to get every Me out of the way in order to start doing whatever the work will be.”  
“But your ‘Me’ is the best part,” responded the interviewer.  
“Still,” said Anne Carson, “I’d like to be free of her.”  
 175 
“Wouldn’t we all,” sighed the interviewer, then asked, “How do you do it? Do you use the 
Greeks?”  
“Sure,” said Anne Carson, “But it could just as easily be a pencil.”  
Anne Carson then held up a pencil, and the interviewer saw what she meant: contemplate 
anything intensely enough and you forget about your “Me” for a while.1  
  
 To a greater or lesser extent, all of the autobiographies this dissertation has studied have 
done their best to take the “Me” out. Their contemplated objects have been things they have 
lost—a brother, a lover—and things they have loved—the colour blue, the mad wives of the 
modernists, the subtlety of night. They have stood before paintings and been drawn in by a line 
that “sort of whorls in on itself,”(Heti 294) or the apparent weightlessness of a body (Lerner 8). 
They have done drugs, sought help, given in to the pleasures of the body even if it meant 
reigniting the pains of the heart. They have looked for meaning, and wondered if they had the 
right. They have been privileged, and they have called their privilege unearned. They have felt 
powerless and empowered.  
 
 What does writing do, they have asked, as they contemplated the blush of death and the 
sounds of their words translated into a foreign tongue. What does writing do to shame in the age 
of The United States of Bush? Does writing free us of shame, or does it manifest it? Does it rob 
us of shame, or does it give it back?   
 
 Contemplate anything intensely enough and you forget about your “Me” for a while. 
Until, that is, you are caught contemplating. Caught, for instance, by the sound of footsteps 
approaching or by the slightest quiver in the brush. “Behold! I am somebody!” says Sartre in this 
vulnerable moment and suddenly he feels pride, shame, recognition or something else. We have 
fallen into the world. We have been seen. 
  
 This study began with a reflection on the way the binary relation of self and other 
replicated itself in any system defined by a power imbalance. It is there in sexism, colonialism, 
self-strafing autobiography and in the critical enterprise in general. The implied antagonism of 
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the self-other binary suggests a contest that only ever concludes with a winner and a loser. 
Sartre’s study of shame, however, suggested that the self-other binary was dependent on a third 
element: perception. Furthermore, he noted something else: that the “self” was hardly so 
impregnable and certainly not a coherent whole. Tomkins couldn’t have agreed more. Sartre’s 
structure of shame: “I am ashamed of myself before the other” says as much. Perception may lead 
to a binary structure of self and other, but this happens internally as often as it does in the world. 
In other words, perception fractures the binary by multiplying it. Perception is kaleidoscopic.  
 
 In his observations about the tendency for contemporary writers to express their shame of 
privilege through the self strafing memoir, literary critic Timothy Bewes wrote: “If 
autobiography is to be a force for the betterment of the world, it must proceed on the basis of the 
reversible nature of the relation between self and other, and eventually to the elaboration of the 
self as other.” (“The Shameful Order” 480) Did he mean we must invent new selves? Did he 
mean we had to take the “Me” out, replacing it with a pencil, or blue, or night?  
 
 Let us trace the presence of the pharmakon in this dissertation. In the first chapter, shame 
was the pharmakon that hurt; writing was the pharmakon that healed. Society administered the 
former; the lone writer administered the latter. Shame’s toxicity was destructive. It led to mental 
illness and for both Cvetkovich and Zambreno, writing, rather than medication, provided the 
authors with a form of healing. Writing also generated alliances with others so that a community 
sprung up around Kate Zambreno’s blog, Frances Farmer is my Sister, and Cvetkovich hoped 
that her depression journals would do the same for those who were similarly afflicted: the 
graduate students and adjunct professors, the precarious classes of academe. Writing gave voice 
to the particular shames of minoritarian cultures—of women writers whose work was overlooked 
and of those who identified (or wrote) as queer. Both Zambreno and Cvetkovich described their 
writing as political not only because it spoke out against the systems that were harmful—a 
patriarchal literary establishment, or the everyday pressure of racism and capitalism—but also 
because they wrote in forms that defied the strictures of those systems. Zambreno’s writing was 
defiantly hysterical; Cvetkovich’s risked writing an account of depression that was dull and 
deadened, the way depression can so often be. Both wrote out of the desire to normalize what had 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 I have only slightly dramatized the conversation that took place when Eleanor Wachtel interviewed Anne 
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been pathologized. It was what made Ann Cvetkovich describe her melancholy as political 
depression and it was what made Kate Zambreno describe her invalidation in the same terms she 
used to describe a century-old misogyny. They wrote criticism with the self left in (Zambreno 
281). Leaving the self in was an antidote to the way society would shame them and to the 
discursive, objective forms of writing society demanded of them; it was an antidote that was both 
self-administered and freely shared: the memoir made it available for anyone who was similarly 
afflicted. Shame was the pharmakon that hurt; writing was pharmakon that healed. 
 In the second chapter, shame starts to transform. Instead of being defined, as it was in the 
first chapter, as the result of external dictates about how one ought to be, in the second chapter, 
shame starts to move inward to the personal desires and ambitions of the semi-fictional characters 
and the authors who write them. Autobiography transforms from being a genre tied to an 
authentic voice to something looser—more inventive, sometimes even fictional. For the 
characters, shame comes from the failure of art to be meaningful, beautiful, or political. For the 
writers, shame comes from the form of realist novel, a form that both Sheila Heti and Ben Lerner 
sought to undermine. These are not the ideals and aspirations of contemporary society; they are 
much more idiosyncratic, much more local, and the associated shame is as well. When thought of 
as a pharmakon, shame’s toxicity starts to become reparative. Writing as a pharmakon shifts as 
well; in How Should a Person Be? Sheila nearly destroys her relationship with her best friend 
through writing. It is only her shame at being so selfish that rescues their friendship. Adam’s 
shame at being a poet in Leaving the Atocha Station is what finally urges him to overcome it and 
his shame at being an American is what keeps him tied to a darkness he cannot flee.  
 In the third chapter, Saint Medina cuts her eyes out for shame at her own lust but Maggie 
Nelson insists upon looking. Unrequited love, depression, and the solace that comes from caring 
for another provide the barest narrative structure to a lyric essay whose pursuits are wildly 
disparate but always united by the love of blue. Blue is the pharmakon here: it is what dizzies and 
inspires, what disappoints and what shames. Blue makes writing possible. “I am writing all this 
down in blue ink, so as to remember that all words, not just some, are written in water,” says 
Nelson, evoking Plato’s Phaedrus and its debates about the permanence or impermanence, the 
danger or impotence, of writing (92). We don’t need to ingest the pharmakon for it to have its 
way with us: it is enough for us to see it for us to fall under its spell. Nelson’s speaker is Nelson 
                                                                                                                                                        
Carson for Brick Magazine in the Summer of 2012. 
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herself, and this is autobiography, but you’d hardly know it from the form. The two-hundred and 
forty propositions that make up her lyric essay drag us out into the streets and leave us weeping 
before a pile of ultramarine blue for reasons we could never even fathom. The “Me” of the 
writing is there in every sentence, but somehow totally absent as well. When blue makes Nelson 
a fool and a philosopher, it makes one of her reader as well. Nelson offers her readers a taste of 
her pharmakon, and we willingly accept. 
 Melancholy or depression has been a recurring mood in all of the chapters until the fourth 
where its absence is a surprise. Anne Carson’s Nox takes the “Me” out, and with it, the sentiment. 
Gone too is almost all trace of narrative. In the absence of a feeling subject and a fulsome 
narrative, shame registers as a form more than a feeling; as an affect more than an emotion. In the 
language of the pharmakon, shame is more clay pot than it is noxious substance. The form of 
shame is one defined by absence. Carson knows that autobiography can betray and she knows 
that “It’s hard to keep the dignity of the [elegized] subject without getting your own fingerprints 
all over it” (Interview with Wachtel). Her fingerprints are there, in her gnomic style, her 
trademark translations, her use of tempura paint, and above all in her use of space. Much is left 
unsaid about the brother she once had, but she permits him his stairwells, a dog that loved him, a 
wife with whom he shared a complicated history. That is enough, she seems to say: anything 
more would make the book a betrayal. There is some shame, but not too much: this is a dosage 
that heals rather than harms. 
 In the final chapter, an autobiographical gesture begins a book that argues against such 
gestures on the grounds that they manifest the shame of privilege rather than absolve their authors 
of it. Timothy Bewes’ The Event of Postcolonial Shame takes the literary figure of the paradox 
and uses it as form of thought. Shame, after all, is a paradox. As a feeling it is what makes us feel 
so alone, but only in the midst of community. As a form, it is an absence rendered visible by the 
presence of something else. Bewes’ autobiographical gesture acknowledges the way that 
autobiography reads as authenticity, confession, and truth but its purpose is paradoxical: the book 
argues against such modes of truth-telling. Bewes’ uses the autobiographical gesture as a starting 
point. As with Nox, it is the clay pot of the pharmakon: shame’s shape, but not shame’s content.  
  
 Shame is the affect that notices the strangeness of everything, including ourselves. 
Writing is what takes us away from familiar streets, and out beyond the city walls. By way of 
concluding, allow me one last anecdote. When Frédéric Sauser left France in 1911 on a steamer 
 179 
bound for New York, he had already written his semi-autobiographical Prose du transsibérien et 
la Petite Jehanne de France, which detailed a transcontinental train trip he never took. On board, 
he had brought with him Baudelaire’s “Mon Coeur mis à nu” and Goethe’s Dichtung und 
Wahrheit, or Poetry and Truth (Sieburth). When, after three weeks on the open sea, the skyline of 
New York finally came into view, Sauser sketched a self-portrait beside which he wrote “Je suis 
l’autre.” From that point on, he called himself Blaise Cendrars. Shame and writing are 
pharmakon. Shame and writing take us out of ourselves, making us Other, which is simply 
another form of ourselves. Shame and writing always threatens to kill us. But they can also 
intoxicate. To hear Plato talk of it, there wasn’t a single pharmakon that Socrates could refuse.  
 
Perhaps it isn’t true that contemplating anything intensely enough will suffice for taking the 
“Me” out. Perhaps it really must be a pencil. Or a book. 
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